Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS)

An Investigation into Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Punjab

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List of Acronyms

ACR = Annual Confidential Report
AEO = Assistant Education Officer
ASER = Annual Status of Education Report
BEd = Bachelors in Education
CM = Chief Minister
CMIT = Chief Minister Inspection Team
CPD = Continuous Professional Development
CRC = Complaint Redressal Cell
CT= Certificate for Teaching
CTSC = Cluster Training and Support Centers
DCO = District Coordination officer
DDEO (F) = Deputy District Education Officer Female
DDEO (M) = Deputy District Education Officer Male
DEO (F) = District Education Officer Female
DEO (M) = District Education Officer Male
DEO = District Education Officer
DMO = District Monitoring Officer
DPC = District Promotion Committee
DPI (E) = Director Public Instructions Elementary
DPI (SE) = Director Public Instructions Secondary Education
DSD = Department of Staff Development
DTE = District Teacher Educator
DTSC = District Teacher Support Center
EDO = Executive District Officer
EMIS = Education Management Information System
ESE = Elementary School Educator
EST = Elementary School Teachers
ITA = Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi
LEAPS = Learning and Educational Attainment in Punjab Schools
MEA = Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants
Med = Masters in Education
MNA = Member of National Assembly
MPA = Member of provincial Assembly
PA = Personal Assistant
PEEDA = Punjab Employees Efficiency and Discipline Act
PER = Performance Evaluation Report
PMIS = Personal Information Management System
PMIU = Punjab Monitoring and Implementation Unit
PST = Primary School Teachers
PTC= Primary Teaching Certificate
RECOUP = Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty
RPM = Raven's Progressive Test
SE = Secretary Education
SESE = Senior Elementary Schools Educators
SSA = Senior Staff Association
SSE = Secondary School Educator
SST = Secondary School Teacher
STR = Student Teacher Ratio

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

List of Boxes

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

List of Tables

Executive Summary

Post-2002, the Government of the Punjab has implemented a number of reforms in the areas of teacher recruitment, retention, deployment and accountability. Research suggests that teacher competencies and pedagogical content knowledge, among other factors, have a significant impact on student learning outcomes. This, in turn, highlights the need to establish a connection between teacher training and recruitment and retention to ensure that (i) competent teachers with the requisite pedagogical skills and content knowledge are able to enter the public education sector, and (ii) existing policies and politics provide them with the motivation to continue working effectively in this sector. This report documents existing trends and outcomes in teacher recruitment, transfers, postings, absenteeism, qualifications and pre- and in-service training, and explores the relationship between major policy changes and these outcomes. Moreover, it investigates the political economy and institutional constraints that undermine the effective implementation of these policies.

Literature from the developing world points to numerous issues that are of importance for effective teacher training, recruitment and management. The broad consensus suggests that teacher competencies, pedagogical content knowledge and qualifications have a significant impact on student learning outcomes. However, minimum qualifications do not necessarily define teachers' competencies: teachers may have the requisite qualifications on paper but not necessarily the competencies or subject knowledge needed to be good teachers. There are many 'unmeasured' teacher characteristics that are equally or more important for student learning, such as the ability to convey ideas in a manner conducive to learning, to create effective learning environments for students of different abilities and to teach creatively.

While it is important to recruit good quality teachers to ensure better learning outcomes, it is also imperative that these teachers are offered conducive working conditions and sufficient incentives to remain effective teachers. Literature suggests that teachers' motivation to work in this field is undermined by numerous factors such as students' lack of commitment, discipline problems, limited teacher input and influence over school policies and lack of support for the teacher (UNESCO, 2006a). Teachers' motivation is also affected by their familiarity with the curriculum and their confidence in their teaching skills. Having a coherent training system for teachers is a key step to developing their skills and helping them deliver good-quality teaching.

The political economy surrounding teacher management and effective deployment also affects recruitment and retention (UNESCO, 2005). While there is an emerging body of literature on

this from other parts of the world, there is a need to further investigate this issue in a Pakistan-specific context.

0.1 Data and Methodology

This report uses a mixed-methods approach to analyse recruitment and post-recruitment departmental policies introduced in the Punjab over the last decade and to investigate the political economy and institutional constraints that undermine the effective implementation of these policies. In order to identify the major policy changes and key gaps in policy implementation, we initially present an in-depth analysis of the policy documents pertaining to recruitment, retention and deployment and highlight the flaws in policy design. We supplement this by a quantitative analysis of the trends in teacher recruitment and deployment and other measures such as transfer rates and promotions at the district level over time, linking these trends with the policy milestones identified. Several data sources have been used for this purpose. These include a school-level survey, the Education Management Information System (EMIS) for 2008–2012, and a teacher-level survey for 2006. Both these surveys were conducted by the Government of the Punjab and cover all public schools in the province. They are supplemented by smaller-scale but rich and unique micro-level data from selected districts (see below).

Once we have illustrated the main issues and policy gaps that adversely affect teacher labour market outcomes (and potentially student learning outcomes), we explore the possible reasons for these failings in policy implementation and design. An ethnographic study of the Education Department is used to tease out the political economy factors that hamper the department's day-to-day workings. The two main research methods used in the ethnographic study are (i) interviews with key stakeholders of the Education Department and (ii) observation of the office environment. At the district level, the Education Department is headed by the Executive District Officer (EDO) (Education) and the District Education Officers (Male and Female). These officials are the main point of contact for teachers and are responsible for handling all teacher-related matters on a daily basis. Each district has a number of offices that house these government officials along with their subordinates, (Deputy District Education Officer (DDEO) and Assistant Education Officer (AEO)). Since these offices are the focal point of the interaction between the teachers and the government, it was important to conduct field visits to these offices and interview these officials for the purposes of our study.

In order to gauge the institutional constraints that affect teacher recruitment, transfers and postings, the last chapter of the report examines the litigation process. It analyses the reasons why teachers and the Education Department alike resort to the courts for complaint redressal. This investigation is done through interviews of key stakeholders, including teachers who have fought cases in the courts, union members, litigation officers and other relevant Department officials. The interviews are supplemented by case studies of five court cases involving teacher transfers, promotions and recruitment. These case studies provide a fair idea of what institutional as well as political economy factors prevent the Education Department from duly performing its duty in terms of teacher recruitment, promotions and transfers.

0.2 Main Findings

0.2.1 Policy and Data Analysis

Policy reforms have ranged in focus from instituting merit-based hiring and improving the recruitment process to implementing new in-service training programmes and monitoring systems to ensure teacher effort to introducing rationalisation policies for effective deployment.

The contract policy of 2002 introduced merit-based hiring and raised the minimum academic qualification requirements for new teachers. Later policy reforms raised the professional qualification requirements for Primary School Teachers (PSTs) and Elementary School Teachers (ESTs) from a Primary Teaching Certificate (PTC) or Certificate for Teaching (CT) to a Bachelor's in Education (B-Ed) degree. In the aftermath of these policy reforms, there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of teachers with a Master's degree or higher and a noteworthy decline in teachers with only a Matriculation certificate over the same period. The proportion of teachers with a PTC or CT has also decreased over time, although a high percent (27.84%) remained in the teaching force in 2012.

A number of interventions in terms of in-service training have also been introduced in the Punjab post-2002. The main intervention has been the introduction of the Continuous Professional Development (CPD) in 2008. The CPD framework incorporates Cluster Training and Support Centres (CTSCs) and District Teacher Support Centres (DTSCs) in a decentralized structure for the provision of training and support for teachers. Further, a comprehensive programme for monitoring teacher performance and attendance was established in 2007, the key components of which include: (i) an annual census, the EMIS and (ii) monthly monitoring visits. A District Monitoring Officer (DMO) supervises the field staff of Monitoring and Evaluation

Assistants (MEAs); the latter are responsible for undertaking regular field visits and collecting data on teacher attendance. Parallel to this, further monitoring is carried out by Assistant Education Officers (AEO) who reports to the EDO.

A well-defined career path can also act as a strong incentive for teachers if their performance is linked with the promotion structure. Prior to 2010, promotion was based on seniority alone and in a number of instances reported, political affiliations were used to obtain promotions. In order to curb this practice, the following conditions were set under the 2010 promotion policy: teachers had to (i) have satisfactorily completed their probation period, (ii) possess the required qualifications and experience, (iii) have completed a minimum period of service, (iv) have a satisfactory Performance Evaluation Report (PER) and (v) have passed the prescribed departmental examinations. The promise of a progressive career track encourages teachers to improve their attendance and performance and fulfil their in-service training requirements. In practice, however, trends in promotion show that teachers' quality is inconsequential in determining promotion. Teachers who passed their highest degree in the third division have had the highest average number of promotions and this is irrespective of the year in which they were recruited (except the 1990s and 2000s). Having passed in the third division usually indicates extremely low examination performance; this does not bode well for the education system, which already lacks a capable and competent workforce. It also implies the role of political affiliations in securing promotions.

Deployment is another key component of effective teacher management. Weaknesses in teacher deployment are manifested in the form of rural-urban disparities, differences in class size (pupil-teacher ratios) and the shortage of teachers in some regions with an excess in others. Moreover, the current recruitment policy (2011) does not address the issue of teachers being allocated to posts far away from their place of residence. This results in teachers obtaining transfers, often through political backing, to schools nearer their place of residence. Such transfers create vacancies in remote areas, leading to high student-teacher ratios (STRs). To counter this issue and limit the number of politically motivated transfers, a new transfer policy was introduced in April 2013: transfers must now be carried out on merit alone and after a teacher has completed three years at his or her current post. Additionally, such transfers will be carried out only against vacant seats. This policy gives head teachers the authority to recommend teachers for transfers based on their performance. Further, to counter teacher shortages and the skewed distribution of teachers and to achieve an STR of 1:40 across all schools, the Government of the Punjab has also introduced teacher rationalisation policies in the past decade.

The data suggest that overall STRs have fallen over time, although they remain high in rural areas and primary schools with some evidence of inter-district variations. This implies the inefficient allocation of teachers with some districts facing severe teacher shortages while others face an excess supply of teachers, especially in primary schools. The extent of multi-grade teaching and the proportion of one-teacher schools across districts – especially in rural areas – further demonstrate weak deployment. This suggests, first, a flaw in the allocation of posts across districts and region on initial recruitment and, second, the failure of the rationalisation policies to adjust teachers across schools to ameliorate the problem of inefficient deployment.

0.2.2. Ethnographic Study

Education policy *outcomes* are highly dependent on the political courses and developments that shape them, i.e. the political economy within which policies are made and implemented (or even blocked and hindered). It is well understood that policymaking of any kind does not occur in a vacuum and educational policymaking is no exception. Whenever there are varied interests, different stakeholders with varying incentives and the potential for pressure groups to exert influence to achieve their desired outcomes, there is potential for a conflict of interest, which creates adverse political economy conditions.

The most important gateways to political and personal influence in the Education Department are the clerks and Personal Assistants (PAs) who work in the EDO's office. Since they liaise between teachers, lower staff and the Education Department officials, they also scrutinise most documentation (including teachers' degrees, records and requests) before it reaches the EDO. This gives them discretionary power in matters of transfers, postings, recruitment and promotions. Another reason for this degree of influence is that the clerks and PAs remain in a certain post for long periods of time while the EDO of that district changes frequently. Hence, the clerks and PAs usually cultivate strong connections in the district's political, departmental and teacher circles – this allows them to use their discretionary power to engage in corrupt practices such as nepotism and red tape. Further, as an integral part of the department, PAs are well versed with each policy procedure and its rules. This knowledge gives them an insight into any weak spots in policy rules and flaws in departmental workings that can be exploited.

The gaps left in policymaking allow clerks to gain this influence. Similarly, key gaps in policy documents also lead to interference by politicians and the manipulation of rules by teachers for their own gains. These gaps arise for three reasons: (i) the stakeholders and officials responsible for policy implementation are not involved in the policymaking process, (ii) real-world

limitations to implementation are not considered at the policy design stage and (iii) frequent policy changes take place without properly evaluating the previous policies.

0.2.3. Court Cases

The political environment in which policies are implemented often leads to discontent among teachers with misgivings about the department. Although there is a set procedure for teachers wishing to have their complaints resolved within the department, this procedure is not always followed due to political and institutional constraints. In such circumstances, teachers seek closure in the courts. At other times, the Education Department may issue inquiries against teachers whom they feel are engaging in unlawful practices detrimental to the department, such as providing fake degrees or bogus transfer/appointment orders or using political affiliations to move ahead on seniority lists for promotions. Even though the myriad of cases that are brought to the courts vary in terms of the issues being addressed and the parties involved, all these cases face similar obstacles in the litigation process. These range from intuitional constraints faced by the department to political economy barriers faced by the teachers.

There are a number of impediments to complaints redressal within the Education Department which force the teachers to take their concerns to the courts. These range from political and financial constraints to teachers' personal traits, i.e. whether they are motivated enough to go through the tedious and physically and mentally strenuous court process. Some teachers refrain from filing petitions in the High Court or Punjab Service Tribunal merely to avoid the inconvenience of attending frequent court hearings and bearing the high costs involved in hiring legal counsel.

The Education Department, in turn, lacks the capacity to handle the burden of court cases that falls on it. Although each district-level department houses its own litigation branch, this unit usually lacks the proper human capital needed to deal with court cases. The litigation officers who staff these units often lack the proper qualifications and have little or no background in law. On occasion, a headmaster or subject specialist may be brought in to fill the post of litigation officer, performing these duties as an additional charge. This lack of adequate human resources prevents cases from being processed swiftly. Moreover, there are no lawyers available to the department and the legal documents for court cases are drawn up by officials who lack the appropriate legal knowledge. These constraints lead to numerous court cases being taken to the courts. The most common types of cases include those relating to teacher transfers, promotions and postings.

0.3 Policy Recommendations

Overall, political interference in the recruitment, retention and deployment processes and design flaws in the policies relating to these processes have been identified as the main reasons for policy failures and the ineffective management of teaching resources. One way of reducing political interference would be to limit the role of clerks and PAs in teacher recruitment and management. Automating the recruitment, transfer and promotion procedures would mean that teachers do not have to go through the department's clerks when submitting any kind of application. This would also help automate the process of generating merit and seniority lists, again reducing human interference. Another way to curb clerks' discretionary power is to transfer them more frequently – their average tenure in a certain area should not be more than five years.

Apart from political interference, a key gap in policy design that needs to be addressed is the lack of a firm policy stance on transfers. Currently, this leads to teachers applying for transfers out of remote areas to big cities and other attractive work environments, resulting in a skewed distribution of teachers. To counter this, school-based hiring should be introduced with limited transfer possibilities.

Another general concern observed in all facets of teacher management is the transient nature of policies and short-notice changes in rules and regulations. For instance, transfers are often banned in an ad hoc manner and without prior notice. To avoid this, a systematic procedure should be followed before any change in policy or ban is introduced whereby all concerned parties and stakeholders are consulted before the policy is formed.

Government officials often lack a proper understanding of the policies that are in place. The officials responsible for implementing policies should be trained in and briefed on what the policy entails and how exactly it is to be implemented. This would make the implementation process more efficient and reduce its susceptibility to political pressure.

1. Literature Review and Data Analysis

1.1 Literature Review

Understanding how teachers are recruited, managed and held accountable for their performance sheds light on the quality of the teaching force and the consequent quality of the students an education system is likely to produce. Improving the equity, efficiency and effectiveness of the education system necessitates ensuring that competent individuals not only enter the teaching profession but are also provided sufficient support and motivation during their careers.

1.1.1 Literature on recruitment

One of the main aims of a well-functioning education system is to recruit 'effective' teachers. Increasingly, policy-makers are using student outcomes – often measured through standardised tests – as indicators of a teacher's effectiveness. It is well known that policymakers have tended to base recruitment decisions on the most measurable indicators of what is believed to encompass 'teacher quality' – usually academic qualifications, experience and training. This is despite the fact that the international literature quite strongly indicates that formal qualifications and measurable résumé characteristics seldom predict their effectiveness in improving student learning. For instance, a longitudinal study using US data by Goldhaber (1999) finds that only 3% of teacher contribution to student outcomes is related to factors such as experience and educational degree, leaving 97% of the differences in student achievement unexplained.

This is also the broad consensus of research from South Asia, where recent studies have found that that the standard observable résumé characteristics of teachers do not matter significantly to pupil achievement. Ironically, they are the very factors on which teacher recruitment is based. Kingdon and Teal (2010) in India and Aslam and Kingdon (2011) in Pakistan report similar findings, which are corroborated by research in developed countries. For instance, a study from the UK (Burgess, Davies and Slater, 2009) reports considerable variability in teacher effectiveness in improving student test scores and concludes that observable teacher characteristics explain very few of these differences.

In terms of teacher 'experience', studies have shown that it improves teacher effectiveness but only in the first few years of teaching. The teacher's degree of specialisation appears to matter only for some subjects (e.g. mathematics) and research shows that teacher verbal and numerical aptitude tests can have some positive effects. Earlier research also shows that teacher effects can differ across the subjects taught (Park and Hannum, 2002). Using a stringent within-teacher

within-pupil fixed effects methodology, teachers' subject-specific achievement in test scores has been shown to increase pupil achievement significantly (ibid). Metzler and Woessman (2010) show that a one-standard deviation increase in teacher achievement increases student achievement by 10% of a standard deviation. This is of concern, particularly when one takes into account that teacher competency tests have brought to light worryingly low levels of teacher achievement as shown by the results presented below from the SchoolTELLS data on India and Pakistan.

Perhaps the one observable characteristic that does emerge as important in determining outcomes, especially within the South Asian region, is the teacher's gender. Research to date has emphasised importance of teacher gender and in particular the importance of female teachers with regard to girls' enrolment in rural areas. Studies examining the impact of teacher gender on student outcomes show that both gender and ethnicity are significant in determining student outcomes (Dee, 2005; Rawal and Kingdon, 2010). Warwick and Jatoi (1994), for instance, find that, in Pakistan, teacher gender has a much stronger influence over student outcomes in mathematics than the student's own gender. They find that this result relates more to rural than to urban schools where female teachers are associated with the same if not better pupil outcomes.

In Pakistan, however, Aslam and Kingdon (2011) find that students achieve significantly less if they are taught by a female teacher. However, they also note that female students benefit appreciably from being taught by female teachers. They put forward various explanations for these findings, including the possibility that 'preferences' for same-sex students or deeply entrenched stereotypes influence the process through which knowledge is disseminated in the classroom, in turn influencing student learning. They also propose a 'role models' explanation: students of the same gender may perform better when taught by same-sex teachers whom they view as role models. This hypothesis is especially convincing in light of cultural norms in Pakistan where mobility restrictions especially after adolescence may contribute to making female teachers role models for their female students.

The broad consensus is that it is almost impossible to predict who is likely to be a 'good teacher' a priori, especially by focusing on measurable characteristics such as qualifications, training and experience alone. There are many 'unmeasured' teacher characteristics that may be equally important for student learning, such as the ability to convey ideas in a manner conducive to learning or to create effective learning environments for students of different abilities and creative teaching. For example, Aslam and Kingdon (2011) use stringent econometric techniques

and data from Pakistan to identify the key factors that 'make a good teacher'. They find that standard résumé characteristics are not significant determinants of student learning and it is how a teacher actually teaches while in the classroom that determines this. These practices are evaluated using data on the minutes spent giving surprise tests and observations on whether the teachers were using lesson plans, reading aloud or engaging students in the lecture at the time of the visit to the school. Thus, the teaching process is an important determinant of student outcomes.

This is not to say that observable résumé characteristics are not important from an educational policy-making perspective. Academic qualifications, for instance, are thought to proxy for teacher ability. Trained teachers are believed to behave differently from untrained teachers in a classroom setting. Thus, while résumé characteristics alone do not make an effective teacher, it is also evident that someone with six years of schooling or less or with no formal training at all may not be equipped to teach primary school students. Highly acclaimed education systems of the world, such as in the Republic of Korea, have been credited with attracting the best graduates into the profession; while high academic records are not necessarily indicative of effective teaching, there is evidence that the persistent entry of less intellectually capable people into the teaching force is likely to compromise the quality of teaching, with resultant negative implications for student outcomes. Setting minimum national qualifications and training requirements is, therefore, one way of differentiating between those who are certified to teach and those who are not. However, these measures are also almost entirely the only ones used widely by ministries of education and other bodies to recruit teachers and for their career progression. A review of the literature indicates that effective recruitment policies need to be based on more than just observable characteristics of teachers.

The literature indicates some key areas in which policies can be changed to improve teacher recruitment. Ensuring high standards in the profession necessitates drawing a reasonable share of competent individuals into the profession to improve not only the prestige of the occupation but also to ensure students' academic success (World Bank, 2009a). To be able to do so, the recruitment process should be simplified and streamlined so that potential hires are not discouraged from the daunting process of selection (UNESCO, 2006a). Zafeirakou (2007) argues that policies should not only address the supply of teachers but also the quality by providing teacher education and better models of pre-service preparation and by improving teachers' working conditions. Policies should include stronger incentives for teachers with skills that are in short supply and support for teachers in challenging areas. Multiple steps could be taken to

encourage capable students to enter this field, for example by offering attractive internships and camps to students in secondary school (UNESCO and USAID, 2006b). Furthermore, the recruitment criteria should be broadened and school involvement in recruitment and deployment encouraged (UNESCO, 2008). A coherent infrastructure of recruitment, preparation and support programmes is also needed to support the broader national and local education goals (UNESCO and USAID, 2006b). This is reiterated in UNESCO's (2008) report that emphasises the need for CPD, mentoring, the provision of sound career paths and the use of new technology for teacher education and training. Recruitment policies aimed at ensuring that more female teachers are hired and complementing these with interventions aimed at reaching marginalised children (especially girls) in the more remote rural parts of a country could also prove useful.

1.1.2 Literature on retention

Once good-quality teachers are inducted into service, the next task is to ensure that they have a healthy working environment and enough incentives to remain in the profession. The literature indicates that the main reasons for high attrition rates are low salaries and poor working environments. The labour supply is reduced considerably due to teachers who leave the profession before their retirement age (Mulkeen et al., 2007). Teachers are economic actors who make rational choices about their career and take up a better job when presented with the opportunity to do so. The literature suggests that teachers' motivation to work in this field is undermined by multiple factors such as students' lack of commitment, discipline problems, limited teacher input and influence over school policies and lack of support (UNESCO, 2006a). With better outside opportunities increasingly available over time, the quality of the teacher workforce has deteriorated over the years and is now composed of a very small proportion of high achievers (OECD, 2005). Turnover is especially a challenge in the earlier years where lack of support is the main cause for professional distress, which can force them to consider outside options (Anhorn, 2008).

There are two models that shape teacher employment: 'career-based' and 'position-based'. In the career-based model, which is followed in Pakistan, teachers are usually recruited on the basis of competitive tests; once inducted, they follow a predictable career path. Promotion is based on grades associated with the particular individual rather than with the position. This model has certain drawbacks: once teachers are inducted, they do not have any incentive to continue developing – the selection criterion does not emphasise teaching competencies effective for student performance and teacher education is not aligned with school needs. In the position-

based system, the focus is on the best candidates. Entry into teaching positions is flexible and can take place at any point in the career. However, such a system faces difficulty in retaining capable individuals beyond the age range of 30–40 (OECD, 2005).

Teacher motivation is affected primarily by the career path and salary structure in place. There are different forms of salary structure: individual-based rewards that award gains on student achievement (Solomon and Podgursky, 2001) and school-based performance rewards that award the collective effort of teachers. School-based awards generate motivation for group performance and foster cooperation among teacher to achieve collective goals. However, both these schemes can work only if the basis for teacher rewards is measurable, goals are short-term and the reward is guaranteed (Odden, 2000). It is often argued that teachers do not receive good remuneration. Even though Hanushek (1986), Grogger (1996), and Betts (1995) suggest that students outcomes are not consistently related to teachers' salaries, low salaries can have a negative effect through other channels. When teachers cannot meet their needs through their salaries, their focus on teaching declines and their quality of instruction suffers (Daun, 1997). Low salaries also compel teachers to supplement their work with tutoring or second jobs (Gaynor, 1994). This is exacerbated by late and inefficient payment, which imposes further hardship.

Teachers can only reach their full potential in the right working environment. There is a broad consensus in the literature that policies should aim to create the right structure of rewards and challenges as well as support for professional development and high performance at high levels. It is also important to change the school culture and introduce induction support and mentoring programmes (UNESCO, 2006b). Using administrative and survey data on almost 3,000 teachers, Ronfeldt (2012) find that teachers who initially work in staff field placement schools and learn to teach are less likely to leave their jobs early on in their careers. They also have a positive effect on student achievement gains. Thus, a supportive work environment at the beginning of a teacher's career can play a substantial role in improving retention rates.

Providing a coherent training system for teachers is a key step to developing their skills and helping them deliver good-quality teaching. Leu (2004) argues that there is a bias in favour of pre-service training in developing countries. Where in-service training does take place, it reaches only a small percentage of teachers and is too ad hoc to provide a comprehensive learning programme. These programmes can be made more successful, however, if teachers are compensated for travel to the training centre, if their participation is given official recognition and if they are awarded certification for their involvement. Moreover, the potential of training

will be realised only if it is a continuous process. This means that sustainability is one of the key concerns for a long-term training programme. However, the literature has not yet been able to draw a comparative analysis of different forms of training and their respective costs and long-term sustainability potential.

Recent research has discussed the benefits of the shift to school-based and cluster training, which constitutes part of the larger transfer of agency and authority to more local levels (Hiebert, Gallimore, and Stigler, 2002). Training systems that facilitate cooperation among head teachers within a cluster can provide a forum for sharing lessons from individual experiences. Training would offer head teachers recognition for their work, boost their confidence and help them network with their counterparts.

Teacher attrition remains uneven across the teacher workforce and is high in geographically harsh areas or where teachers are not comfortable with the local customs, culture or lifestyle (Macdonald, 1999; Mulkeen et al., 2007). In order to prevent high turnover in these areas, teachers can be compensated with monetary benefits. McEwan (1999) refers to this as a compensating differential – the tradeoff of pecuniary versus nonmonetary factors when teachers decide to work in backward and unfavourable areas. It is particularly difficult to attract teachers to rural areas: rural schools have poor infrastructure, limited instruction inputs and low-quality teachers. Several countries have adopted ways to attract teachers to locate in rural areas, such as travel allowances, free housing and other similar schemes to compensate for the poor quality of schools. However, there is a wide gap between policy and research in these areas. Such benefits are given without taking into account the implications for cost-effectiveness when, for example, compared to other methods of increasing student achievement such as reduced class size (McEwan, 1999). Besides salary structure, teachers' motivation is also affected by non-pecuniary factors such as lack of respect and privileges, leading to high turnover (Falch and Strom, 2005; Zafeirakou, 2007).

Teacher attrition is also higher among more qualified teachers or among those in subjects with high demand in the outside market since they have greater opportunities to switch to a better paid profession (Macdonald, 1999). This drains the teacher workforce of talented and able individuals and has a negative impact on overall education quality. Several countries have, therefore, adopted methods to retain teachers through contractual bonds, increases in salary or improved working environments. In addition, some countries have introduced policies to ensure that teachers are provided with improved accommodation, more community support and counselling (Mulkeen, 2008).

The literature indicates that teacher absenteeism is one of the most prevalent problems in the education sector, especially in developing countries. Chaudhry et al. (2006) survey teacher absence based on visits to primary schools in six developing countries – Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda – and recording the number of teachers who were absent. About 19% of teachers were found to be absent with a substantial number who were present but not teaching at the time of the visit. This is considerably higher than in the US where teachers are found to be absent 5 to 6% of the days they are expected to teach (Podgursky, 2004). Chaudhry et al. (2006) report that senior, better-educated and older teachers are more likely to be absent than their counterparts. They also find that working conditions play a significant role in influencing absenteeism rates. For example, moving from the lowest to the highest index on the infrastructure scale reduces absenteeism by ten percentage points.

Following their research on Zambia, Das et al. (2007) suggest that policies should focus on improving teacher absence and quality since households cannot substitute for these two educational inputs. Among all educational inputs, households are particularly unable to shield themselves from teacher shocks. Das et al. estimate that the gains in learning achievement in English and mathematics decrease by 4 to 8% due to a 5% increase in teacher absence resulting from illnesses – a form of an exogenous shock. Miller, Murnane and Willet (2007) draw a similar conclusion and find that ten additional days of teacher absence reduce student achievement in fourth-grade mathematics by 3.3% of a standard deviation. Therefore, policies should be designed to improve teacher attendance but whether they are effective in reducing teacher absenteeism is still contestable. Chaudhry et al. (2006) use proximity to the ministry as an instrument for monitoring and find that increased proximity leads to reduced absence in at least three of the six developing countries they study.

Many countries have started recruiting para-teachers (Moon, 2007) on the basis that hiring teachers on probation and renewing their contracts conditional on satisfactory performance is more effective for student performance (Ballou and Podgursky, 2002). The contract policy is also believed to influence absenteeism rates. The World Bank (2005) shows that contract teachers have lower absenteeism rates than regular teachers, with 24% absenteeism among regular teachers and 17% among contract teachers. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) analyse the experimental evidence from India and find that contract teachers do indeed have lower absenteeism rates than regular teachers (16% versus 27%). Moreover, students in schools with an extra contract teacher perform better than regular schools.

In Pakistan, the contract policy was introduced in 2002 and has had mixed results. Andrabi et al. (2007) have studied the impact of the contract policy on teacher fixed effects, using a regression discontinuity design with the hiring month as the forcing variable. Their results show that having a temporary contract has a significant and positive effect on teacher fixed effects of between 0.1 and 0.2 standard deviations. Habib's (2010) qualitative study on the contract policy finds its effect on absenteeism to be insignificant. She draws this conclusion based on interviews with teachers and school principals and their perceptions of the policy, where they cite lack of supervision as the main reason for high absenteeism among teachers followed by sickness, slackness and lack of motivation. Using data from attendance registers, she finds that absenteeism is only moderately lower among contract teachers. In their study on India, Kingdon and Banerji (2009) find that, in states such as Bihar where the same, poorly implemented incentive structure applies to contract and regular teachers alike, there is no difference in their absence rates. Habib (2010) also finds that all teachers usually avail themselves of the maximum allowed leave.

Duflo et al. (2007) also address the question of whether monitoring the attendance of para-teachers has an impact on absenteeism, using the experience of Seva Mundir, a nongovernment organisation (NGO) in India. In 2003, the NGO implemented a monitoring scheme in 57 randomly selected schools where teachers were required to take a picture at the beginning and end of the day and were paid according to the days they attended. Over 30 months, data was collected on teacher and student activity and evaluated afterwards to assess the impact of this policy on teacher absenteeism and student performance. The evaluation by Duflo et al. (2007) reveals that teachers at the treatment schools had a lower absence rate of 21% compared to their baseline absence rate of 41%. This result can, however, be misleading because it does not capture factors such as a decrease in intrinsic motivation, which usually translates into teachers engaging in activities unrelated to schoolwork during school hours. However, their analysis suggests that teachers did not reduce their efforts in class, implying that intrinsic motivation remains unaffected. Their results also suggest that teachers are responsive to financial incentives as well, and not only to the monitoring system. Duflo et al. (2011) build on this study and estimate a structural dynamic labour supply, finding that the change in absence rate can be explained entirely by the financial incentive of this monitoring scheme. Therefore, while monitoring per se may not be able to reduce absenteeism, when tied to financial outcomes it can have a significant impact on absenteeism.

The literature suggests that teacher absences are widely seen as discretionary and respond to changes in leave policies (Miller et al., 2007). Teacher accountability and absenteeism is also strongly influenced by the political environment in which teachers operate. A set of teachers may have influential political connections that shield them from disciplinary action and unwanted transfers. Some researchers find that being a member of a political party, for example, increases the likelihood of absence (Beteille, 2009). However, the role of politics is not always negative. Priyam (2012) looks at the positive dynamics of politics in cases of success where she compares the institutional framework of educational reform and interventions in the two states of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. In a study examining the public expenditure of the federal and state governments, school participation reports and a primary survey conducted in schools and households, she shows that the two states followed different trajectories in implementing educational reforms in the 1990s. In Andhra Pradesh, the new opportunities presented by the federal government were aligned with its agenda for development, while in Bihar the wider agenda of development was missing. Priyam concludes that the success in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to the role played by the central government in finding ways to cater to opposing ideas and resisting urges to stop the reform.

Union membership, as opposed to political affiliation, may not have a significant impact on teacher absence (Beteille, 2009) but can play a significant role in increasing teachers' salaries. Teachers engage in rent-seeking, using unions as the main forum from which to raise their demands; they usually campaign for issues related to pay and job security and rarely for improvements in the school system (Peltzman, 1993; Kingdon and Muzammil, 2009). Their demands as unions affect the production function by changing the overall budget allocated to school and alternative inputs and by altering the productivity of these inputs (Hoxby, 1996). In her pioneering study, Hoxby (1996) identifies the union effect by difference in the timing of unionisation instrumented by the timing of state laws that support teachers' unionisation. She finds that the effect of teachers' unions on per-pupil spending is insignificantly different from zero with a negative value of about 2.9%, which then translates into poorer student performance. Both Hoxby (1996) and Kingdon and Teal (2010) find that teacher productivity is higher in non-union schools. This result is corroborated by Kingdon and Muzammil (2008) who find that the real increase in teachers' salaries in Uttar Pradesh in India is approximately 4–5%, which has squeezed out expenditure that could have been used to improve schools. Thus, the majority of the literature suggests that teachers' unions have a negative impact on educational and student outcomes.

1.1.3 Literature on deployment

Several studies have also looked at teacher deployment in developing countries. This is typically found to be uneven, with a shortage of teachers in less favourable locations – particularly rural settings – and a surplus in the more affluent areas. Teachers in these areas become isolated and have limited opportunities to participate in professional development or consultation in educational policies. Furthermore, teachers that remain in the less popular areas tend to be under qualified. This runs counter to the aim of equitable distribution (Mulkeen et al., 2007). Addressing this imbalance is, therefore, essential.

Teacher deployment has two systems: one determined by market forces and the other by a central authority (Lewin, 2000). In market systems, teachers apply independently to schools and have the flexibility to apply for advertised jobs during their tenure. This tilts teacher concentration in favour of affluent areas and creates a disparity in teacher ratios across different localities. However, it also has the advantage of making administration easier and creating a ready response to teacher shortages. Pakistan, however, follows the centralised model of deployment for public schools where teachers are deployed by the central authority to any part of the country or province. This system is, arguably, impartial but it runs the risk of being excessively bureaucratic especially where the school-level data used to determine postings is unreliable and inadequate (Rust and Dalin, 1990). It also allows for transfers that result in better-qualified teachers leaving areas with poor infrastructure and limited facilities, which are then left with a high proportion of inexperienced teachers. The existence of a private sector, such as in the case of Pakistan, also disrupts the teacher deployment ratio since teachers may be more attracted to private schools with a lower pay than government schools in a rural area. Furthermore, the fair deployment of specialists in subjects such as mathematics and sciences is also critical since there is a shortage of these teachers (Mulkeen et al., 2007).

Fresh recruits are more likely to find work in rural areas challenging. Therefore, the deployment system should send relatively experienced teachers to rural areas to ensure greater stability in postings. Forced transfers can also help redress the deployment imbalance (Göttelmann-Duret and Hogan, 1998), while those who are forced to transfer can be compensated with subsidised housing, monetary allowances or travel grants. Another alternative is local recruitment where student teachers could be deployed from within their region of origin. Deployment is an important issue both in terms of efficiency and equity. The literature emphasises that deployment is an ongoing process and, therefore, a one-off project will not become embedded in the institutional structure (Penrose, 1998).

Much of the literature on teacher policies describes a particular country or countries' efforts to recruit, retain and deploy teachers, but does not test the effectiveness of each policy. Instead, the research focuses primarily on clarifying the problem rather than testing alternative formulations for deployment. There is also a dearth of longitudinal studies that track the long-term effects and consequences of interventions aimed at improving the teacher workforce. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by looking at the effectiveness of retention and deployment policies with respect to their immediate objectives – such as teacher quality, turnover and STRs – based on stakeholder interviews as well as data analysis. A unique aspect of this study is the analysis of court cases filed by teachers against the Education Department. Court cases form a part of the evaluation of these policies and reveal the nature of the complaints filed by teachers. This highlights the key institutional limitations of the department that prevent it from taking action against teachers. Furthermore, we record day-to-day observations of the interaction between department officials and teachers in the former's offices to reveal the political economy factors that govern the workings of the education sector.

1.2 Policy Analysis: Evolution over Time and Critical Gaps

1.2.1 Introduction

In the past decade, the Punjab government has introduced a number of policy and reform initiatives to mitigate the issues surrounding effective teacher recruitment, retention and deployment. On paper, these recruitment and post-recruitment departmental policies may seem to be a panacea for the problems surrounding teacher effectiveness. Whether they have proven to be so, however, depends largely on the degree to which these policies have been effectively implemented and have had any desirable impacts on teacher labour market outcomes. Limited quality evaluations show the extent of implementation and the possible impact on teacher recruitment and retention of these policies. Further, it is widely understood that a number of issues that these policies were aimed at tackling remain unresolved, for instance teacher accountability, classroom practices such as multi-grade teaching and politically motivated transfers and deployment. Such practices and mitigating factors are expected to affect teacher motivation and, hence, the effort they exert in class. Figure 1.1 below provides a summary of the main factors affecting teacher motivation and effectiveness.

Figure 1.1: Factors Affecting Teachers' Motivation and Effectiveness



Source: Adapted from MJ Cooper & A Alvarado, *Preparation, Recruitment and Retention of Teachers*, Education Policy Series No. 5, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2008.

To ensure that the education system comprises effective teachers, the first step is to identify quality teachers and give them incentive them to enter the system, for instance through effective, merit-based recruitment. However, it is also crucial to provide an enabling environment that ensures that, once these teachers enter the education system, they are also effectively retained. This can be achieved by providing them with both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, including (but not limited to) adequate support systems, ample career progression and well-defined roles in decision-making. In other words, effective post-recruitment policies should be able to address the issues summarised in the figure above.

This suggests that, even if quality teachers are identified and allowed to enter the system, effective retention and deployment policies are required to retain them. This section reviews the policies and reforms pertaining to teacher recruitment, retention and deployment that have been put in place over the past decade. We look at policy remnants and present key constraints in implementation in a bid to identify critical gaps in policymaking. After providing a brief background to the policy changes that took place post-2000, the remaining subsections delineate

and analyse the different types of policies and reforms that have taken place: (i) recruitment, (ii) retention and (iii) deployment. The fifth subsection concludes by summarising the major policy gaps and flaws in implementation.

1.2.2 Background: Institutional Setup

Prior to the 18th constitutional amendment, the responsibility for the administration of public education in Pakistan was shared between the federal government (the federal Ministry of Education) and the provincial governments (provincial ministries of education). The federal ministry's Planning Wing and Curriculum Wing were responsible for developing an education policy, education budgets and school curricula. Implementing the education policy was the responsibility of the Provincial Education Departments, District Governments and NGOs (UNESCO, 2006a). After the introduction of the 18th amendment in 2010, the concurrent legislative list was dissolved and responsibility for the administration and legislation of education policy, planning, curriculum and quality standards shifted to the provincial governments. At the same time, the introduction of Article 25-A to the constitution made the provincial governments responsible for providing free and compulsory education to all children aged five to sixteen years.

The Punjab Education Ministry is headed by an Education Minister and the civil servant in charge of the department is the Secretary Education (UNESCO, 2006a). The responsibilities of the Education Ministry are divided among six provincial bodies: the Directorate of Staff Development (DSD), Elementary Education Department, Secondary Education Department, Punjab Education Assessment System, Punjab Education Commission (PEC) and the Punjab Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU) (see Box 1.1). The DSD is responsible for the provision of teacher training, which includes pre-service teacher training (B.Ed. degrees), in-service training and induction training (for shortlisted candidates before recruitment).

Prior to the introduction of the Punjab Education Sector Reforms Program (PESRP) in 2003, the Pakistan Institute of Teachers' Education provided in-service training while 90 odd Government Colleges of Elementary Education (GCETs) and the Allama Iqbal Open University provided pre-service training. Neither type of training institution was, however, integrated, resulting in a disconnection between the training they provided. One of the programme's aims was to improve teacher education and ensure merit-based recruitment. For this purpose, the DSD was given control over all government pre-service and in-service institutions, thus integrating both types of training. The pre-service training programmes offered include the PTC,

CT, Associate Degree of Education (ADE) and B-Ed degree. In-service training is provided through a CPD programme at the centre and DTSCs and CTSCs at the district and *markaz*[1] levels.

The Punjab Education Assessment System and PEC are responsible for administering school examinations and keeping a check on the quality of teaching and learning outcomes. PEC was established in 2003 and its main responsibility is to conduct student tests at the grade 5 and grade 8 levels. The results of these tests are used to gauge both student and teacher performance. Contract renewal (for contract teachers) and teachers' bonus schemes are also based on these test results. The PMIU, set up in 2003, provides further monitoring and evaluation of teachers' performance as well as implementing the various reforms introduced under the PESRP. Under the PMIU, a multi-layered monitoring system was introduced with DMOs supervising a field staff of MEAs responsible for monthly visits to schools to record teacher presence and details of the available school facilities. The school-level and teacher-level data collected is then housed at the PMIU where it is processed and forwarded to the provincial policymakers.

School education, teacher recruitment and deployment come under the purview of the School Education Departments. There are two such departments: the Elementary School Education Department and the Secondary School Education Department. Both are headed by Director of Public Instruction (DPI) at the level of the province and by EDOs (education) and DEOs at the district level. They, in turn, head a team of DDEOs and AEOs. The AEOs deal directly with schoolteachers and also monitor teacher attendance and teaching quality. These officers are directly involved in the implementation of various teacher-related policies and reforms.

A number of policy changes have been introduced in the past decade, concentrating on effective teacher recruitment, retention and deployment and reorganising various government institutions. Despite these changes, a number of policy gaps remain. The following subsections delineate these and analyse in detail the different policy changes introduced.

[1] The area covered by a police station.

Box 1.1: Institutional Set up – Provincial Education Department:



1.2.3 Recruitment-related policies

Prior to 1997, teachers were hired on a permanent basis through the Punjab Public Service Commission, a provincial body responsible for recruiting all public servants. However, this contributed to weak accountability systems, a high level of absenteeism and politically motivated hiring and transfers among the teaching cadre. A budgetary crisis and consequent lack of resources in the late 1990s led to a ban on hiring of teachers between 1997 and 2002. This ban was finally lifted in 2002 with the introduction of the 'contract teacher policy' whereby recruitment was to be carried out on a contract basis by district-level recruitment committees (see Box 1.2 for details of the current recruitment process).

The aim of this policy was to combat absenteeism and increase accountability by hiring teachers on five-year renewable contracts based on their performance. The policy's rationale was that penalising tenured or regular teachers for poor performance was difficult because their contracts guaranteed employment over their lifetime. This was not helped by their political alignment and strong unionisation. Moreover, political factors rather than a system of merit-based hiring suggested that the most competent and qualified teachers were unable to enter the system. The contract policy was specifically designed to counter these issues. It has been used across the developing world – sometimes very successfully – to counter teacher shortages in times of budgetary crisis as contract teachers (or para-teachers, as they are often called) are often paid substantially less than their regular counterparts. The main features of the policy were: (i) contract non-renewal due to unsatisfactory performance, (ii) merit-based hiring with the education requirement being raised to a BA/BSc for PSTs, and (iii) fewer leave and no transfer options for contract teachers compared to their non-contract counterparts (Habib, 2010).

Although the international literature suggests that contract-based hiring lowers teacher absenteeism and increases accountability, there is limited evidence to confirm this in the context of Pakistan. An extensive qualitative study by Habib (2010) suggests that the contract terms, specifically those relating to transfers and leave options, led to dissatisfaction among hired contract teachers. Lower salaries and greater workloads de-motivated these teachers and led to high absenteeism. Further, political pressure inevitably led to the regularisation of these contract teachers, making the contract terms defunct. Hence, the contract policy had a limited impact on teacher absenteeism and accountability. Apart from Habib's findings, there is limited empirical evidence on the policy's effectiveness. The World Bank's (2005) study has also analysed the impact of this policy and found that contract teachers were less likely to be absent than regular

teachers. However, the study was based on a single one-day visit to the sample schools and the results may not, therefore, be reliable.

A recent systematic review by Kingdon et al. (2013) looks at whether contract teachers are sufficiently cost-effective interventions to address teacher shortages and improve student learning in developing countries. The authors undertake a rigorous review of the literature on contract teachers across the developing world and base their findings on 17 studies that meet their stringent requirements of 'quality'. They argue that the effectiveness of the contract teacher policy depends largely on the features of the contract itself. One of the earliest and most prominent studies on contract teachers by Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) identifies four main characteristics of contract teachers: (i) they are appointed on annual renewable contracts with no guarantee of renewal, (ii) they are often less qualified than regular teachers and less likely to have a formal training certificate, (iii) they are paid much less than regular teachers (typically one-fifth of the latter's salaries), and (iv) they are more likely to be from the area where the school is located. While different countries have played with a mix of these features, the fact that Pakistan's original contract teacher policy adopted only one of these features (contract teachers were paid less than their regular counterparts) is telling in terms of how effective the policy can be expected to be.

Kingdon et al. (2013, p 4) argue that,

> from a policy perspective, research suggests that there is a need to devise policies and contracts that encourage more teacher effort. This can only occur if the incentives and disincentives are aligned within the contracts and are effectively enforced. For example, the threat of dismissal has been identified as a key motivating factor among contract teachers. However, if this threat is not credible, the incentive to exert effort to ensure contract renewal disappears. It is also important to note that contracts 'as they are' will only go so far in raising teacher effort as the evidence has shown that all teachers' effort (even that of contract teachers) is low on an absolute basis, particularly as some studies note that those contract teachers who have more than one tenure period exert less effort in subsequent tenure periods.

Thus, while commendable in its objectives, the contract teacher policy in Punjab, by not adopting the key features expected to make it work, was essentially flawed. The original policy was scrapped in 2007 without being evaluated rigorously.

The present recruitment policy retains some of the main features of the 2002 contract policy. Teachers are still hired on merit and PSTs must have at least a BA or BSc; additionally, recruits are engaged on a five-year site-specific contract that is renewable based on performance.

However, the 2011 recruitment policy more clearly delineates the performance measures to be used to evaluate teachers. These include (i) 100% enrolment and retention of students, (ii) the quality of education (measured by the PEC, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and other exams set by the Quality Assurance Authority, (iii) punctuality and discipline and (iv) overall performance recorded in the teacher's PER. Further, teachers' contracts may now be subject to immediate termination whereas the 2002 policy required a one-month notice period. Previously, contract terms penalising high absenteeism or poor performance were not strictly enforced, which meant that contract teachers were less accountable. Clearer performance measures and a stricter termination policy aim to counter this and improve the accountability structure of contract teachers.

While the literature review section clearly indicates that teachers' qualifications alone should not be the benchmark for hiring teachers, setting minimum educational qualifications and training requirements is a very important way of differentiating between those who are certified to teach and those who are not; such minimum requirements have featured heavily in recruitment decisions. The current policy retains the educational qualification requirements of the 2002 contract policy but raises the professional qualification requirements for PSTs from a PTC or CT to a B-Ed degree. This policy change was geared towards improving the quality of teachers entering the education system. However, no clear policy was introduced stating what would happen to in-service teachers currently holding a PTC or CT. Will such teachers be given further training or simply have limited promotion opportunities?

Further, prior to 2010, promotions were based on experience and seniority alone, which meant that, in many instances, newly promoted head teachers were less qualified than PSTs. This situation can lead to de-motivation among PSTs who are paid less and have to take orders from head teachers less qualified than them. Moreover, as teachers complete their professional training first and then apply for a teaching post, a change in professional qualification requirements would mean that a cohort of freshly trained candidates with a PTC or CT will find their skill set defunct and have to enrol in a B-Ed programme to apply for their desired teaching post. The B-Ed degree, however, does not adequately provide teachers with subject-specific knowledge – especially in subjects such as mathematics and science – nor does it prepare them to handle real classroom situations such as multi-grade teaching. Hence, merely raising the professional qualification requirement does not ensure that good-quality teachers will enter the education system or be equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to impart meaningful learning.

To tackle some of these concerns – specifically those relating to equipping teachers with the skills needed to handle real classroom environments and providing subject-specific knowledge – the 2011 recruitment policy has introduced 190 days of compulsory induction training for all shortlisted candidates. These candidates then sit a written test and a computer test, the marks of which count towards 5% of the final mark they receive when the final merit list for hiring is drawn up. The testing process ensures that political interference in hiring is limited. Prior to this, 5% of the final marks were reserved for an interview with marks awarded for teaching experience. This created room for nepotism: for instance, teaching experience was counted only if the candidate submitted forms signed by the head teacher and countersigned by the DEO. Politically affiliated teachers could easily fabricate experience by having false forms signed by the concerned officials. Further, prior to 2011, among candidates with equal merit marks, those with higher interview marks were given preference; if candidates' interview marks were also equal, seniority was given precedence. Under the present policy, interview marks are no longer considered and seniority alone is given precedence. This again reduces the impact of political economy factors through the manipulation of interview marks in the recruitment process.

In a further attempt to increase the transparency of the recruitment process, the 2011 recruitment policy has raised the role of the DMO from that of a mere observer to a member of the District Recruitment Committee. The DMO functions independently of the EDO (education) and hence does not fall under the EDOs purview. Prior to 2011, the DMO's role was to help the District Recruitment Committee advertise for recruitment, display pre-interview merit lists, enter data and calculate pre-interview merit marks. By giving the DMO decision-making power in the recruitment process, the transparency of recruitment has increased.

Literature on teacher absenteeism indicates the prevalence of this problem in South Asia and highlights the key factors responsible for it. One major concern regarding the 2002 recruitment policy is that absenteeism among contract teachers did not decrease despite the apparently strong accountability structures in place. Whether the proposed accountability structures were designed to be strong enough in the first place is debatable, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the high reported teacher absence could also be attributed to other constraints preventing teachers from attending school. One such constraint, especially for female teachers, was the distance to their school. To alleviate this constraint, prior policies gave preference to local teachers by awarding them ten extra marks. It was hoped that hiring local female teachers in this way would help reduce teacher absence. Building on this, the current recruitment policy recruits teachers only from within the tehsil in which the school is located. This ensures that teachers have a higher

likelihood of being assigned to a school in their own village, reducing the distance they have to travel to work and, hence, the cost of reaching the school.

Evidence from around the world indicates that the political economy of education significantly determines the effectiveness of the governance of the education system. It is now widely acknowledged that the teaching profession in Pakistan is politically entrenched, as a result of which, many hiring, firing and transfer decisions are, anecdotally, politically motivated rather than based on rules of merit or need. The contract teacher policy of 2002 aimed to overcome this particular constraint by delineating school-specific contracts with no room for transfers. The motivation behind this was to reduce the number of politically driven transfers. However, one unexpected consequence of this particular feature was that it resulted in teachers resigning from their posts and reapplying for other posts, hence creating vacancies and high STRs (Habib, 2010).

The current recruitment policy 2011 tries to deal with these issues by allowing teachers to apply for a transfer after they have completed minimum three-year tenure at their assigned school and if they have an adequate performance record. Such attempts at merit-based transfers, while aiming to deal with the issue of teachers resigning to seek reappointment, do not effectively deal with politically motivated transfers, which may lead to a number of teachers transferring to prime locations, creating shortages elsewhere. Frequent bans are placed on transfers – especially near exam time – to deal with this issue. However, teachers still manage to circumvent the ban and get transferred to their desired post. This indicates flaws in the implementation of the bans and red tape in the transfer process.

Changes in the recruitment policy over the past decade have attempted to deal with some of the concerns regarding the recruitment of qualified teachers based on merit, without political interference and nepotism. However, a number of policy gaps and implementation constraints remain. For instance, the contract policy of 2002 had a limited impact because a number of contract teachers were regularised by the Punjab government due to political pressure. The current policy does not deal with this issue: even though it claims that contract teachers will have their contracts renewed based on good performance, contracts continue to be regularised on an ad hoc basis.

It is a priori difficult to underpin the theoretical incentive effect of teacher contracts, such as those in the 2002 contract teacher policy. On one hand, there is evidence to indicate that properly designed contract teacher policies can be effective not only in alleviating teacher

shortages but also leading to better student outcomes (Kingdon et al., 2013). This is, of course, with the proviso that the contract is designed in such a way that it incentivises the teacher appropriately, which, as we have seen, was not done under the Contract Teacher Policy of 2002. On the other hand, unfavourable conditions within the contract design, such as lower salaries and fixed-term contracts, can be seen as de-motivating and unfair by teachers and may lead to reduced pedagogical training and school-specific investments in teachers. Moreover, if threats of non-renewal are not deemed credible, one cannot expect the contract policy to have the desired effect. The current policy aims to address some of these limitations but not all. An in-depth evaluation is needed to underpin those areas in which the recruitment policy has succeeded and those in which it has failed.

Box 1.2: Current Recruitment Process (2011)

Advertisment: All BS 9, 14, 16 grade recruitment done by district recruitment committees (comprising DCO, EDO (F&P), EDO (education), DMO, provincial government representative, expert on relevant subject and appointing authority). Advertisement issued by DCO, clearly indicating vacancies by category, gender, and tehsil.

Merit list: Applicants compete at tehsil level. Initial merit list based on academic and professional qualifications (with weight 90% and 5%, respectively) prepared for each tehsil and quota (2% disability and 5% minority quota filled from regular pool if such applicants not available). If not enough applicants for a particular tehsil, applicants from other tehsils are allowed to compete for placement there.

Final merit list: Prepared after including computer assessment and interview marks (5%). 190 days given to complete pre-service induction training. if a teacher drops out or fails to perform on post-training tests, the person next on the merit list is considered for position.

Allocation of posts and teacher placement: EDO and DMO jointly identify schools for teacher allocation (generally, emphasis on science, maths and English teachers and preference given to schools lacking these teachers and according to STR of 40:1). Teachers placed according to inter se merit in each tehsil. Candidates chosen from within tehsil and, in the case of females, if their husbands are from that tehsil. Preference can be expressed by applicant and on disputed seats, preference based on merit and then seniority. All appointments completed within 190 days and if any teachers leaves after this period, hiring not resumed till the next recruitment cycle.

Source: Punjab Government Recruitment Policy 2011, Lahore, 25 October 2011.

One of the key gaps in the current policy is that there is no way of dealing with the teaching hours lost due to non-teaching duties assigned to teachers, especially during election time. In the current policy, one contract term is that teachers will perform 'all kinds of duties in public interest as may be entrusted to you by Competent Authority from time to time [*sic*]' (Recruitment Policy, October 2011). This implies that teachers are expected to perform out-of-school duties that may take away from their teaching time. Both international and South Asia-specific evidence indicates that this can contribute to de-motivated teachers. It also makes room for valid excuses as teachers may collude and collaborate in absenteeism at the expense of student learning.

In a key policy change in 2010, the medium of instruction in all public schools in Punjab was changed to English. This implied that the curriculum would now be in English, all testing would be done in English and all classes would be conducted in English. To complement this policy, a component of the pre-service and in-service training was designed to focus on providing teachers with English language skills. However, this training is not sufficient: teachers with an Urdu language-medium background cannot fully understand the English-medium curriculum after a month-long course. Further, the training focuses on teaching candidates the English translation of the Urdu curriculum and not on helping them understand the concepts in English. In turn, these teachers teach their students in Urdu and then make them memorise the English translation of the curriculum for examination purposes. This is an inefficient and ineffective approach and more thought needs to be put into how to better equip teachers to deal with an English curriculum.

Figure 1.2: Policy Gaps in Recruitment



1.2.4 Retention-related policies

Once a good-quality teacher enters the education system, it is necessary that he or she is retained. Retention does not merely imply keeping teachers on the job, it also means sustaining their motivation and, hence, their effort. A de-motivated teacher is as good as an absent teacher because his or her presence does not add value to student learning. Even good-quality teachers may shirk from their teaching duties if they lack motivation. A number of factors affect teacher motivation, including the accountability and incentive structures in place, job stability and a clear career path, support systems and teacher confidence in the curriculum being taught (see Figure 1.1). These have been reviewed in the literature review section and the broad consensus of the literature is that some of these factors are critical to ensuring the efficient, effective and equitable delivery of teaching services. The main policies that affect these factors include those relating to (i) teacher training, (ii) teacher monitoring and (iii) teacher incentives.

Teacher training is important not only to increase the competency of teachers but also their confidence in the curriculum they are teaching. In particular, if the easiest way to recruit a good teacher is to train one (Chingos and Peterson, 2011), then appropriate and effective training can prove a very useful policy tool. This view allows policymakers some room for manoeuvre as the brunt need not be borne by recruitment policies such as those calling for minimum competency

levels (especially in the more remote or inaccessible rural areas) under the presumption that any skill gaps among recruits can be effectively filled through pre-service and in-service training.

With the increased focus of educational polices on ensuring good-quality schooling, teacher education reforms have become an urgent policy need. Pre-service training can be a useful tool to better equip new entrants into the labour market while in-service training is essential for keeping existing teachers up to date with new techniques while at the same time motivating and encouraging them. If teachers lack confidence in their own subject knowledge, they cannot pass this knowledge on to their students. Further, teachers need to be equipped to handle real classroom situations such as multi-grade teaching, large class sizes and so forth. They also require professional support during their tenure and in-service training to equip them with current teaching methods and materials.

Box 1.3: Types of Teacher Training

Pre-service training: Elementary and secondary school teachers
B-Ed degree
This can be done in a number of ways, through a combination of a BA and one-year B-Ed programme, a BA/BSc and two-year M-Ed programme, an FSc/FA and four-year B-Ed (Hons) programme, or FSc/FA and three-year ADE

In-service training: Elementary and secondary school teachers
Three-year periodical training at subdistrict (CTSCs) and district (DTSCs) levels

Mentorship programmes

Professional days

Induction training: Elementary and secondary school teachers
190-day compulsory training provided to shortlisted candidates before final merit lists are drafted



In hopes of achieving such a system, a number of interventions in terms of pre- and in-service training were introduced in the Punjab post-2002. The first set of reforms pertaining to teacher training and professional development was initiated in 2003/04 under the first phase of the PESRP. Under these reforms, the DSD was restructured and all pre-service and in-service institutions were placed under its purview (see Appendix A2). The Pakistan Institute for Teacher Training and the GCETs were merged and placed under the DSD to create a uniform and centralised system of pre- and in-service training.

Building on this, the CPD programme was piloted in 12 districts of Punjab in 2007 and fully instituted in 2008. The CPD framework aims to provide decentralised training to PSTs, where the district is the primary unit for assessing and undertaking training activities with teacher training delivered at an appropriate sub-district level. For this purpose, CTSCs were established at the sub-district level, borrowing from the framework of the Teacher Resource Centres that were set up following the 2001 National Education Policy. Each school in a given village or *tehsil* belongs to a CTSC, which is responsible for providing all its teachers with in-service training, mentorship and other support. This brings opportunities for training closer to the teachers and reduces both the associated cost of travel and the absenteeism resulting from training that takes teachers away from their posts. The CTSCs are responsible for coordinating between the various providers of teachers' education, local education officers and other key stakeholders. They also provide data on teacher assessments to the DTSCs and the DSD at the centre. This makes for a structured and decentralised mechanism that provides teachers with pedagogical support and training.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the CTSCs have successfully increased support for PSTs. The most effective key component has been the mentoring visits made by District Teacher Educators (DTEs). The DTEs are responsible for assessing teachers' performance through student tests and for using these assessments and classroom observations to help identify weak areas in lesson planning and delivery. They then help teachers work on these areas and develop their lesson plans. According to a study by the International Growth Centre (2012), teachers have found these mentoring visits to be both effective and supportive, explaining that the visits help them improve their teaching practices and increase their confidence in their knowledge of the pedagogical content.

In terms of accountability structures and monitoring, the second phase of the PESRP – a comprehensive programme for monitoring teacher performance and attendance – comprises three key components: (i) The annual census EMIS and (ii) Monthly monitoring visits. The

DMO in every district reports to the PMIU and supervises a field staff of MEAs, who are responsible for undertaking regular field visits and collecting data on teacher attendance, which is then fed into the EMIS. The MEAs are recruited and their positions funded by the Chief Minister's Monitoring Force – a body established to help monitor all development schemes initiated in the province; it reports directly to the Secretary School Education. The MEAs are Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) retired from the armed forces, and hired on three-year contracts. Their performance is evaluated at the end of the contract period by the DMO. MEAs are assigned "school circles" or areas in each district, such that they are able to visit at least four schools per day and all the schools in their circle at least once a month. Parallel to this, the AEOs carry out further monitoring and report to the EDO.

Although this multi-pronged monitoring system tries to ensure transparency and effective monitoring, cases of nepotism and red tape – for instance, involving teachers who have themselves marked present even when absent during a monitoring visit – have been reported. Innovations to the system have now been introduced: when MEAs visit the schools to collect data, they have a mobile application that allows them to take a picture of the teacher with his or her class, which is then entered along with the attendance data, GPS coordinates, and a date and time stamp. This is geared towards reducing fabricated attendance records. Despite this, a number of problems remain. For instance, teachers have found loopholes within the system with teacher rotations taking place: teachers are shifted from one school to another according to the schedule of the monitoring visits so that their presence is marked in the school being visited.

Incentives affect teachers' attitudes and effectiveness. Salary structure can have a powerful effect on teacher effort and student outcomes. While many developed countries have replaced uniform pay structures that reward teacher inputs (qualifications and experience) with models of performance-related pay, salary structures in Pakistan continue to be based on the former model. Although it is hoped that paying teachers better will attract more able candidates to the profession and raise effort overall, this works only when the threat of dismissal for non-performance or low performance is high. While the evidence indicates that this works very well in private schools in the country, chronic teacher absence prevails in the government sector. Teacher absence in South Asia is believed to stem from systemic failures in accountability systems, low morale among teachers and low pay (Rogers and Vegas, 2009). However, the argument that low pay explains lower effort (when measured by absence) is not supported in Pakistan's case as the LEAPS report (Andrabi et al., 2007) shows that absence among better paid civil service teachers in rural Punjab was actually higher than among less well paid teachers in

private schools. If anything, this hints at the low levels of accountability that exist within the government system compared to those in the private sector.

While effective teacher monitoring may increase teacher attendance, it does not address issues of de-motivation. Previous studies have indicated that contract teachers in particular may be de-motivated by meagre salaries, which effectively reduce them to cheap labour (see Kingdon et al., 2013 for a discussion on this literature). Low salaries also force teachers to provide after-school tuition to supplement their income, which affects in-school teaching. Other teachers take up subsidiary jobs and hence fail to concentrate wholly on teaching. In 2008, when the contract teacher policy of 2002 was phased out, contract teachers' salaries were raised to the National Basic Pay Scale (BPS) in an attempt to improve their incentive structure. Constant pressure from teachers' unions and frequent strikes strongly influenced this change in policy. Further salary rises have taken place, increasing the BPS for civil servants (see Box 1.4). However, the policy still did not provide contract teachers with pension benefits and paid leave options.

Box 1.4: Salary Revisions (2011)

BPS	Post	Basic Pay Scale, 2008		Basic Pay Scale, 2011	
		Starting Pay (Rs)	Annual Increment (Rs)	Starting Pay (Rs)	Annual Increment (Rs)
9	PST/EST	3,820	230	6,200	380
10	PST/EST	3,955	260	6,400	420
11	PST/EST	4,115	275	6,600	460
12	PST/EST	4,355	310	7,000	500
13	PST/EST	4,645	340	7,500	550
14	SESE/SS	4,920	380	8,000	610
15	SESE/SS	5,220	420	8,500	700
16	SSE/AEO	6,060	470	10,000	800
17	SSEs/AEO	9,850	740	16,000	1,200
18	DDEO	12,910	930	20,000	1,500
19	EDO/DEO	19,680	970	31,000	1,600

Note: SESE = senior elementary school educator, SSE = senior school educator, SS = subject specialist.

Source: Punjab Government Notification No. FD-PC-2-1/2011 dated 11 July 2011, Lahore.

As mentioned before, identifying the direction of the incentive effect in such a situation is difficult: while offering teachers BPS-equivalent salaries may improve their motivation, the international literature points out that it is the threat of dismissal among contract teachers that compels better performance. However, if this threat is not credible, the incentive to exert effort

for contract renewal will no longer exist. Additionally, as Kingdon et al. (2013) argue, the evidence indicates that contracts 'as they are' will only go so far in raising teachers' effort. The majority of studies reviewed by the authors show that all teachers' effort is low on an absolute basis especially since contract teachers, who have more than one tenure period, exert less effort in the periods that follow. This, it is argued, points to the need for building performance-related renewal and for the contract policy to be amended to combine the probationary, non-renewal aspects of contract terms with better salaries and benefits. While education policies in recent years have taken on board the 'better salaries' aspect, it is not clear the extent to which nonrenewal and non-pecuniary benefits have been considered.

The analysis so far indicates that simply raising teachers' salaries is not the solution to reforming the country's education system. While the research evidence on the impact of performance-related pay on student outcomes is mixed (as discussed in the literature review), it is increasingly recognised that teachers' salaries need to be linked with student performance. The Punjab government has undertaken recent initiatives that aim to do so. The increase in teachers' salaries in recent years has also been accompanied by incentives introduced in 2011 that tie performance with pay. According to Andrabi et al. (2007), there is a positive correlation between teachers' salaries and their performance in private schools but no such correlation in public schools. In an effort to remedy this, the teacher incentive programme provides a bonus to the top 20% of the best-performing schools in each tehsil. The committee that selects these schools includes the DEO, DDEO and senior headmaster of the high school in each tehsil. Performance is based on student enrolment and attendance (15%), student performance in the annual PEC exams (70%) and student participation in the PEC exams (15%). Primary schools compete at the markaz level, elementary schools at the tehsil level and secondary and higher secondary schools at the district level.

Either a carrot or stick approach can be adopted to improve teacher performance. The monitoring system in place and the termination and non-renewal condition in teachers' contracts acts as the stick; the cash awards act as the carrot. Parallel to these cash awards, another carrot approach to improving teacher performance is the Promotion Policy 2010, which links promotions to performance and the completion of mandatory training. The promise of a progressive career track for teachers is intended to encourage them to improve their attendance and performance and to fulfil their in-service training requirements. Prior to this, promotion was based on seniority alone and a number of instances were reported whereby political affiliations were used to obtain promotions. In order to curtail this practice, certain conditions were set for

obtaining promotions under the 2010 policy. Teachers were required to (i) have satisfactorily completed their probation period, (ii) possess the required qualifications and experience, (iii) have completed the minimum length of service, (iv) have received a satisfactory PER and (v) have passed the prescribed departmental examinations. Thus, the policy sets out a structured procedure for obtaining a promotion and attempts to motivate teachers by providing them with more clarity in terms of career paths.

As delineated in this subsection, a number of attempts have been made to improve teachers' motivation and performance. However, a number policy gaps remain unaddressed. For instance, although mentoring and CTSC-based teacher training seem to be effective, it is unclear whether they have helped teachers deal with the change in curriculum from Urdu to English in 2011. Whether the DTEs are well trained enough and capable of handling the new curriculum is an open question. Further, even though teachers can now avail themselves of training opportunities at their local CTSC, reducing the teaching hours lost in travel time, this issue has not been completely dealt with. Teachers continue to sacrifice teaching hours by attending tehsil training sessions, affecting student learning. One solution could be to hold all training sessions during the holiday period, as suggested in the National Education Policy of 2009. If this is implemented, teachers could then concentrate on teaching during the school year and focus on training during the holiday season. In terms of monetary incentives, such incentives may lead to a more results-based – rather than knowledge-based – teaching style and even further de-motivation if the set targets are not achieved. These considerations need to be taken into account when assessing the current incentives scheme.

Teachers often express their dissatisfaction with the monitoring system in place. Many say they find the actions of monitoring officials to be badgering and intrusive. Excessive monitoring can be disruptive and lower teacher morale. This policy gives outside coordinators responsibility for monitoring teachers, and the coordinators provide little support. On the other hand, if an internal actor, such as a head teacher, were made responsible for monitoring, it would help develop a more coherent system of monitoring. Teachers are likely to respect the head teachers' authority and the head teachers is more involved in teachers' management. Thus, despite the multitude of reforms and policy changes that have taken place over the past decade, policy gaps remain, which continue to affect teacher motivation and retention. These need to be adequately addressed in order to retain good-quality motivated teachers in the education system.

Figure1.3: Policy Gaps in Retention



1.2.5 Deployment-related policies

Flawed teacher deployment is among the most complex challenges faced by the education service delivery network in South Asia (World Bank, 2005). The allocation of teachers has, historically, been suboptimal in many developing countries and especially in South Asia. Pakistan is no exception. Weaknesses in teacher deployment are manifested in the form of rural-urban disparities, differences in class size (STRs) and the shortage of female teachers in regions where they play an especially important role in girls' enrolment and may be critical for the latter's improved learning. The allocation to posts after recruitment may also be an important factor affecting teacher attendance and motivation. If teachers are allocated to schools distant from their place of residence, their likelihood of attending school will be much lower than if they are allocated to a post nearer their place of residence.

To counter this, as discussed above, the current recruitment policy hires teachers from within the tehsil a school is located in. However, a tehsil covers a large area and postings may still not be from within the village the school is located in. Although recruitment policies prior to 2011 allocated 10 extra marks to teachers belonging to the same village as the school, this was subject to political manipulation and nepotism. Transfers were also disallowed under the contract terms of the pre-2011 policies, creating discontent among teachers and vacancies in schools as teachers resigned from their posts and reapplied to schools nearer to their place of residence. Although the current recruitment policy deals with the issue by allowing teachers to transfer after they have completed three years of their tenure, it does not address the issue of teachers being allocated to posts far away from their place of residence. This is problematic especially in rural areas and for female teachers and can lead to high absenteeism and de-motivation among teachers.

In April 2013, a new transfer policy was introduced whereby teachers can only be transferred (i) on the basis of merit alone, (ii) once they have completed three years at their current post and (iii) against vacant seats. These transfers will be based on the academic performance of the teachers' students, gauged through the PEC examinations (40 marks), whether they currently serve in a remote area (20 marks), seniority (10 marks), marital status (15 marks) and compassionate grounds (for instance, if a female candidate is widowed or divorced or if a candidate suffers from a disability). The policy also gives the head teacher the authority to recommend teachers for transfers out of their schools based on the latter's' performance. This devolution of power to head teachers and performance-based transfer criteria attempts to increase the accountability of teachers and reduce the number of politically motivated transfers.

However, this will only happen if the policy is implemented effectively, which remains to be seen.

Ineffective deployment also affects STRs and creates disparities among schools in terms of the number and types of teachers available. According to the current recruitment policy, the EDO (education) and DMO jointly identify schools for teacher allocation and advertise for recruitment. Generally, science, mathematics and English teachers are given emphasis and preference is given to schools lacking these teachers. The allotment is also conditional on each school achieving an STR of 1:40. Once candidates have been shortlisted from within a tehsil, they are placed in the selected schools on merit inter se. Candidates may express their preferences during the induction training and if there is a dispute over a post, the senior-most in terms of merit is given priority.

Box 1.5: Allocation of posts (2011)

Overall allocation of posts done on the basis of achieving a 1: 40 STR in each school

- ESTs (Science and Math) will be given to Primary Schools or Primary Portions where enrolment is at least 140 or above in descending order of enrolment in the concerned tehsil. No primary School will be given two or more posts of ESTs (Science and Maths).
- Only the Elementary Schools selected for the establishment of computer labs will be given one post of SESE (Science) and SESE (Math) and they will also teach the subject of Computer Studies.
- In Secondary Schools, preference will be given to those schools in the given tehsil where no Physics-Math or Chemistry-Biology Teacher is available. Posts either SSE (Phy-Math) or SSE (Chy-Bio) will be given in descending order of enrolment of science students in 9th and 10th class.
- SSE (Computer Science) will be provided to those High/Higher Secondary schools where computer labs have been established but no SSE (Computer Science Teachers) are not available there.
- SSE (English) will be provided on a basis of enrolment of 9th and 10th Class in descending order in schools of the given tehsil where no SSE (English) is available.

Selected candidates will be placed according to the inter-se merit in each tehsil of the respective category of post

Source: Punjab Government Recruitment Policy 2011, dated Lahore, 25th October, 2011

Although the procedure for deployment described above assumes that all schools in a tehsil have an STR of 1:40, this is not the case. STRs across schools can vary widely, resulting in a number of one-teacher schools and multi-grade teaching. In 2011, approximately 36.2% of schools in Punjab were found to engage in multi-grade teaching, which suggests ineffective teacher allocation. Teacher allocation is also influenced greatly by political economy factors. Politically affiliated teachers may be able to obtain desirable posts, creating a surplus in certain areas and shortages elsewhere. Further, if any teacher leaves service after the 190-day training period, hiring is not resumed till the next recruitment cycle. This also creates vacancies and leads to teacher shortages in certain schools.

To counter these issues of teacher shortages and the skewed distribution of teachers across schools, the Government of Punjab introduced three teacher rationalisation policies in the past decade: in 2005, 2008 and most recently in 2010. Their aim was to create an STR of 1:40 in all schools and address the issues of multi-grade teaching and one-teacher schools. In order to achieve this, a two-pronged approach was adopted, comprising school mergers and the rationalisation of teachers. Under the school merger policy, schools with very low STRs and enrolment overall were merged to form one school. The surplus staff resulting from this merger was to be shifted to other schools on the basis of achieving an STR of 40:1. Teacher rationalisation focused on shifting surplus staff to schools deficient in staff and addressing complaints regarding staff shortages. These policies thus attempted to fill the vacancies created by teachers either opting out during the initial induction period or resigning in order to reapply to other posts. This was also done to ensure that every teacher had a reasonable workload and to curtail multi-grade teaching.

The evidence, however, points towards barriers that have constrained the effective implementation of these rationalisation policies; the problems in implementation have persisted with the 2010 rationalisation policy. The main reason that these policies were not implemented properly was the lack of buy-in from teachers and teachers' unions. According to a study by the Society for the Advancement of Education (2012), teachers and teachers' unions were not taken into confidence when the 2010 rationalisation policy was being devised. As a result, they did not agree with it, which led to non-compliance. Further, the DPI also opposed the rationalisation policy and did not comply with its tenets. The evidence also suggests that some politically affiliated teachers managed to defy the orders given under the policy and retained their posts.

Apart from issues in implementation, there are a number of other concerns regarding the rationalisation policy. For instance, in the aftermath of rationalisation, teachers were reappointed to different students in the middle of the academic year, which meant that students' progress was not monitored by the same teacher over the year, negatively affecting their learning outcomes. Moreover, when reallocating teachers across schools, the policy has failed to account for problems of distance and mobility faced by female teachers. The issue of distance can result in either increased teacher absenteeism or teachers resigning from their posts, creating vacancies that cannot be filled till the next recruitment cycle. Thus, rather than resolving the issue of vacant posts, the policy may in fact have created more of such vacancies. Lastly, the policy focuses on maintaining a 1:40 STR but does not account for multi-grade teaching. For instance, if a school comprises 40 students divided among different grades, then one teacher will not suffice since it would lead to multi-grade teaching.

Although on paper, all these policies have recommended effective deployment strategies for teachers, this has not translated into action, for which flawed implementation and nepotism are primarily responsible. One way to tackle this issue is to involve teachers and teachers' unions in the design and development of allocation policies. Further, when rationalising teachers across schools, the distance to school – especially for female teachers – needs to be kept in mind. This will ensure better compliance and more effective implementation.

Figure1.4: Policy Gaps in Deployment



1.2.5 Conclusion

This section has analysed some of the major policy changes in the areas of recruitment, retention and deployment in the Punjab, Pakistan and how they affect teacher motivation, and indicated some of the policy gaps that remain unaddressed. Despite the numerous policies and reforms that have been introduced in the province over the past decade, nepotism in the recruitment and deployment process, inadequate teacher motivation and the lack of good-quality teaching in schools still plaque the public education system in Pakistan. One reason for this is that a number of policy changes have come into effect in a short period but without any proper evaluation having been carried out. Hence, policies are discarded or changed before their impact can be gauged. This implies that some good polices may be rescinded. Too many policy changes and little or no persistence in policy implementation also adversely affect teacher motivation and, therefore, teaching quality. For instance, the sudden shift to English as the medium of instruction in schools – without properly training current teachers in how to deal with the new curriculum – has led to lower-quality teaching as teachers themselves have not fully grasped the curriculum they have to teach.

In terms of recruitment, an important question that arises is whether it is even possible to identify and recruit motivated individuals as teachers. Can providing incentives sustain the motivation of these teachers? What sorts of incentives are needed to do this? Bonus schemes and teacher incentives based on students' examination results may lead to rote learning and

teaching to the test. This needs to be kept in mind when designing any incentive package. Finally, can teachers be looked at through a labour market lens at all? In order to ensure the effective recruitment, retention and deployment of teachers, these questions need to be carefully debated and reflected on. The public education system needs good-quality teachers and the sooner Pakistan gets the recruitment, retention and deployment of teachers right, the sooner the public education system will improve.

2 Data Analysis

2.1 Introduction

The supremacy of teachers in the delivery of high-quality education is indisputable. However, many developing countries are challenged in the equitable, efficient and effective delivery of teaching services, which undermines their achievement of this goal. The Government of Punjab has undertaken significant reforms in teacher recruitment, retention and deployment, placing strong emphasis on teacher resources. Effective recruitment and posting strategies help ensure the equitable distribution of teachers whereas adequate deployment allows the efficient delivery of teaching services and well-designed retention policies are aimed at achieving teacher effectiveness. Keeping this in view, the government's policy reforms have ranged from increasing the sheer number of teachers to meet rising student needs to implementing new in-service training programmes and hiring teachers on fixed-term contracts or using merit-based hiring to improve the recruitment process (see Chapter 1.2 for a discussion on major policy reforms over the past decade).

Concurrent with these state-wide programmes are wider developments that have the potential to (directly or indirectly) affect teachers with resulting educational outcomes for millions of children in Pakistan. One of the best examples of this is the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2012, which calls for making all 5–16-year-old children residing in different parts of Pakistan legally eligible for free and compulsory education. While the act is still in varied phases of development in the different constitutional regions of the country,[2] if promulgated, it has the potential to affect tens of millions of children across Pakistan. However, the teaching resources needed to translate policy into practice need to be carefully considered and state-level governments need to ensure that effective policies are adopted that buttress these efforts to improve educational access and quality rather than hinder or block development.

The Government of Punjab's policy efforts to improve educational access are broadly viewed as having been successful. This belief stems from several key milestones and outcomes that have been achieved over the last few decades. For example, considerable progress has been made in the universalisation of basic education for children. The gross enrolment rate at the primary level has risen from 95% in 2004/05 to 98% in 2012, with the gender gap in enrolment decreasing by

[2] In Punjab, as of 8 July 2013, the official website http://rtepakistan.org/legislation/punjab/ claims that legislation on the act is currently pending. According to the website, the 'Punjab Education Commission has finalized a draft "Right to Education" bill and presented it to the Punjab government for approval. Meanwhile the Pakistan Muslim League-Q has presented its own Bill to the Cabinet yet to be considered. The civil society is trying to make these bills open to debate so that all the shortcomings can be addressed [*sic*].'

four percentage points.[3] The percentage of students completing primary school has also increased from 67.1% in 2004/05 to 80% in 2011.[4] Strides have been made in data collection and monitoring systems. However, attempts to provide a good-quality education to those entering the education system have met with less resounding success.

The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) from various years laments the lack of basic learning among rural children across the country and Punjab is no exception. While it fares better than other parts of the country, this achievement 'advantage' for Punjab, when compared to an incredibly low level of national achievement, does not really amount to much. The role of the teacher in achieving these challenges is paramount and, within this context, the relevant evaluation question pertains to whether major policy changes have led to teacher services being delivered in an effective, efficient and equitable manner over the past few years. An answer to this question can highlight progress made as well as focus attention on the challenges that remain to be addressed and the role of the teachers in overcoming them.

The analysis in this report uses various data sources, including data from the EMIS (2007–12) and the Teachers Survey (2006) and richer data from household surveys such as the Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP) of 2006 and SchoolTELLS data from 2011. The graphs, charts and tables are appropriately labelled to explain which data have been used. Key features of the data are described in Box 2.1 below.

Box 2.1: Data Sources

EMIS School Survey

The EMIS School Survey is an annual survey conducted by the PMIU. It was initiated in 2002/03 under the ambit of the PESRP and covers all government schools in the Punjab. The data is collected through interviews with school head teachers and based on the observations of field staff. It includes school-level variables such as the school level, gender, number of teachers employed (by class and post), school facilities (availability of libraries, laboratories and playgrounds as well as provision of basic facilities such as electricity, drinking water and toilets), number of classrooms and school enrolment. The survey was further enriched in 2007/08 to include more detailed information on schoolteachers, including variables measuring their qualifications, professional degrees, in-service training and demographics. This detailed data on

[3] Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (various issues).
[4] PSLM (2004/05); Punjab Development Statistics (2011).

teachers is used in this report to analyse the changes in composition of the teaching force. We use data from 2008–12.

Teachers Survey: Personal Information Management System (2006)

As part of the EMIS survey in 2006, the PMIU also collected extensive data on schoolteachers, headmasters and headmistresses in Punjab at all school levels. The details were verified by the AEO and DEO of the respective district to ensure that the information collected was correct and up to date. The teachers were asked to give details of their demographic characteristics, qualifications and grades, training, service details and previous posts (including institution name and duration of service there). We use data from the 2006 round of the Teachers Survey.

RECOUP (2006–07)

The RECOUP household survey was conducted in Pakistan between November 2006 and March 2007. It was administered to 1,194 urban and rural households that were selected randomly through stratified sampling from nine districts in two provinces – Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The RECOUP survey collected basic demographic, anthropometric, education and labour market status information on all resident household members in the sampled households (more than 8,000 individuals); detailed individual-level questionnaires were administered only to those aged between 15 and 60 years. Some 4,907 individual-level questionnaires were thus filled. Tests were also administered to assess these individuals' skills in literacy, numeracy, health knowledge and English. For literacy and numeracy two types of instruments were used for capturing 'basic-order' skills and 'higher order' skills.

In our analysis, we have used the scores for the 'short literacy test' and 'short numeracy test', each consisting of five questions. Individuals also coded their occupation status (which distinguishes between teachers and nonteachers) and provided information on whether they had graduated with a 'First', 'Second' or 'Third' division in their Matriculation, FSc, BSc, and higher-level exams. These aspects of the data are used in parts of the analysis in this report.

SchoolTELLS Pakistan (2011)

The SchoolTELLS Pakistan survey was undertaken in April–May 2011 with World Bank funding and with the collaboration of Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (Centre for Education and Consciousness). The survey covered three districts – Faisalabad, Mianwali and Rahimyar Khan – in Punjab. The project covered 20 villages in each district: two schools were selected from each

village, comprising a total sample of 120 schools. The main purpose of this study was to obtain reliable in-depth data to comprehensively understand the relationship between student learning levels and factors that influence them, such as teachers' backgrounds, children's backgrounds and ability, classroom environment and school environment.

Student tests were used to determine learning levels for students in classes 3 and 5, while students' ability or IQ was tested using the Raven's Progressive Test (rpm). Students' background information was collected using a questionnaire. Ten students from class 3 and ten from class 5 (from each school) took the tests and questionnaire. Teachers' learning levels were measured using a test that was designed to test three main competencies: their understanding of the subject matter in the primary curriculum, their ability to spot students' mistakes and their ability to explain content effectively. (Unknown to the two groups, their tests included some common mathematics and language questions.) Additional background information was also collected on areas such as experience, education, affiliation, political economy issues (such as union membership) and measures of effort (time spent on tasks, absenteeism etc.). The survey gathered rich information on more than 1,500 students and more than 300 teachers across the 120 schools in Punjab.

We discuss some of the key findings that emerge from these data sources and their possible policy implications. One caveat to note is that these data are not representative of Pakistan as a whole and the findings from this research are meant to be informative. On a more positive note, some of the findings reported highlight critical issues in education in areas that have been sampled for the first time and provide food for thought to policy makers, researchers and academics alike.

The rich analysis conducted using several datasets highlights some interesting findings. Our analysis shows that the recruitment of teachers, both male and female, has expanded over the years 1960–2000, peaking in the 1980s and 1990s. With the change in policy on recruitment, there was a rapid expansion in the hiring of contract teacher in the 2000s. Teacher numbers have further trended upwards over the past five years (2008–12) with the proportion of female teachers increasing over time. However, a look at STRs over time and across districts and regions does not paint a similar rosy picture of the teacher labour market. Although overall STRs can be seen to be decreasing over time, they remain high in rural areas and for primary schools. Further, inter-district variations in STRs suggests the inefficient allocation of teachers with some districts facing severe teacher shortages while others face an excess supply, especially in primary

schools. Weak deployment is further evidenced in the extent of multi-grade teaching and the proportion of one-teacher schools across districts, especially in rural areas. This suggests, first, a flaw in the allocation of posts across districts and regions on initial recruitment and, second, a failure of the rationalisation policies in adjusting teachers across schools to ameliorate the problem of inefficient deployment.

The trends in teacher recruitment show that, in concurrence with policy changes that have raised the bar in terms of qualification requirements for entering the sector, more teachers with a first or second division grade at the highest degree level are being hired. The pool of teachers is also improving in terms of pre-service and in-service training acquired. This is in keeping with the higher professional qualification requirements for teachers and the development of the CPD framework for in-service training. However, two caveats remain: (i) there are still a high proportion of teachers, especially in primary schools, with a PTC or CT and a mechanism is required to filter them out of the system or improve their qualifications; (ii) rural areas and female teachers remain disadvantaged in terms of access to in-service training. Higher qualifications do not necessarily imply greater effort on a teacher's part or a resultant better teaching quality. For teaching quality to improve, teachers need to be motivated through effective incentive structures and accountability mechanisms.

Two main factors that motivate teachers are salaries and promotions. The analysis indicates that teachers' promotions are not presently linked to performance, which undermines the incentive structure once they have been inducted into the teaching profession. However, as per the policy, teachers with higher qualifications are rewarded in the form of promotions: those with doctorates and Master's degrees take the lead in the average number of promotions awarded over their respective teaching tenure. Further, while there have been periodical salary revisions over the past decade, the increments are not linked with teachers' performance, again undermining their incentives. Finally, political interference in teacher recruitment, retention and deployment remains rife and leads not only to inefficient deployment, as mentioned above, but also exacerbates the problem of weak accountability. Flawed policy design and implementation combined with political interference are, potentially, some of the main reasons for de-motivated teachers, resulting in poor learning outcomes.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the extent to which changes in recruitment policies have led to an equitable distribution of teacher services in Punjab and an improvement in the quality of the teaching force. We focus especially on the composition of the teacher labour market (numbers, age, gender and academic profile). Section 2.3 discusses the

impact of major reforms in retention policies on teacher effectiveness by analysing teacher competence, training levels, salaries and accountability concerns especially with respect to the political economy of education systems within which teachers work. Section 2.4 focuses on efficiency concerns such as teacher management and deployment and Section 2.5 concludes with a discussion of the main issues arising from this analysis.

2.2 Teacher Recruitment: Trends in Numbers, Gender Composition and Qualifications in the Teacher Labour Market

This section investigates the link between the main changes in recruitment policy and trends in the key characteristics of the teacher labour market in the Punjab. A discussion of this is helpful from a future planning perspective for effective teacher recruitment through policies aimed at balancing teacher numbers, their experience and gender across different regions of the province. Various datasets (discussed above) have been used to examine teacher numbers, changes in the gender composition of the teaching force and trends in teachers' qualifications and contractual status over the past few years.

One of the key policy goals pursued by the Punjab government has been to ensure universal enrolment. However, one consequence of this ambitious policy is that, if rising student numbers are not met by commensurate increases in teacher numbers, the quality of education offered may be severely compromised through poorer learning environments arising as a result of multi-grade teaching and higher STRs. Table 2.1 depicts absolute teacher numbers over the 2008–12 period and Figures 2.1 to 2.2 depict this by school gender and school level over the same period.

Table 2.1: Absolute Teacher and Student Numbers in Punjab, 2008–11 (All School Types)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total Number of Teachers	30,2021	31,3341	31,4171	31,4322	33,1837
Total Number of Students	10,912,634	10,644,434	10,674,740	10,679,244	10,640,159
Total Number of Schools	62,686	61,724	59,050	60,500	57,426

Source: EMIS data (2008–12).

It is clear that, while absolute teacher numbers have increased over the five-year period across different schooling levels and school types (male and female schools), the number of students has actually declined as has the total number of schools. Additionally, disaggregating by school gender and school type yields a slightly different picture that indicates that teacher numbers are actually more static or follow a declining trend compared to what aggregated statistics show. This

is especially apparent from Figure 2.2, which shows that teacher numbers in primary schools have actually declined somewhat over the five-year period.

Figure 2.1A, however, shows that there has been an increase in the absolute number of female teachers hired over the five-year period. The distribution of female teachers in the teaching labour force has been shown to be a significant factor in determining the level of girls' enrolment and retention in schools (UNESCO, 2003; Bista, 2005; and UNESCO, 2006a). Hiring a higher proportion of female teachers is a promising trend as recent research from the Punjab indicates that being taught by a female teacher is especially beneficial to girls' learning outcomes (see Aslam and Kingdon, 2011).

Figure 2.1B illustrates the trends in teacher recruitment between 1960 and 2000 by gender and shows that the recruitment of both male and female teachers peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, which corresponds broadly with the policies of rapid educational expansion that were met by recruiting large numbers of teachers – a story common across much of the South Asian region. Many people maintain that the rapid expansion of schooling across much of South Asia (Pakistan being no exception) has been achieved at an enormous cost because it has resulted in the deterioration of quality in education systems in the region. This, it has been argued, has led to the recruitment of a huge pool of poorly qualified and untrained individuals. The expansion of education systems at the expense of good-quality teachers is problematic because their initial training and education is believed to contribute to good-quality education, which, in turn, is known to positively affect student learning.

Figure2.1A: Absolute Teacher Numbers, by School Gender (2008–12)



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

Figure2.1B: Recruitment Distribution, by Gender and Year of Recruitment



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

Figure 2.2: Absolute Teacher Numbers, by School Level (2008–12)



Ensuring that the quality needs of the teaching cadre are effectively met relies on attracting a reasonable number of competent individuals to the teaching profession. While academic qualifications do not necessarily reflect ability, it is recognised that the persistent entry of less intellectually capable people is likely to compromise the quality of teaching with resultant negative implications for student outcomes (World Bank, 2009a).

The highly acclaimed education system in the Republic of Korea is credited with attracting some of the best graduates to the profession each year. The research indicates that making teaching a preferred choice of career does not necessarily depend on high salaries but more so on critical policy choices that relate to developing strong processes for recruiting and training teachers, paying competitive salaries relative to other professions and carefully managing the status of the teaching profession.

The intellectual capability of persons entering the teaching profession is highly debated. It is argued that, with a few exceptions, only less able individuals choose teaching jobs. A study by Cuenca (2005) on training programmes in ten Latin American countries concludes that, more often than not, future teachers come from a pool of secondary graduates with lower entrance scores than their peers (cited in World Bank, 2009b, p 4). Lack of data has meant that, while the same is believed to be true of teachers in South Asia, the view is based more on anecdotal evidence than on sound data or empirical analysis.

Figure 2.3 uses the RECOUP dataset to illustrate the 'quality' differences between teachers and non-teaching wage workers, using various proxies for quality (highest academic qualification, passing 'division', etc.). A large percentage of teachers are graduates in science subjects compared to non-teaching individuals, suggesting a relatively high quality pool of the teaching cadre. However, a disproportionately lower number of teachers (science graduates) have completed a Master's degree and, even among all postgraduates, a significantly lower number of teachers have obtained a first division (arts and sciences) (see Figure 2.4). In general, a higher percentage of teachers tend to complete their education as 'private candidates' compared to non-teachers. Private candidates are those who sit their board exams after self-study rather than based on study in a regular school or college, and their results are generally inferior with worrying implications for teacher quality.

Figure 2.3: How Able are Our Teachers? (RECOUP, 2006)



However, while the above graph provides a snapshot, albeit a rich one, of the pool of teaching versus non-teaching candidates, Figure 2.4 depicts the trend over time in the teaching cadre. It shows that there has been a steady increase in the hiring of 'more able' teachers (i.e. those who have obtained a first division (from about 3.5% in the 1960–1970 period to almost 20% during 2000–10). However, a vast majority of the teaching cadre constitutes candidates who have not fared very well in their own examinations, indicating that the teaching profession in Punjab continues to draw less able individuals with implications for their own effectiveness in imparting meaningful learning.

Over the past decade, the Punjab Government has focused on qualifications-based recruitment policies, raising the minimum academic requirements for teachers (see Section 1.2.2 for further details). Within this context, there has been a significant improvement in the 'quality' of the teaching cadre.

Figures 2.5A to 2.6C variously depict the extent to which teaching 'effectiveness' has increased through strides made in improving the qualifications of teachers. There is a substantial increase in teachers with postgraduate qualifications or higher (from 25% in 2008 to about 39% in 2012) and a noteworthy decline in teachers with only a Matriculation certificate over the same period (Figure 2.5A). Going forward, policies may need to address the somewhat stagnant 28% or so of teachers who merely have an intermediate qualification (grade 12 or FA/FSc). It is also clear from Figures 2.5B and 2.5C that these averages mask considerable variation across school levels and districts. Figure 2.5B, for instance, shows that, in 2012, over 60% of the teachers in primary schools had acquired either 10 or 12 years of schooling (Matriculation or FA/FSc) and a very small percentage of teachers were highly qualified. While some of the well-qualified teachers teach in higher secondary schools, primary schooling forms the foundation stage of learning and there is a need for good-quality teaching to be focused at this level to ensure meaningful learning. Policy may, therefore, need to advocate improved qualifications of teachers at the primary education level. Similarly, Figure 2.5C shows a wide variation in teachers' qualifications by district with some districts faring better than others at attracting well-qualified individuals to the teaching profession.

Figure 2.4: Distribution of Grade Division in Highest Degree Attained



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

Figure2.5A: Academic Qualifications of Teachers over Time



Figure2.5B: Academic Qualifications of Teachers, by School Level



Figure 2.5C: Academic Qualifications of Teachers, by District



In terms of pre-service training, recruitment policies have emphasised the hiring of better qualified individuals by raising the minimum professional requirements for PSTs and ESTs from a PTC or CT to a B-Ed or BS-Ed. Figure 2.9 below shows the trend over time in the distribution of professional qualifications. As expected, the proportion of teachers with a PTC or CT has

decreased over time. However, there are still a high proportion of teachers with a PTC or CT (27.84%) in 2012. Further, although till 2011, the proportion of teachers with a B-Ed, BS-Ed or M-Ed degree has steadily risen over time, there is a stark rise in the number of teachers with 'other' degrees (i.e. subject-specific degrees) in 2012. This can be attributed to the emphasis in the 2011 recruitment policy on the hiring of subject specialists, specifically science and maths teachers.

Figures 2.6B and 2.6C show the inter-school-level and inter-district variation in teachers' professional qualifications. There is a significant variation in professional degrees at the different school levels with PTC or CT holders being employed mainly in primary schools (60% of PSTs have a PTC or CT). As primary schools form the basis for a student's further learning, it is important to have well-qualified teachers equipped with the latest teaching methods at this level as well. We also see a stark difference in the proportion of B-Ed or BS-Ed and M-Ed degree holders across districts; some districts still have a high proportion of PTC or CT holders, who are mainly older teachers that were hired prior to the policy change in professional education requirements. As for permanent teachers, there is no firing mechanism and teachers remain in the field till they retire. It is hard to filter out teachers with inadequate degrees and teaching skills. One way forward is to make it compulsory for them to undergo further training and improve their degrees.

Figure2.6A: Professional Qualifications of Teachers Over Time



Figure 2.6B: Professional Qualifications of Teachers, by School Level



Note: MPS = Model Primary School.

Figure 2.6C: Professional Qualifications of Teachers, by District



One key policy change in recruitment was the introduction of 'fixed-term' contracts in 2002 in conjunction with a recruitment freeze on the hiring of regular teachers. Figure 2.7 depicts this graphically, showing a peak in the hiring of 'contract teachers' in the late 1990s and a dramatic decline in that of 'regular teachers'. Governments in South Asia are relying increasingly on contract or para-teachers who are not hired through the civil service system. India and Bangladesh have experimented with introducing this type of teacher on a relatively large scale while Pakistan's experiment has not been entirely successful. In Sri Lanka and Nepal, 'temporary' teachers have also been hired by local bodies in a bid to overcome deployment problems and improve local accountability.

Contract and temporary teachers generally have lower educational qualifications (though significant youth unemployment often means that they are not any less qualified than regular teachers), are paid a fraction of what civil servant or regular teachers are paid and generally have fixed-term contracts with varied renewability. The main impetus to introducing para-teachers into schooling systems was to reduce costs. Another stimulus for the increased recruitment of contract teachers is the deployment of teachers to remote regions, especially rural areas to which regular teachers avoid being posted.

A recent review of the evidence on contract teachers in the developing world indicates that they can be a successful and cost-effective means of reducing teacher shortages and that children's learning outcomes are no worse (if not better) than if taught by regular teachers (see Aslam et al. 2012. However, in the case of Pakistan, the contract teacher policy did not work mainly because these teachers were better qualified than their permanent counterparts but were paid a quarter of the latter's salary (Habib, 2010) – the minimum qualification requirement for contract teachers was a Bachelor's degree; permanent teachers previously hired were required to have attained merely a Matriculation certificate as a minimum requirement. This acted as a disincentive for contract teachers, leading to de-motivation and lack of effort on their part (see Section 1.1.2 for an analysis of the 2002 contract policy).

Figure 2.7: Teacher Composition in the Teacher Labour Market



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

2.3 Retention: How Effective Have Policy Reforms Been in Enhancing Teachers' Motivation and Quality?

This section investigates the impact of key changes in retention policies on teachers' motivation and quality, which, in turn, enhance the effectiveness of teaching services. There are a number of factors that affect teachers' motivation, such as accountability and the incentive structures in place, a clear career path and teachers' confidence in the curriculum being taught. In this context, we examine the policies relating to teacher training, salaries and promotion structure.

If the easiest way to recruit a good teacher is to train one (Chingos and Peterson, 2011), appropriate teacher training can prove a very useful policy tool in improving teacher quality.

Under this view, the recruitment of teachers need not be based on minimum competency levels and qualifications under the presumption that knowledge and skill gaps can be filled through in-service training. In this regard, in-service training can be a very effective policy tool, especially in hard-to-reach areas where very few individuals achieve high education levels and where policy-makers are, therefore, obliged to recruit less-qualified individuals as teachers. Further, teacher training is important not only in increasing the competency of teachers but also their confidence in the curriculum they are teaching; it thus affects teachers' motivation. Therefore, ensuring good-quality in-service training is crucial from a motivational standpoint and also for achieving a meaningful learning experience for children. Figures 2.8A-2.8C show the changes over time in the levels of professionally trained teachers in government schools across the Punjab by gender and by region and a snapshot in 2012 of the proportion of teachers who received in-service training by district.

Following the introduction of the CPD framework by the Government of Punjab and the restructuring of the DSD – whereby DTSCs and CTSCs were set up to provide in-service training at the district and tehsil levels (see Section 1.2.2) – the proportion of teachers reportedly receiving in-service training has increased substantially over time. This increase has occurred among both men and women and also among teachers in urban and rural areas (Figures 2.8A and 2.8B). However, it is also apparent that women and rural teachers consistently report receiving less in-service training than their male counterparts or those residing in urban locales. Moreover, while it is obvious that the gender gap in in-service training has declined over 2008–12 and the absolute number of trained teachers has certainly increased over time in rural areas, the regional gap has not declined over the five-year period.

More importantly, while the glass-half-full picture is certainly rosy and one of improvements in in-service training by gender and across regions, the glass-half-empty one still indicates that over half the teachers in the country do not appear to be recipients of in-service training. Figure 2.8C depicts wide variations across districts: only 35% of teachers in Bahawalnagar have received in-service training as opposed to almost 61% in Bhakkar. Thus, there appears to be a significant divide in the extent to which the reforms in teacher training have effectively improved access to in-service training and, hence, increased teacher effectiveness in the Punjab.

Figure 2.8A: In-Service Training, by Gender, 2008–12



Figure 2.8B: In-Service Training, by Region, 2008–12

Figure 2.8C: In-Service Training, by District, 2012



Teacher effectiveness in imparting meaningful learning depends largely on teacher competence and knowledge to achieve this ultimate aim. There is surprisingly little evidence on this key component of what makes an effective teacher. The unique SchoolTELLS survey in Punjab was aimed at measuring teachers' competence in relation to knowledge and tested their ability to spot mistakes that children commonly make as well as teachers' ability to explain concepts in mathematics and language. A key feature of this survey was that, unknown to the teachers, they were administered the same test as student respondents in grades 3 and 5 on material that they were expected to be teaching at the grade 3 curriculum level. The survey was conducted with a view to identifying the extent to which teachers in rural Punjab are capable of teaching primary school curricula.

There are some striking findings as indicated in Figure 2.9. The glass-half-full picture indicates teachers in rural Punjab to be somewhat competent in certain skills – 82% of the teachers tested were able to explain long division correctly while 64% were able to explain the meaning of difficult words with precision. However, the glass-half-empty scenario points to the fact that not all the teachers were able to correctly answer grade 3 curriculum questions. It is of concern that, in some instances, teachers do not have the competencies required to teach the curriculum as expected. For example, in a question relating to two-digit addition, only 36% of the teachers were able to explain the concept while an alarming 32% were unable to do so.

As a consequence, it is doubtful whether these teachers are able to impart meaningful learning to their pupils. In fact, it is apparent from Figure 2.9 that their students do not appear to have learnt many of the basic skills captured in the assessments. For example, only 34% were able to answer correctly a grade 3 curriculum question on long division. Similarly, in language, only 11% of the children correctly identified the meanings of difficult words. This reflects not only a lack of knowledge on the part of the teacher but also the inability to transmit knowledge to students to a satisfactory degree.

Figure 2.9: Competencies of Teachers and Students on Identical Tests, Rural Punjab (2011)



Source: SchoolTELLS Pakistan (2011).

There is considerable evidence in the literature on the association between competent teachers and student learning. This evidence from across the world broadly suggests that teachers' capabilities are positively related to student achievement (see for instance Metzler and Woessman, 2012). There is no question about it: a competent teacher produces better learners. Therefore, improving teachers' competence (and hence effectiveness) will undoubtedly produce better outcomes. The major challenge of teacher effectiveness lies in recruiting and 'training' competent teaching candidates. This is especially pertinent given the large number of teachers having been recruited without the requisite qualifications in a bid to meet rising student numbers.

Improving recruitment policies and attracting more able individuals to become part of the teaching cadre could be one approach. Countries have experimented with teacher tests (such as the Teacher Eligibility Test in India) in the recruitment process in a bid to improve the quality of inductees into the teaching workforce. However, as the Indian case reveals, the pass rate in these tests was shockingly low, which raised questions about their content. In designing similar policies for Pakistan, care would need to be taken to ensure that such a test actually examined the competencies and knowledge base expected of an effective teacher.

If such tests are to be used in the recruitment process and if the test truly examines the competencies believed to be necessary for an effective teacher, the burden would then lie with the pre-service and in-service training providers to ensure that the teaching cadre of new and existing recruits was effectively equipped with the competencies needed by effective teachers. In-service training can be used not only to plug gaps in skills but also to enable teachers to deal with special circumstances (multi-grade teaching or teaching children with disabilities), which arise frequently in a teaching career. Equipping teachers with such skills increases their motivation and confidence in their teaching abilities and makes them more likely to remain in the profession.

The effectiveness of teachers depends not only on teacher training but also on teacher effort. This effort, in turn, depends crucially on the accountability and incentive structures that teachers face. In many developing countries, the teacher effort exerted while in school is pitiably low, as measured by very high teacher absence rates. The problem, therefore, is not even one of low-quality teaching but one of no teaching at all for a significant part of the time (World Bank, 2004). Teacher absence has been linked with low student outcomes in a diverse group of countries (Miller et al., 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2006). Additional equity issues arise as absence rates in the latter study appear to be higher in areas that serve disadvantaged or marginalised children, further lowering the quality of education they receive. Research in developing countries has also shown that absence has a very large impact on student outcomes: each additional increase of 5% in teacher absence lowers student outcomes by a remarkably large amount - 4–8% of an academic year's learning (Das et al., 2007).

Poor motivation and a lack of accountability (through credible sanctions and punishment) are said to be the main reasons for the high rates of absenteeism observed among teachers in developing countries. The only clear evidence on 'teacher effort' emerges from the LEAPS study on rural Punjab and more recently from the SchoolTELLS survey. Both sources confirm the relatively high levels of absence among government school teachers in rural Punjab.

The LEAPS project in rural Pakistan (Andrabi et al., 2007) finds that government school teachers were absent one-fifth of the time. Absence rates were measured through reports by head teachers and are likely to be underestimates. Nevertheless, there are striking differences in absence rates between government and private school teachers: more 'experienced' or senior government school teachers were more likely to be absent than their younger colleagues while female teachers were more likely to be absent than their male colleagues in government schools. None of these differences by gender or experience exist in private schools. The study attributes some of these differences to the additional non-teaching workloads of government school teachers and most of them to the higher degree of accountability in the private schooling sector.

Data from the SchoolTELLS survey reveals that, on the day of the survey team's visit, 11% of the teachers were reportedly absent. This was an unannounced visit and teacher absence was measured by counting how many were absent rather than being based on the head's account. The majority of this absence was 'unexplained' rather than attributable to official non-teaching duties. Illness accounted for most of the explained absences. The teacher absence rate in private schools, where there tend to be stricter accountability policies, was 7%. This is lower than the absence rate of 12% found in government schools.

An important reason why the observed absence rates among private school teachers are substantially lower than among government school teachers is that the former hold periodically renewable jobs while the latter have jobs for life. Another often-observed problem is that, even when teachers are present in school, they are often not found engaged in teaching. Unfortunately, there is no statistical evidence of this in Punjab but evidence from India confirms that this is a persistent problem across the region. Additionally, more recent research from Pakistan indicates that teacher effectiveness may be related to more nuanced factors, such as teaching processes and teachers' attitudes (see Aslam and Kingdon, 2011. Box 2.2 highlights a recent study on rural Punjab that delves into teachers' opinions and examines whether these affect their ability to teach and the resultant student outcomes.

Box 2.2: Disentangling Teacher Effectiveness in Rural Punjab

A more recent study by Rawal, Aslam and Jamil (2013), using the SchoolTELLS data from rural Punjab, looks further into teacher attitudes and views to examine whether these affect teachers' ability to teach and the resultant student outcomes and also whether these attitudes vary along gender lines. A table from this study is replicated below and indicates teachers' perspectives and

whether they agree that they are dissatisfied with their current salary, are active in unions and other aspects such as student abilities and so on.

Teachers' Perspectives: The Case of Punjab

Agrees that:		Female teacher	Male teacher	t-stat of difference
Dissatisfied with salary	Mean	0.5855	0.5667	0.7507
	SD	0.4930	0.4958	
Dissatisfied with facilities	Mean	0.5202	0.5000	0.7967
	SD	0.4999	0.5003	
Teacher problems	Mean	0.8897	0.8806	0.5622
	SD	0.3135	0.3245	
Leaders are effective	Mean	0.3212	0.4309	-4.4832***
	SD	0.4673	0.4955	
Teachers active in unions	Mean	0.5899	0.5300	2.3781**
	SD	0.4922	0.4994	
Performance-related pay	Mean	0.9443	0.9868	-4.7247***
	SD	0.2295	0.1140	
Salary reduction for absence	Mean	0.8340	0.8040	1.5191
	SD	0.3723	0.3972	
All students capable in maths	Mean	0.7775	0.8009	-1.1385
	SD	0.4162	0.3995	
Use new training techniques	Mean	0.9468	0.9883	-4.784***
	SD	0.2246	0.1076	
Satisfied with own skills and knowledge	Mean	0.9444	0.9789	-3.6358***
	SD	0.2294	0.1437	
Have difficulties in teaching maths	Mean	0.5660	0.5389	1.0675
	SD	0.4960	0.4988	
Boys more passionate about studies	Mean	0.2254	0.3832	-6.7866***
	SD	0.4181	0.4864	
Boys more capable in maths	Mean	0.6704	0.6464	0.999
	SD	0.4704	0.4784	
Send reports annually to parents	Mean	0.8452	0.7993	2.3611**
	SD	0.3620	0.4008	
Inquire about student absence	Mean	0.9847	0.9402	4.5415***
	SD	0.1228	0.2372	
Parents are attentive	Mean	0.5063	0.5878	-3.2483***
	SD	0.5003	0.4925	
Parents have no objection to teachers punishing	Mean	0.4098	0.5649	-6.1541***
	SD	0.4921	0.4961	

The table above explores these issues in further detail. Levels of dissatisfaction with salary and facilities appear to be the same across gender despite the fact that female teachers are paid so much less than their male colleagues. Male teachers display more faith in political leaders than female teachers, but the latter say they are more actively involved in teachers' unions. A remarkable 98% of female teachers indicate a preference for performance-related pay and,

although statistically significantly less, 94% of male teachers do so as well. Similarly high results emerge when looking at teachers' preference for salary reductions for absence: 83% of male teachers and 80% of female teachers agree with this measure. In general, male teachers are significantly more satisfied with their skills and knowledge and their use of new teaching techniques.

However, what is worrying is that more than half of both male and female teachers indicate having problems with teaching mathematics. More male than female teachers say that they believe boys are more passionate about their studies than girls, although there is no such gender bias in their opinions of children's maths capabilities in particular. What is of most concern is that over 60% of both male and female teachers think that boys are more capable in maths. Female teachers appear to be more proactive in relation to children in that more female teachers claim to send annual reports to parents and inquire about student absence. It should be noted that the means for both genders in these aspects are, nonetheless, high. Around half the teachers view parents as being attentive to their children's education, with female teachers holding more negative views in this regard.

The difference is more apparent with regard to teachers' opinions of parental views concerning classroom punishment: only 41% of female teachers agree that parents would not object compared to 56% of male teachers. These are important findings for research on teacher effectiveness. For example, if, as is the case here, more male teachers feel that parents are not likely to object to their children being punished, this may affect their teaching style. They may be stricter and harsher towards their students who, in turn, may respond to them differently as a result of this fear. This could, therefore, result in differing student outcomes. As is apparent, there are several such areas where teachers differ in their views along gender lines and, therefore, not only must one control for the gender of the teacher but also for these very opinions in order to disentangle the web of teacher effectiveness more fully.

Empirically, the study finds teachers' opinions and attitudes to be important determinants of student outcomes in rural Punjab.

Source: S Rawal, M Aslam & B Jamil, *Teacher Characteristics, Actions and Perceptions: What Matters for Student Achievement in Pakistan?*, mimeo, Institute of Education, University of London, 2013.

Teacher incentives are also deeply linked with teacher effort and, in turn, with student learning outcomes. In Punjab, the two main incentive mechanisms in place are salaries and promotions.

Government teachers' salaries in the Punjab, as in the rest of the country, are de facto linked to national pay scales, which are often revised (see Figure 2.10). Teachers in public schools are deployed as civil servants and their salaries have generally risen annually in line with civil service pay scales, the rises being the result of a combination of factors such as annual inflation-proofing, periodic raises to reflect an increase in national prosperity and lobbying pressure by public sector workers' unions, including teachers' unions. The most recent pay revision in the Punjab occurred in 2012, which resulted in the average salary of a Grade 9 PST increasing from Rs 6,200 per month to Rs 12,400 per month. With the implementation of the 2013 budget, salaries for all government employees (including teachers) have risen further by 10%. Thus, pay increments have raised teachers' salaries substantially and while the ultimate objective of this was to improve the quality of public services delivered, arguably, there are several reasons why high salaries may not always lead to better outcomes in the teaching sector.

While the premise behind higher salaries is not only to attract better individuals to the profession but also to motivate greater effort while in service, very high salaries can also have adverse effects on the profession, e.g. by attracting financially motivated individuals to the profession as opposed to those with a high aptitude for and interest in teaching. Higher salaries may also be detrimental to student learning if they greatly increase the social and economic distance between the teacher and the taught (Rawal and Kingdon, 2010) or if – by not being based on performance – there is no credible risk of dismissal for teachers who are guaranteed 'jobs for life'.

Figure 2.10: Average Monthly Salary, by Grade and Gender (2006)



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

A World Bank flagship report on teacher quality (Aslam et al., 2013) discusses the extent to which teachers' salaries may be higher than the average per capita income in different parts of Pakistan. Table 2.2 below shows that, in the Punjab, on average, teachers' salaries were more than five times the per capita income (in 2008), suggesting that teachers were about five times as well off as an average person with the equivalent education.

Table 2.2: Ratio of Teacher's Salary to Per Capita Income, by Province (Rs)

Province	Average monthly household income (2004–05), Rs/month *	Average household size (1998 census)*	Estimated monthly per capita income	Annual per capita income	Annual teacher salary in 2008+	Annual per capita income in 2008 prices**	Teacher salary as multiple of per capita income in 2008
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
Punjab	9,488	7.0	1,355	16,265	115,172	22,283	5.2
Sindh	10,413	6.1	1,707	20,485	128,624	28,064	4.6
KP	9,395	8.0	1,174	14,093	106,572	19,307	5.5
Balochistan	8,849	6.8	1,301	15,616	127,070	21,394	5.9
Pakistan	9,685	6.9	1,404	16,844	119,480	23,076	5.2

Source: Aslam, M, G Kingdon & S Rawal, *Teacher quality, World Bank flagship report*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013.

* Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (2007), Federal Bureau of Statistics; We identified teachers using the occupation codes in the Pakistan Labour Force Survey (2008). The reported salaries are for all teachers in government and private school jobs teaching at all levels. ** Column (f) shows column (d) figures inflated to 2008 prices using the wholesale price index for Pakistan reported in the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (2007).

Teachers' attitudes and effectiveness can vary depending on the incentives they face. Having 'jobs for life' crucially alters these incentives and teachers' effectiveness. Pay structure is therefore a potentially important incentive-tool in the hands of the education policymaker and proposals that link pay to performance have recently been discussed in several countries and applied in some. However, the issue of whether such linking is an effective means of improving performance has been contentious in educational debates. Thus, the current system of rewarding teachers may be highly inefficient in that teachers are rewarded – quite highly – for possessing qualifications and experience (which, in turn, determine the grade under which they are hired) and not for the outcomes (learning) they generate.

The inefficiency of rewarding teachers through salaries is also manifested in other inefficiencies, such as the lack of a coherent career progression structure, which has the potential to significantly undermine morale and motivation among teachers. One such situation arises when, rather than promoting and rewarding teachers for improved student learning, they are promoted for possessing observable characteristics such as seniority and better qualifications that have, time and again, been shown not to improve student outcomes. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that merit is hardly taken into account in determining who will be promoted and that these decisions are largely politically driven and depend on how politically well-connected the teacher is. Again, this is damaging for teacher morale and confidence.

In practice, trends in promotion show that teachers' quality, which can be approximated by the grade they have attained at the highest degree level, is inconsequential in determining promotion.

Figure 2.11A shows that those who obtained a third division in their highest degree had the highest average number of promotions irrespective of the year in which they were recruited (except the 1990s and 2000s). Passing in the third division usually indicates extremely low examination performance and does not bode well for the education system, which, arguably, already lacks a capable workforce. Those who are promoted to higher grades teach secondary and higher secondary students and need to have a better grasp of the material they are required to teach. The quality of teachers has to be ensured at all school levels but this becomes especially important at higher grades since the curriculum becomes increasingly demanding over the years. If those who have passed with a third division have the highest average number of promotions, the incentive structure for teachers in the education sector is highly distorted.

The promotion policy specifies that teachers who have completed a Master's degree or doctorate will be favoured at the time of promotion. This is supported by the data: Figure 2.11B shows that, among teachers recruited in the 1960s and 1970s, those with a doctorate were promoted more than any other highest-degree category – approximately three times more than teachers holding only a diploma – while in the 1980s and 1990s, teachers with a Master's degree took the lead. However, the breakdown by grade division (see Figure 2.11C) shows that there is no systematic link between grade division and the number of promotions within each degree category. Teachers who passed with a second or third division were more likely to be promoted than those with a first division, further proving that the incentive structure in the education sector is not conducive to encouraging better-quality teachers.

Figure 2.11A: Average Number of Promotions, by Year of Recruitment and Highest Degree Grade



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

Figure 2.11B: Average Number of Promotions, by Year of Recruitment and Highest Degree

Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

Figure 2.11C: Average Number of Promotions, by Year of Recruitment and Highest Degree Grade Division



Source: Teachers Survey (2006).

2.4 Deployment: Efficiency in the Delivery of Teaching Services

This section discusses the key issues pertaining to deployment policies in the Punjab and the resulting efficiency (or inefficiency) in teacher allocation. It highlights the potential detrimental impact of ineffective teacher management and identifies areas where improvements can be made with regard to effective policy.

One of the key causes of inefficiencies within the education system is the weak deployment of teachers with resulting disparities in teacher distribution across the country. This leaves some areas facing teacher shortages while others face excess demand, reflecting the suboptimal use of teacher resources. Poor teacher deployment is likely to manifest itself in the form of large classes. Developed countries are largely able to contain their STRs to below 30 students to 1 teacher, which allows more individual attention and better classroom management.

According to UNESCO estimates, some 45 countries around the world have STRs higher than 35:1 and the majority of these are in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (cited in VSO and CfBT, 2005). Larger classes make classrooms more difficult to manage, reduce teachers' motivation and compromise teacher quality and student learning. A more useful metric for indicating teacher inputs, therefore, is the STR. These ratios can vary widely within countries and across geographic regions. The use of averages can often mask imbalances that are not necessarily only quantitative

but also qualitative if inadequate deployment policies result in discrepancies in the availability of female teachers, qualified teachers and teachers of differing education levels across rural and urban areas. This is of particular concern in remote rural areas where marginalised children can face persistent teacher shortages even while overstaffing occurs in urban areas.

Figures 2.12A to 2.12C depict a promising decline in STRs across different education levels, school types (by gender) and regions. While encouraging, these figures clearly highlight the key challenges that remain, especially with respect to the very high STRs in primary schools (where the average class size still exceeds 40 despite the official regulation stating that classes must not exceed this number). The decline in STRs in girls' schools is especially commendable as is that in rural regions. However, the fact remains that rural STRs are substantially higher than urban ratios.

Figure 2.12A: STR Trend, by School Level (2008–12)



Figure 2.12B: STR Trend, by School Gender (2008–12)



Figure 2.12C : STR Trend, by Region (2008–12)



Figure 2.13 below uses a set STR of 40:1 to illustrate the ineffective management of teachers across districts (at all school levels) in the Punjab. We can see that there is an excess supply of teachers in most districts across the province, which has only increased over time. However, the excess supply gives a misleading picture: even though there may be up to 40 students in a school,

these students may belong to different grades. So, if there is one teacher, the STR for that school will be 40:1 or lower but that one teacher is responsible for teaching multiple grades at the same time.

Such a situation where schooling resources are so severely limited that the entire brunt of teaching is borne by a single teacher arises frequently in many government schools in Pakistan. This is especially true in remote rural locations where student and staff numbers make it necessary for children of different age groups to be combined and taught together by one teacher. Figures 2.14A to 2.14C depict the proportion of one-teacher schools over time, by location and by district. Figure 2.14A shows a promising decline in the proportion of one-teacher schools over the five-year period (from about 19% in 2008 to about 11% in 2012). However, Figures 2.14B and 2.14C indicate that rural areas and certain districts are severely disadvantaged and have a significantly large proportion of one-teacher schools.

Figure 2.13: Inefficiencies in Teacher Deployment in Punjab, All School Levels (2008 and 2012)



Figure 2.14A: Proportion of One-Teacher Schools (2008–12)



Figure2.14B: Proportion of One-Teacher Schools, by Region (2008–12)



Figure 2.14C: Proportion of One-Teacher Schools, by District (2012)



Multi-grade teaching has become a common strategy for dealing with teacher shortages and absences, particularly in remote rural areas in several developing countries. Many agree that, when it is a pedagogical choice accompanied by teacher training and learning materials that

support this style of teaching, multi-grade teaching can be as, if not more, effective as mono-grade teaching (Ames, 2006; Aikmen and el Haj, 2006). However, in many developing countries, multi-grade teaching has arisen out of necessity, not choice, and is therefore rarely accompanied by the training and resources that might make it an effective teaching methodology. This has to be balanced with the reminder that, for millions of children, small multi-grade schools may be the only type of school, if any, to which they have access.

Research on the effects of multi-grade teaching on student learning to date has shown mixed results (Little, 2008). Several studies report a disadvantage associated with this situation. For example, Kochar (2007) has found that students in multi-grade settings in Andhra Pradesh, India, performed at a lower level than their counterparts in mono-grade settings. Rowley (1992) finds that mono-grade schools in Pakistan show cognitive differences that favour mono-grade teaching. Suzuki's (2006) observation of multi-grade settings in Nepal reveal that one major negative impact is that, for some proportion of the day, there was a group of children who were neglected or ignored with no teacher taking responsibility for their learning or directing them towards self-learning during this time.

Figures 2.15A and 2.15B illustrate the extent of this phenomenon across the Punjab in recent years. It is clear from Figure 2.15A that multi-grade teaching is widely practiced across the province, especially in rural areas: more than 22% of schools report multi-grade teaching and this proportion increases over time. While it is practised less often in urban areas, more than 10% of schools undertake multi-grade teaching and this practice has increased over the past five years. From an equity perspective, this regional divide is of concern because, as is the case with most small multi-grade settings, these tend to be located in remote rural areas already facing educational deprivation and social marginalisation.

Figure 2.15A: Proportion of Schools with Multi-Grade Teaching, by Region (2008–12)



Of even greater concern is the fact that, on average, a PST teaches three grades together. As mentioned before, this practice often arises out of necessity and is unaccompanied by any training that effectively prepares the teacher for combining children of different ages and grades into one class. This picture shows considerable instability in grade-grouping configurations, which make it difficult for the teacher to prepare for a given mix of classes. Much of this, at least in India, Kingdon and Banerji (2009) argue, stems from frequent teacher absence, which results in ad-hoc-ism about classroom organisation. The primary driver governing whether teaching will be organised in a mono- or multi-grade setting in rural schools in India, the authors claim, is the teacher's absence rather than a choice about how best to address children's learning needs. There are no data from the Punjab or any other part of Pakistan to confirm whether this is also the case here but anecdotal evidence implies that it may well be so.

Figure 2.15B: Average Number of Grades Taught in a Multi-Grade Setting, by School Level (2008–12)



Note: The number of classes taught by a teacher is calculated by dividing the number of classes in a school by the total number of teachers in that school – hence, a value of less than 1 implies excess teachers, i.e. more teachers than the number of classes.

The issue of multi-grade teaching is most obvious in primary schools, which could be a result of inadequate teacher deployment. Figure 2.16A depicts the highly inefficient deployment of teachers in Punjab's primary schools with several districts facing severe teacher shortages and others facing a significant over-supply in 2012. Figures 2.16B and 2.16C illustrate this scenario by region: it is clear that the issue of poor deployment is starkest in rural areas and is fairly persistent over time. Part of the problem stems from the fact that there is often no clear guidance on how teachers will be allocated. In many situations, their effective redeployment is inhibited by the complexity of transfer/posting mechanisms and the surrounding political economy. As a result, there is often very little match between teachers' skills and children's needs.

Further, although rationalisation polices have been introduced frequently over the five-year period 2008–12, they have failed to address weak deployment in primary schools. One reason for this is inadequate implementation due to political interference and the lack of buy-in from teachers and teachers' unions (see Section 1.2.4) Moreover, the policies concentrate on having an overall STR of 40:1 in schools but do not address the issue of teachers' workloads or multi-grade teaching. These policy gaps need to be filled for efficient teacher deployment to take place.

Figure 2.16A: Inefficiencies in Teacher Deployment in Punjab, primary schools (2008 and 2012)



Figure 2.16B: Inefficiencies in Teacher Deployment in Punjab, primary schools, by region (2008)



Figure 2.16C: Inefficiencies in Teacher Deployment in Punjab, primary schools, by region (2012)



Ineffective postings on initial recruitment and the failure to fill all sanctioned posts through the recruitment cycle may also lead to flawed teacher deployment across districts. Figure 2.17 below gives the sanctioned and filled teacher posts by district for 2012. There is considerable variation in the number of sanctioned posts across districts and also a significant gap between the numbers of sanctioned and filled posts in each district. This gap indicates unfilled vacancies in each district, which could lead to high STRs and the problems of multi-grade teaching and one-teacher schools as discussed above.

Figure 2.17: Sanctioned and Filled Posts, by District (2012)



Political interference is one of the main drivers of weak deployment and inefficiencies in teacher resource delivery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is significant political penetration among teachers in Pakistan as in the rest of South Asia and that this potentially undermines efficiency in the delivery of teacher services. The extent of this politicisation is evident through newspaper reports of strike actions and political lobbying by teachers in the country, although more robust evidence is very hard to come by. The Punjab Teachers Union in Pakistan lays claim to a total strength of almost 350,000 government teachers, covering 63,000 schools in 38 districts.[5] This is equivalent to almost 100% union membership among all government school teachers in Punjab alone.

The SchoolTELLS data show that, in rural Pakistan, only 5% of teachers report being union members while as many as 85% stated that no teacher was a union member. This illustrates a reluctance to reveal union membership, which may be linked to the motives for joining unions. When asked if unions could help teachers resolve transfer-related problems, 35% answered 'yes', suggesting that teachers recognise and possibly utilise their unions in getting transfers. About 64% of the sample also believed that paying a bribe was an effective method of accomplishing a transfer. Moreover, 43% of the teachers in the sample claimed that their transfer to the current school was a 'routine' transfer; up to 44% acknowledged that their current position was due to

[5] http://punjabteachersunion.com/?p=4, downloaded 22 June 2011.

'personal requests' and effort. One teacher even admitted that she had paid an official a bribe to obtain a transfer to her current position.

The extent of politicisation in the teaching profession is reflected in the role of the bureaucracy and politicians in providing political favours in the form of transfers and postings in exchange for votes. When asked to what extent it was helpful for teachers in the district to engage with *nazims* (mayors), national or provincial assembly members and ministers in the matter of transfers and postings, almost 60% of the sample suggested that it could prove somewhat or very helpful (see Chapter 3 for an in-depth analysis of the political economy factors affecting transfers, postings, and recruitment).

Unethical practices are clearly rife across the board in many developing countries. While the governments of these countries state that teacher recruitment is transparent, it is understood that, in many countries in the region, teaching jobs are 'sold' to gain political favours or sold by educational bureaucrats simply to earn money. Better connections rather than better qualifications are used to appoint and recruit individuals to coveted permanent posts. In such a situation, the system as a whole and education officials in particular are in a weak position to insist on greater teacher accountability. As Kingdon and Muzammil (2010) say: 'The educational administrator who takes bribes from teachers (poacher) would be abashed to turn into [a] game keeper.'

Thus, the excessive politicisation of public education has had a profound impact on levels of teacher accountability in many education systems in South Asia (Bennell, 2004) and Pakistan is no different. More specifically, empirical studies on India (Kingdon and Muzammil, 2009, 2010; Kingdon and Teal, 2010) have found teachers in Uttar Pradesh to be highly unionised but also that this unionisation has a significantly negative effect on student learning. In addition, high levels of unionisation may lead to 'union wage premiums' for government school teachers. The deleterious effect of teacher politicisation on school functioning and performance arises in part because, by being engaged in political activities, teachers are kept away from actual teaching. This is then reflected in poor student learning and ill-functioning schools.

2.5 Conclusion

The Government of Punjab's efforts to reform recruitment, retention and deployment have had varying levels of impact on teacher labour market trends over the past decade. An analysis of the data suggests that recruitment policies have been the most rigorously implemented with the quality of the teaching force improving in concurrence with the reforms. However, there is

considerable inter-district variation in the pool of qualified teachers. Further, the composition of the teaching force also varies across school levels: primary schools still have a large proportion PTC and CT teachers and Matriculation certificate holders. In terms of retention, considerable progress has been made in the number of teachers receiving in-service training. This may be a result of the CPD approach to improving access to and the quality of in-service training through CTSCs and DTSCs as well as mentorship visits and 'Professional Days'. However, again, a disparity emerges across districts, region and gender, with female teachers and rural areas lagging behind in access to such training.

In terms of teacher incentives and accountability structures, the successive salary raises that have been introduced in the past decade have been ineffective in improving teachers' motivation – as evident from the high levels of teacher absenteeism in public schools. This results from the fact that the salary increments are given periodically and are not linked with performance, undermining teachers' incentives. Our analysis further shows that promotion is not linked to performance either. However, as per the policy, teachers with higher qualification are rewarded in the form of promotions: teachers with a doctorate or Master's degree take the lead in the average number of promotions over their respective teaching tenure.

Deployment remains a key issue impeding the effective delivery of teacher resources. There is considerable inter-district variation in STRs, indicating the inefficient allocation of teachers across districts: some districts face severe teacher shortages while others face an excess supply. Weak deployment is further evidenced in the extent of multi-grade teaching and the proportion of one-teacher schools, especially in rural areas. This signifies poor implementation of the many rationalisation policies introduced to ameliorate the problem of inefficient deployment. It also attests to the inadequate allocation of posts on initial recruitment. Again, we see considerable inter-district and inter-school variation in the extent of multi-grade teaching, suggesting a variation in the extent of implementation of these deployment policies.

Overall, the data analysis in this chapter suggests that, although the delivery and effectiveness of teaching resources have been improved to some degree through the myriad policy reforms introduced, a number of issues remain pertaining to effective teacher recruitment, retention and deployment. These concerns arise due to gaps in policy design, inadequate policy implementation and political interference in teacher labour market processes. Further, the stark differences we see in the trends in teacher-level variables across districts suggest an inter-district variation in the extent of policy implementation and political interference in the teacher labour market. The disparity results in the most disadvantaged groups (rural dwellers and female teachers) bearing

the brunt of the negative consequences of weak policy design and inadequate implementation. These policy gaps need to be filled in order to ameliorate the situation and reduce political interference, which results largely from flawed policy design. The next chapter uses a qualitative approach to delve into the intricacies of the political economy factors affecting the teaching sector and the policy issues that foment such political interference.

3 An Insight into the Political Economy of Education from Ethnographic Research Conducted in Three Districts of Punjab

3.1 Introduction

Education policy outcomes are highly dependent on the political courses and developments that shape them, i.e. the political economy within which policies are made and implemented (or even blocked and hindered). It is well understood that policymaking of any kind does not occur in a vacuum and education policymaking is no exception. Whenever there are varied interests, different stakeholders with varying incentives and pressure groups with the potential to exert influence to achieve their desired outcomes, there may be a conflict of interest that creates adverse political economy conditions. In the education sector, decisions and policies that are made at various tiers – ranging from ministries of education to district-level offices to even more micro-levels such as individual teachers and school heads – have implications for individuals at multiple levels. The potential heterogeneity of interests and incentives for the distribution of benefits and rents often creates adverse political economy conditions that undermine effective implementation and reform (Drazen, 2000).

The political economy of education is shaped and influenced by a number of key stakeholders, such as government officials at various tiers, bureaucrats, parents, school officials and teachers. While students are the main recipients of education-related decisions and should be seen as critical stakeholders, their inability to organise themselves and voice their concerns (mainly at lower levels of education rather than at higher levels) often leaves them out of the equation. As we have mentioned repeatedly in this report, teachers are one of the key inputs into the educational process. They are also one of the main actors in and stakeholders of education policymaking. More often than not, they are also the most well organised group and able to voice their concerns through various channels.

Chapter 2 has provided a brief, albeit interesting, picture of the political power of teachers in Punjab. Other government officials and politicians also wield strong influence over educational decision-making, some of which has also been hinted at in the chapter above. The preceding two chapters have also discussed the main policy changes and reforms pertaining to teachers that have been introduced over the past decade and the policy gaps that remain in the documentation. We have examined the data on teacher labour market variables to assess the effectiveness of these policy changes. Our analyses have revealed that, although the problems in the teacher labour market have been ameliorated to a certain extent, a number of issues remain

unaddressed. However, to gain a better understanding of why these policy gaps and shortcomings in teacher recruitment, retention and deployment persist, a deeper understanding of how policies work and how they are implemented – or indeed hindered or blocked – is needed.

In Punjab, the delivery of educational services usually occurs at the level of the district (see Section 1.2.1). The district Education Department offices are, therefore, entrusted with ultimately resolving the issues pertaining specifically to teachers. The government officials running the show in these district offices are key stakeholders in influencing the implementation of education policies that ultimately affect education outcomes. This section of the report, therefore, examines the workings of the district-level departments and their daily interaction with teachers. The objective of this exercise is to gain specific insights into the micro-level workings of these departments to identify the roles played by their key stakeholders and the main ways in which education policies at this level are either effectively realised or thwarted.

For this purpose, we conducted an ethnographic study in three districts: Attock, Rahimyar Khan and Gujranwala. The districts were selected such that our sample would be representative of the entire province of Punjab (northern, central and southern). As part of this exercise, we visited the Education Department offices in all three districts and undertook participant observations in the EDO and DEO's offices. These observations were complemented by interviews with the department officials as well as the teachers visiting the department at the time of our visit. This ethnographic study is a novel contribution to the literature because it provides a new perspective on the workings of the department, highlighting its day-to-day interaction with teachers and the political economy surrounding this interaction.

Often, policies that might seem effective on paper are not properly implemented or are beset by problems that arise during implementation, which might not have been obvious at the policy design stage. These lacunae in policy design create room for political interference, nepotism and red tape in the workings of the Education Department. As mentioned before, the influence of the main actors involved in this process is likely to affect the ultimate achievement of education objectives. This chapter delves into these issues and provides a picture of the political economy factors surrounding the recruitment, retention and deployment of teachers. It also delineates the shortcomings in each policy area – recruitment, retention and deployment – that give rise to this political interference.

3.2 Methodology and Research Methods

This section provides an overview of the methodology used in the ethnographic study.

3.2.1 Methodology

At the district level, the Education Department is headed by an EDO (education) and male and female DEOs who are the main points of contact for teachers and are responsible for handling all teacher-related matters on a daily basis. Each district has a number of offices that house these government officials along with their subordinates (the DDEO and AEO) and serve as the main place of contact for teachers who need to request transfers or the release of school budgets, to file complaints regarding recruitment or transfer or to voice their concerns on similar issues.

Since these offices are the focal point of interaction between teachers and the government, field visits to their premises were considered essential to draw interesting conclusions about the political economy factors involved in the daily workings of the Education Department. The duration of these observations was limited to a few days, so it was not possible to immerse ourselves in the political culture of the offices but it was enough to gain valuable insights into their workings.

3.2.2 Research Methods

Ethnographic research typically entails participant observation and interviews with key informants. Participant observation involves living among and observing the day-to-day activities of the people under study for an extensive period (up to a year). During this time, the ethnographer maintains daily field notes on the lives and practices of the people being observed. These observations are then supplemented by formal interviews, usually with a few key informants. Two main methods are used to select the interviewees: random sampling and judgement sampling. Random sampling allows for a more representative sample whereas judgement sampling allows researchers to choose individuals they know will be the most open and honest about their cultural practices.

These primary techniques are often complemented by secondary research – examining newspaper reports and articles and other records maintained by the community. This helps place the study in a larger political and social context. We have relied on similar qualitative approaches, starting with field observations and supplementing these with key stakeholder interviews. However, due to time constraints, we could not immerse ourselves in the culture of the district-level Education Department and carried out participant observations only for a few days. For the

interviews, we relied on a judgement sample of the main stakeholders in the department. We used the secondary analysis presented in the initial chapters of this report to contextualise our findings from the field in a broader context. The remaining part of this section describes in detail the methodology used to conduct the participant observations and interviews.

The two main research methods used in this ethnographic study include: (i) interviews with key stakeholders of the Education Department, including EDOs, DEOs and DDEOs and (ii) researchers' observation of the office environment. The interviews were conducted informally as a dialogue between key informants/stakeholders and the researchers. The questionnaires we used were designed to provide a rough guideline for the interviews but, for the most part, these remained open-ended and unstructured. In addition to the main themes in the questionnaire, the interviews also brought forth many emergent themes that were then absorbed into the main questionnaire and pursued in subsequent interviews. The second part of the ethnographic study, the observation of the day-to-day workings of the department, involved asking the officials for permission to sit in their offices and observe their interaction with other officials and visiting teachers.

Our researchers maintained field diaries throughout the study period. Initially, during the interviews and participant observations, they made raw or abbreviated notes that were later transcribed in detail. The content of these field notes was divided into two parts: descriptive and interpretive or reflective. The descriptive notes were detailed descriptions of what we encountered in the field, including the office settings, staff, verbal cues, nonverbal cues, interviews, actions, events and conversations. The reflective notes, on the other hand, included our own interpretations and reflections on what we had observed in the offices. Both types of notes give a detailed picture of the study's findings and the political economy factors that govern the interaction between the teachers and the department.

3.3 Key Stakeholders

Our visit to the offices revealed that, even though the EDO presides over the affairs of the Education Department in each district, there are many other key stakeholders in the department who play a pivotal role in implementing policy rules. The PA to the EDO, who either shares an office with the EDO or sits in a separate office, is the main point of contact for most teachers who come to the department to have their problems resolved. Teachers are also very likely to come into initial contact with the clerks of each office, who are responsible for maintaining files and acting as a liaison between the department and the teachers. There are clerks assigned to each office, including administration, litigation and finance, and they tend to remain with a particular office for long periods. They are well versed with the rules and environment of the department in their district and their vast experience gives them an upper hand in the department.

We chose to focus on the activities of these stakeholders and observed their offices and interaction with each other and with visiting teachers for two or three days. Their roles are discussed in the following sections to illustrate the dynamics of departmental workings and the political economy factors behind the implementation of policies pertaining to recruitment, retention and deployment. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 outline the structure of these offices and illustrate the position of each stakeholder in the office.

Figure3.1: District-Level Administration Structure



Figure3.2: Office Structure – EDO and DEO'sOffices



3.4 Political Economy Factors Involved in Recruitment and Retention of Teachers

Our interviews and participant observations point directly to the political economy factors involved in teachers' recruitment and retention. All three districts – though varying in size, rank, location, demographics and culture – have common problems related to the non-transparent implementation of policies. One teacher went so far as to say: 'The Education Department is even more corrupt than the police department'–a strong statement in Pakistan's context where the police department is generally considered to be extremely corrupt and highly politicised.

Two forms of corruption tend to occur in the Education Department: nepotism and rent seeking. Teachers either obtain favours based on political connections or bribe the department's clerks to manoeuvre around the system to obtain their transfers or promotions. The first is a form of rent-seeking; the second is monetised. Errors of omission and commission in policies and ambiguity in their details allow for this extra room for rent-seeking and nepotism. The discussion on key players (the PA to the EDO and the clerks) in the implementation of policies and administrative procedures is worth analysing because it illustrates the dynamics of the department's workings. Even if policies look effective on paper, how well they are understood by the stakeholders and how effectively they are implemented are questions that are rarely given due importance in policy analysis.

Figure3.3: Political Economy of the Education Department



3.4.1 PA to the EDO: The Gateway to Political and Personal Influence

One of the most important gateways to political and personal influence in the Education Department is the PA to the EDO, who is responsible for scrutinising most of the documentation for transfer requests and related matters before it can reach the EDO. This gives the PA enormous leverage in influencing departmental decisions – the PA wields this influence by filtering out the wheat from the chaff, i.e. deciding which applications are allowed to pass through to the EDO and which are not. This power is also recognised by the department's officials and teachers who then come straight to the PA for help in settling their concerns. The PA is well aware of policy procedures as well as loopholes that can be exploited in different ways. For instance, a teacher who was upset about having had a day's pay cut for being absent from school was advised by the PA (whom he knew well)to file the case as medical leave –the

holiday would not count as casual leave and the teacher would therefore not have his salary deducted under the aforementioned rule.

These embedded relationships between the PA and teachers and staff have certain costs attached to them. Such relationships are often maintained by incurring various unlawful favours. Specifically, in Rahimyar Khan, many of the people who visited the PA's office were there for personal reasons or to obtain favours. Roughly, one third of the PA's time was spent on tasks extraneous to his contractual duties, i.e. extra favours, informing teachers about the EDO's visits, meeting people not related to the department or his work, etc.

The PA plays a pivotal role in the department not only because he or she acts as a gateway to the EDO but also because he or she remains in this position for a long period while the EDO keeps changing. The PA usually serves for extended periods and develops connections within the district's political, departmental and teachers' circles. EDOs, however, tend to change frequently–often on the whims of politicians–regardless of their performance and tenure. For example, in Rahimyar Khan, ten different EDOs have been in office between 2008 and 2013. Members of the national or provincial assemblies (MNAs or MPAs) may favour their own candidates for the post since it is an important position in the Education Department (at least nominally). Quotes from teachers and staff to the PA, such as, '(the) EDO keeps changing, but you will always stay here (as the de facto EDO)', certainly point to the undeniable role the PA plays in policy implementation. This illustrates the extent of the EDO's power and influence and the degree to which the PA's office is under political and personal influences because of its importance in policy implementation.

Box 3.1: Gifts and Bribes: Clerks' Role in Transfers and Appointments

During a conversation in Rahimyar Khan, outside the EDO's office where lists of accepted, rejected and objectionable candidates were posted, a teacher shared an incident with us pertaining to his interaction with the department's clerks. He said that, when submitting the application for his transfer, one of the clerks asked him to pay money. He had refused to comply and, consequently, he believed that his records (which he said were complete) had been 'misplaced' by the clerk. His name was now among the list of objectionable candidates, with the objection stating, 'documents not complete'. Similarly, in Attock, getting any work done at the local Education Department requires paying the clerks in the office. The prevalent uniform rate for having one's request noted down in the clerk's diary is Rs 200.

3.4.2 Clerks: The Dark Face of the Education Department

Every office in the Education Department has its own set of clerks. Their role includes maintaining records and files, acting as a liaison between teachers and the respective offices or branches to which they are assigned as clerks within the department and other miscellaneous tasks assigned to them by their superiors. Clerks are, therefore, a primary contact point for teachers and provide a channel of communication with the department–they have a special position that allows them to exert power and influence. With greater rewards for cheating and the absence of an effective accountability mechanism, clerks find it rational to bypass the system and manoeuvre around policies to respond to teachers' requests.

Clerks are the gatekeepers to all the department's offices and teachers come into contact with them initially and frequently. This interaction makes it clear to the teachers that clerks are their most important point of contact in the department. Clerks may be seen as conniving and even malicious but teachers realise they have to keep them happy if they want their work done. Clerks will not facilitate teachers they do not like; often, they will only help teachers with whom they have a personal or political relation.

With teachers describing clerks as 'kings of the department' and the consensus in the department being that clerks wield substantial influence, it is no secret in the education sector that clerks use this power to their advantage. The process of transfers is marred by political influence and clerks' corruption. In Gujranwala last year, clerks demanded around Rs70, 000 per transfer and also charged for disclosing information on any transfer vacancies to teachers. This year, however, the new transfer policy has reduced their role. With too many discretionary powers given to clerks, compounded by subjective and incomplete policies and very little accountability, teachers often find themselves at the receiving end of clerks' corruption.

Most of the teachers we met in all three districts had a similar response concerning clerks' role in policy implementation and administrative issues. Teachers thought of them as a hindrance and a major menace rather than as facilitators in solving their issues. Teachers' lack of knowledge about policies and administrative procedures allows the clerks to exert even more influence. For example, many teachers were not aware of the current transfer policy and did not know how to write an application or fill out the form accurately. For this, they would turn to the clerks for help, who in turn used their superior knowledge to extract money.

Apart from the clerks' detrimental role in the implementation of policies, they also fall short in their duties of maintaining files and compiling data. Data and files are usually fabricated to make

them more agreeable to the authorities. Thus, data that is produced by the government department is not reliable and should be viewed with suspicion. The process of manipulation starts from the lower end, i.e. teachers, and goes to the top, i.e. higher officials. This incorrect data entry and manipulation of facts is rampant despite the fact that, in all the department offices we visited, the cupboards and tables were piled with files. Although this problem affects primarily the files, reporting and documentation, the process of compilation and the authenticity of the records is also questionable.

Clerks maintain the case files for any inquiries lodged against a teacher and sometimes may receive threats from powerful individuals asking them to either change the decision on a certain inquiry or 'misplace' certain documents so that the department cannot prove the allegations against the offender. Some officials hold the view that clerks do not usually yield to this pressure since they know that, if something goes wrong or contravenes the legal procedures, they will be held responsible within the department and penalised. However, this does not concur with the views of teachers who claim that clerks are involved in unlawful activities, which then alter the normal course of legal procedures. Officials in different districts agree, however, that clerks do have some influence over how policies are implemented.

Clerks, in turn, have their own reservations and grievances against the department. They have a different pay scale and are paid less than teachers at the same grade level. Similarly, there is no mechanism to ensure that, if clerks improve their qualifications, they will be promoted, whereas teachers are promoted or given allowances if they improve their qualifications. Clerks work in the same capacity throughout their lives and cannot rise in the department's hierarchy. They tend to vent their resentment in the form of corruption, protests and below-par work effort. The department has a myopic view of human resources and makes policies in a vacuum without understanding the incentive structures that affect clerks and other officials. No matter how effective policies are on paper, if the behaviour of the people who implement these policies is not looked into, the current dismal situation in the Education Department will not improve.

Box 3.2: Courts as the Last Hope for Teachers

In a number of instances, the courts are viewed as the 'last hope' for teachers who wanted their issues resolved. Although there is a complaint redress mechanism within the Education Department, teachers are often not satisfied by the procedures followed: they feel that the department unduly delays the hearing of their cases or gives unfair and prejudiced decisions. One instance of this that we witnessed in Rahimyar Khan involved two teachers who were unhappy

with their school's headmaster. They had come to the department to speak to the clerks in the EDO's office. The clerks later told us that the teachers had appealed against their headmaster for something, although they did not reveal the full details of the case. According to them, an inquiry had been initiated against the headmaster by the department but the teachers were not happy with its proceedings and were inclined to resort to the courts if the department did not provide them with justice.

3.4.3 Courts: The Last Hope or a Lost Hope?

To settle any unfair action, teachers may resort to the courts. The role of the courts is much deplored by the department, whose view is that it delays procedures and gives unfair decisions. On the other hand, teachers view the courts as their last hope of finding justice. However, many cases take much longer than anticipated and sometimes this 'last hope' becomes a 'lost hope'. Some of the department officials we met were not very happy about the courts' role in addressing such cases. They felt that teachers sometimes went to the courts and applied for stay orders on issues that could be legally settled by the department; this took a heavy toll on the department's resources, time and money.

3.4.4 Policy Implementation: A Tale of Political Patronage and Inefficiencies

Through our interviews and observations, it was evident that the implementation process is heavily influenced by political patronage and personal favours. Be it teachers or department officials, all agreed that policies are not implemented properly. Although the intensity of political involvement in policy implementation has decreased overtime (because of improved policies), the departmental process still incurs the cost of political patronage. This patronage permeates the department at all levels: from the lower end of the hierarchy (PAs and clerks) to the higher ranks (EDOs and DEOs). Prior to the introduction of the 2013 transfer policy, MNAs and MPAs had a say in who was transferred and where, but since the new policy was introduced, all transfers are carried out according to its tenets. However, most of the teachers we met felt that transfers were still carried out on political grounds and the policy was often ignored.

The rationalisation policy was not implemented properly because of resistance either from teachers or certain MNAs or MPAs. There was also a lot of political interference in recruitment prior to the 2009 recruitment policy. In 2009, the generation of merit lists was computerised, restricting the amount of political interference in the recruitment process. The rationalisation policy introduced to improve STRs did not work due to political interference. Whether the new transfer policy will be able to withstand political pressure depends on how well it is implemented

by the officials concerned. If they fear they might be penalised for succumbing to political pressure, they may be more inclined to implement the policy properly. The promotions policy has met the same fate: it is implemented by the same people and through the same department corrupted by patronage.

When it comes to teachers' administrative issues, the department's procedures and outcomes are no different – all are affected by political patronage. Teachers had very few pleasant things to say about the authorities in the Education Department, claiming that they targeted teachers whose work was fair and diligent but who did not have any contacts or influence in the department.

The department's accountability mechanism is very weak. Decisions against any teacher can be overturned with the help of connections. Politicians can call and ask officials to lift suspensions or undo decisions taken against a particular teacher. Officials then adulterate the procedure for teachers with political backing. Even if one does not have political backing, even knowing an official in the department can help one avoid being held accountable for misconduct. If someone wants to report any mismanagement or corruption, the complaint redress cell at the EDO's office is seldom used as it is akin to invoking the anger of the department's officials who can use the PEEDA Act to transfer teachers to remote areas or even terminate their employment.

Box 3.3: The Role of Political Patronage in Policy Implementation

Teachers in Attock had very strong views about the workings of the local education office and the implementation of department policies. According to them, if a teacher were to approach the department with a problem, the EDO or DEO would tell them to obtain a political reference before the matter could be resolved: 'Ke MPA se likhwa ke lao pehle' (get it written down by the MPA first). The teachers also complained that, even in recruitment, there existed a reserved quota for applicants favoured by MPAs or MNAs

Overall, policy implementation is rife with political interference and nepotism. This is in large part due to the gaps present in policy design and the lack of clarity in policy documents. Although the policies relating to recruitment, retention and deployment have been reformed, gaps remain –leaving room for politicians and department officials to use their political power to mould the implementation of these policies in their favour. Teachers also find loopholes in policy documents, which they then use to their advantage. The next section delineates the main policy gaps and flaws that our field visits and interviews highlighted.

3.5 Policy-Level Factors Affecting the Recruitment and Retention of Teachers

Over the past decade, numerous policy reforms have been introduced in the Punjab to address issues pertaining to teacher recruitment, retention and deployment. Even though on paper these initiatives seem to be effective remedies for the ills that plague the delivery of teaching services, our discussion with stakeholders unveiled a number of key gaps and lacunae in policy configuration.

An overarching policy flaw that was highlighted by almost all the government functionaries and teachers to whom we spoke is that policy documents are not comprehensive and do not cater to the needs of different districts or the concerns of the various constituents of the education sector. This problem arises because policies are made by officials at the upper levels of the government (at the provincial and national level) who have little understanding of the workings of district-level departments and the ground realities of the education sector. Little is done to ensure that the opinions of officials at lower levels–those who engage with teachers on a day-to-day basis–are taken into consideration during policy formation.

This gap between policymakers and those who implement the policies leads to the half-hearted implementation of policies. Further, teachers or teachers' unions are not consulted when drafting these policies, which, again, results in flawed implementation and lack of buy-in from the teachers. Very little consideration is given to possible problems in implementation when framing a policy and, often, rapid policy changes are introduced, which does not allow enough time for the policy to be effectively executed. Officials in Attock, for instance, were exasperated at having received a letter informing them about the introduction of a reallocation policy on 26 June 2013; the details of the policy's implementation were to be submitted in two days' time, on 28 June 2013. Such short notice hampers the effective implementation of policies and does not allow procedures to be followed completely.

The lack of involvement of district-level officials in policy formulation as well as the dearth of training they are provided in policy implementation means that they lack a complete understanding of the policy documents. This not only results in flawed implementation but also in the mushrooming of court cases related to policies. A number of cases that are currently in the courts of the three districts we visited pertain to various policies and the government officials acting as the respondents in these cases do not fully understand the relevant policies; in some cases, they have not even read the policy documents. This lack of understanding of the policies

on the officials' part creates hurdles in the litigation process and slows down the resolution of cases (see Chapter 4).

The rest of this section identifies the policy gaps and implementation issues highlighted through our ethnographic work in each of the three main policy areas: recruitment, retention and deployment.

3.5.1 Policy Level Factors-Recruitment

'Recruitment' marks the entry point into the education system for teachers: hence, if the policies pertaining to recruitment are flawed, good-quality teachers will never be attracted to the education sector. This is problematic as teachers, in effect, have 'jobs for life' and so, if an undesirable pool of teachers is hired, it becomes very difficult to sift them out later. Moreover, flaws at the point of entry can result in teacher management issues later on, such as the inability to motivate teachers and retain teacher effort, and inefficient deployment.

Designing and implementing post-recruitment policies is one way of addressing these issues, but a better approach would be to make the recruitment policies comprehensive enough to prevent problems from arising later on. The issue of recruitment is discussed frequently among Education Department officials and teachers, and each has their own opinion about how it should be done and whether the current policy is effective. Although these opinions diverge considerably, the consensus is that the current policy is inadequate and contains a number of loopholes that can be misused by politicians and that create difficulties for teachers and officials alike. The main concerns identified by our ethnographic work include: (i) the decentralisation versus centralisation of recruitment and (ii) inadequate contract terms – the assignment of nonteaching duties. The remaining subsection discusses both concerns in turn.

The question of decentralised versus centralised decision-making is an issue that comes up in almost all public policy debates. The debate on teacher recruitment policies is no different. Some stakeholders advocate district-level recruitment while others support the previous practice of centralised recruitment. Advocates of decentralisation argue that it is important because it localises the recruitment process and because officials at the local level are better aware of schools' human resource needs in their district and, hence, better able to decide the type and number of sanctioned posts to advertise.

Proponents of centralisation argue, however, that decentralisation can lead to 'local capture'. Local governments are more susceptible to local capture than national governments: at the

national level, there is usually a coalition of political parties with one party acting as a check on the others. Local governments are usually formed by one party and do not have to worry about appeasing their opponents. Rent-seeking behaviour by local elites is more common at this level. For instance, annex-EDO of Lahore district, at the time of his appointment, was known to be corrupt, recruiting teachers at his whim without following the proper processes and embezzling school funds. However, despite this, the teachers could not have him removed from office as he had support from local politicians. Moreover, local-level officials, even if not corrupt themselves, are more susceptible to political pressure and less able to withstand pressure from MNAs or MPAs. For instance, a number of teachers we interviewed in Attock commented on how the local MNA and MPAs had a reserved quota for people of their choice in the pool of teachers to be recruited.

Undue political interference in recruitment can also result in surplus appointments, leading to inefficient deployment. For instance, officials in Attock cited the case of the politically motivated hiring of Arabic contract teachers in 2007. The number of teachers hired exceeded the sanctioned posts and when the government changed, their posts were terminated. When they took their case to the courts, it was decided in their favour and all the teachers in question were regularised. The present Attock government is facing the brunt of this as court cases continue to be filed against these surplus appointments, embroiling the department in time-consuming court hearings that divert resources from other critical activities. The recruitment policy of 2009 has attempted to curb political influence over the hiring process by computerising the generation of merit lists. Now, all applications are entered into software developed by and housed at the PMIU; the software automatically generates merit lists according to the set criteria, limiting the level of political interference in the recruitment of teachers.

Another issue relates to the level at which recruitment –that is, at which teachers compete for posts– is carried out. Prior to the introduction of the contract policy in 2002, teachers competed at the district level. The contract policy instated school-based hiring, i.e. teachers were to specify (in order of preference) ten schools they wished to apply to and if they did not meet the merit criteria for any of these schools, they would not be selected. Both these policies have their merits and demerits. Teachers tend to support school-based recruitment as they feel that, when they compete at the district level, they are not always posted to schools near their place of residence and have to commute long distances. With school-based hiring, teachers can apply to schools in their locality, reducing the distance they have to travel. However, Education Department officials are of the view that school-based hiring leads to a suboptimal pool of teachers being selected –

less competent teachers have a higher chance of being selected if the pool they are competing against is less qualified or experienced.

Similarly, there are some very desirable posts for which many highly qualified teachers apply. When these teachers compete among each other, a number of good teachers may not be selected. Further, poor-quality teachers may choose to apply to schools in less desirable locations where they feel they are more likely to meet the merit criteria. This would allow them to enter the system, following which they might apply for transfers to schools near their place of residence. This is likely to result in many petitions for transfers being filed and, where rejected, a good many court cases. To avoid this gaming of the system and to filter out the 'bad' from the 'good' in the pool of applicants, officials feel that merit lists for teachers should be made at the district rather than school level. The recent policy change of hiring teachers at the tehsil rather than school level has attempted to address the issue of inadequate competition when drafting merit lists and also of posting teachers to schools in their locality.

The other major gap in recruitment policy that came up in our ethnographic work is the right given to government officials or HTs to assign teachers nonteaching duties, such as during elections, exams, health campaigns and any additional responsibilities that might arise from time to time. For instance, at the time of our visit, a measles campaign was underway in the districts that we visited. The campaign required teachers to keep their schools open for several days during the summer vacation (from 1 to 4 July 2013) and ensure full student attendance so that all their students could be vaccinated. A number of teachers were unhappy about doing this and failed to understand the utility of such an activity. They felt it was unfair for the department to make teachers come to school whereas the campaign fell under the purview of the health sector and Basic Health Units. Forcing students to stay in school even after they had been vaccinated seemed equally futile to them.

The department officials had a different view, arguing that teachers are paid for 365 working days and, technically are not entitled to a summer vacation in their contracts. They complained that teachers were used to a lax work structure and protested if they were made to exert the slightest effort – 'The teachers act as though they are the governors of Punjab whereas they are actually government employees and are supposed to carry out all the duties mandated by the government!'The officials also contended that teachers were paid for the extra duties they were assigned and did not understand why they should complain. However, we observed that, regardless of the remuneration, teachers were generally unhappy about taking on these extra duties.

Teachers carry out these duties only because it is impossible to avoid such tasks. Negligence of their duty would put them in danger of losing their job. For instance, a number of teachers whose schools had been found closed during the measles drive were suspended. Job security becomes an even bigger concern during an election as teachers' jobs depend on the smooth running of the polling stations. If there is a fight between political parties at any of the polling stations, the officers on duty there may face an inquiry and be dismissed. Such political scuffles often break out when the results are released at the polling stations; hence, teachers are especially cautious during election time.

Such nonteaching duties also take a toll on teaching quality and detract from teaching hours. During the recent election, students were given five or six days' holiday – more days than were set aside for teachers to carry out their election duties, resulting in lost school time. Female teachers, in particular, face difficulty in performing these duties and have complained that the polling stations to which they are assigned are usually very far from their place of residence.

Apart from nonteaching duties, teachers are also often asked to serve additional charges in various capacities. For instance, the current litigation officer at the department in Rahimyar Khan is actually a school headmaster in that district and has been given the extra charge of a litigation officer. Teachers are not paid for such additional duties, although these duties require handling the workload of two different posts. This not only adversely affects teachers' motivation and the quality of instruction but also impedes the working of the branches (such as the litigation branch in the example above), as these teachers do not have the necessary skills or qualifications to function in those capacities.

3.5.2 Policy Level Factors-Retention

Retaining teachers after they enter the education system requires investing in their motivation and effort. Teacher training, monitoring and promotion policies are relevant in this regard.

In order to prepare teachers to handle real classroom environments and equip them with subject-specific knowledge, the government has introduced teacher training at two levels: pre-service and in-service training (see Chapter 1.2.2). The aim of this training is to equip teachers with the requisite subject knowledge and class management skills and to prepare them for classroom situations such as multi-grade teaching and large classes. However, the effectiveness of such training remains hotly debated. Teachers and government officials hold diverging views on the need for and utility of such training sessions, especially in the case of in-service training. These sessions are generally held during the summer break to avoid wasting teaching time.

At the time of our field visits, in-service training sessions were being held for teachers categorised as 'E & F' teachers. This classification was based on their students' performance in the final school examinations – 'E & F' meant that the students had received an E grade or lower. The teachers were taking refresher courses in English and science. We were able to observe these sessions and form our own views of the quality of the training. We also interviewed the DTEs and teachers involved for their opinion on the effectiveness of the training.

From our observations, one major flaw in the training methodology was that trainers emphasised a more result-based than knowledge-based teaching style. The teachers were being taught to rote-learn, repeating definitions of concepts and ideas that the DTEs dictated. For instance, in one of the science sessions we visited in Attock, the DTE narrated the water filtration process and then asked the teachers to repeat it five or six times without explaining the underlying concept.

However, the teaching style differed across the training sessions and depended mainly on the DTE. Some DTEs, for instance, adopted a more interactive teaching style and taught their trainees through games and dialogue rather than in lecture form. This was particularly the case in Rahimyar Khan where trainers actively engaged with the teachers who, in turn, were generally enthusiastic and eager to learn and took the training as seriously as a good student would take a class. Some teachers undoubtedly lacked the basic knowledge of certain concepts of the English language or science, but when corrected by the trainer, quickly picked up these new concepts.

When asked for their opinions of the utility and quality of the training being imparted, the teachers seemed to have reservations about the DTEs' qualifications and were critical of the quality of the lessons being provided. The consensus among the teachers was that the content of the training was not directly relevant to the problems they encountered at school. For example, teachers were taught that, to promote in-class discussion and peer learning, students should be made to sit in a semi-circle during some parts of the lecture. This is, however, difficult to implement in real class environments as most public schools have large classes and small classrooms. Further, despite the prevalence of multi-grade teaching, no training is given to teachers to help them deal with this issue. No support is offered to enable teachers to transition smoothly from Urdu-medium teaching to English-medium teaching, which is vital especially for older teachers whose English speaking and comprehension skills are relatively poor. To reap the maximum amount of benefit from such training, it is important that teachers are consulted on its design, content and methodology.

Monitoring is another contentious issue: government officials consider it an effective means of holding teachers accountable and ensuring their presence at work, whereas some teachers feel that monitoring is an intrusive measure that undermines their motivation and self-respect. Teachers dislike the 'excessive' monitoring carried out through a number of different entities, i.e. the DSD, DMO and Education Department officials (mainly AEOs but also at times the DEO, DDO or EDO of their district). According to the teachers we interviewed, monitoring could be more effective if done in a transparent manner.

However, the extraneous monitoring practiced in the Punjab does not serve its purpose due to the widespread corruption in the system: monitoring officials generate good reports for teachers and schools who are well connected with the department or have political support. These officers are simply an addition to the number of people whom a teacher needs to bribe to survive in the Education Department (see Box 3.4below). Further, the attitude of the monitoring staff is disrespectful: they pass derogatory comments about the teachers in front of their students. Teachers are also critical of the funds and facilities that the monitoring staffs receive, such as motor cycles etc., which they can never attain while serving as teachers.

Box 3.4: Monitoring: A Help or a Hurdle?

One of the teachers we interviewed during a field visit effectively expressed her misgivings about the recently introduced system of monitoring with the following example:

'You can think of the teaching department as a horse. A horse has his lentils and that is all he eats to survive. Now, in order to avoid being troubled by the people who are supposedly his "care-takers", he might give them some of his lentils as a bribe. If you increase the number of "caregivers" the horse has to fend off (which you are doing by the sheer number of officials employed to monitor the teachers), the horse will eventually run out of lentils and starve. So, if the number of officials monitoring the teachers keeps increasing, soon the teachers will run out of money with which to bribe these officials and the department will "starve" to death!'

Apart from monitoring, the incentive structures inherent in the teaching profession also critically determine teachers' motivation and effort. The presence of a clear career path in terms of promotion processes linked with performance plays a key role in providing incentive structures for teachers. However, from what we observed in the field and gleaned from our interviews, no such promotions structure exists in practice.

On paper, promotions are to be awarded on the basis of seniority, performance (teachers' PERs) and qualifications. The District Promotions Committee sits annually and drafts a merit list based on these criteria; the top-ranked teachers on the list are then promoted. Generally, the process is thought to be transparent and fair. However, one of the conditions required for promotion is a satisfactory PER, and both officials and teachers agree that the writing of PERs involves a considerable degree of favouritism and corruption. Teachers often have fake PERs made or bribe their school principal to report their attendance as being 100% even if they have been absent during the year. Moreover, the committee only evaluates the PERs for the last three years. This distorts the incentive structure as teachers anticipating promotion are often seen to increase their effort and improve student scores from 0 to 100% for the three years prior to the time they become eligible for promotion, after which they fall slack again.

Court cases pertaining to teachers' promotions spring-up frequently when a teacher's name is missed on the seniority list and the teacher next in line is promoted before them. This can happen for several reasons, such as a processing error or if the teacher has lost his or her seniority after being transferred. The litigation officer in Rahimyar Khan pointed out that these court cases were often a result of teachers' own carelessness. For example, a teacher had missed her promotion from BS-14 to BS-16 in 1998 and her junior had been promoted instead. Six years later, in 2004, she decided to take action and filed a petition against this unfair promotion, demanding that she be promoted and given the seniority she had lost. When this was not granted, she took the case to the courts; her case is still pending in the High Court. Thus, her carelessness has effectively resulted in a massive drain on the department's resources.

A clear delineation of what can be done in such cases needs to be included in the policy. Delays in promotion are, however, common in the education sector and occur mostly at the hands of the department than as a result of teachers' carelessness. This affects their motivation, especially since they wait for years to be promoted to a higher grade and earn a higher salary; in some cases, teachers have waited more than 25 years.

In some districts, such as Attock, we learnt that promotions were not going to take place due to the presence of surplus teachers in the district. Teachers demanded that some mechanism be introduced in the promotions policy to allow the grade progression of teachers serving in districts with surplus teachers. PSTs expressed their dissatisfaction with the current promotions policy, which promotes PSTs to secondary school teachers (SSTs). They unanimously agreed that promotion procedures should be altered in a way that PSTs are moved up the grade scale

but retained to teach in primary schools– which is their forte. Teaching a similar course every year yields gains from specialisation, both for students as well as teachers.

The issues raised above are critical and need to be adequately addressed to ensure a high-quality, motivated teacher workforce.

3.5.3 Policy Level Factors-Deployment

Effective teacher deployment is necessary to ensure equity and efficiency in the delivery of teaching services. Our field visits coincided with the time that teachers' transfer applications were being received by the Education Department. According to the official notification on the transfer policy, within a week of receiving these applications, a district-level committee headed by the DEO is supposed to convene to scrutinize the applications based on the prescribed criteria. A tentative list of accepted and rejected applications and those to which the committee has objections is posted outside the EDO's office. Teachers are given time to address any such objections, after which their applications are reviewed once again and a final transfer list is posted outside the EDO's office.

At the time of our visit, the Rahimyar Khan and Gujranwala EDO offices had completed their initial scrutiny and were waiting for teachers to address the objections raised to their applications. Since the lists had just been posted, numerous teachers were visiting the office to resolve the objections they had received. The policy also seemed to be a favourite topic of discussion among the department's officials with mixed opinions about the policy document.

The clerks lauded the current policy for wiping out the control of members of the legislative assemblies. Prior to the introduction of the transfer policy, MNAs and MPAs had a say in who was transferred and where. The names of candidates for transfer had to be written down on the MNA's notepad for the office staff to sign and implement the transfer orders. It was thought that the new policy would streamline the entire process and remove political influence as all transfers were now to be made as per the policy. Teachers had to have held their current post for at least three years before they could apply for a transfer. Even then, there had to be a vacant post available against which to apply for the transfer. However, department officials were sceptical about the policy's ability to withstand political pressure. It all rested on the implementation: if officials feared being penalised for succumbing to political pressure, they would resist and implement the policy properly.

Teachers were also optimistic that the new transfer policy would reduce the number of politically motivated transfers and eliminate the role of clerks, making the entire process transparent. A major reason cited for the huge number of transfer applications was that teachers preferred to be posted to their home district and, within their home district, close to their residence. Teachers with long commutes – in some cases, more than 25 km – faced a number of issues, including the extra burden of travel expenses. If they were to be remunerated for such costs, it would reduce the number of transfer applications and boost teachers' motivation. Teachers also argued that, given the proper incentives, they would be willing to relocate and teach in far-flung areas that are presently deprived of their due education rights and facilities. There is evidence in the literature that financial incentives are useful in the effective deployment of teachers. For example, in Miami-Dade County Public Schools in the US, teachers at hard-to-staff schools receive 20% higher salaries than teachers at other schools (MDCP Schools, 2006).[6]

Authorities' tendency to use transfers to penalise teachers (by relocating them to a less desirable place) should be discouraged and a policy denouncing this practice enforced. PSTs also expressed their discontent over the policy under which they lose seniority in case of a within-district transfer while ESTs maintain their seniority. Teachers in one-teacher and two-teacher schools are annoyed because the new policy renders them ineligible for transfer. This may be severe on teachers but it is important in ensuring that they are better deployed and that their schools function more productively.

Based on our conversations with all the stakeholders, it seems that, despite the presence and documentation of a proper transfer policy (2000), neither officials nor teachers recognise its existence or are aware of the details of the previous transfer policy. This is a point of major concern and calls into doubt the efficacy of the new transfer policy because if it is not implemented appropriately, it may end up suffering a similar fate to its predecessors.

During the field visit to Attock, we discovered that, given the skewed distribution of teachers in schools and the presence of surplus teachers, the transfer policy was not applicable in the district (also in Lodhran and Khushab districts). In these districts, teacher rationalisation and reallocation is underway for which a formal policy is being designed. For schools with surplus teachers, preference will be given to those who are willing to relocate. In case teachers are reluctant, those who are junior-most in service terms and have completed their three-year tenure

[6] http://drs.dadeschools.net/Reports/Teacher_Turnover.pdf

will be transferred. The reallocation will first take place within the locality, and then at the level of union council, markaz and tehsil.

The DMO had been delegated the task of implementing this policy and facilitating the EDO's office; recommendations were to be made based on the enrolment figures of 31 October 2012. Teachers were to be relocated depending on the needs of the school (for a student strength of 1–60, two teachers would be appointed; for 61–90 students, three teachers; and for every 40 students above a total strength of 90, one additional teacher was to be allotted). An initial unsigned version of this policy had reportedly contained a clause reallocating the 'senior-most' teachers. However, with political interference, the policy was revised to favour senior teachers and the clause was changed to 'junior-most' teachers. Officials felt that, generally, older teachers did not fulfil their duties and created obstacles for other (younger) teachers, especially in areas where they had served for decades and had developed strongholds. The reallocation of senior teachers would thus remove their influence. However, this was a politically risky and challenging move and, as per the norm, politics got the better of the policymakers.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed some of the major policy gaps identified by key stakeholders in the areas of recruitment, retention and deployment in the Punjab. It has also shown how these gaps in policy design and implementation lead to the politicisation of policy implementation. Both officials and teachers alike acknowledge that the implementation of teacher-related policies is marred by political economy factors. In order to reduce the extent of political interference, nepotism and red tape in the functioning of the Education Department, it is crucial that the shortcomings in policy design are dealt with and a mechanism introduced to minimise the discretionary powers of the department's clerks and PAs.

Policies also need to be designed in such a manner that any possible loopholes that teachers can use to manoeuvre around policy dictates are reduced. Moreover, the processes involved in teacher recruitment, retention and deployment need to be made more transparent. Unless this is done, teachers will continue to have grievances against the department and vice versa, hindering the smooth functioning of the education sector. This will lead to more and more teachers resorting to the courts to have their complaints addressed. The consequent mushrooming of court cases will further hamper departmental functioning and waste resources and time – both that of teachers as well as department officials. The next chapter provides a detailed insight into these issues.

The Litigation Process: Institutional Constraints and Barriers to Complaint Redressal: A Case Study Approach

4.1 Introduction

With blatant gaps in policy and corrupt departmental practices, there are many instances in which teachers have had to take their cases to the courts in hopes of a final resolution of their complaints against the Education Department. Although there is a set procedure for teachers to follow in cases of complaints that can be resolved within the department, this can be hampered by nepotism and red tape. In such circumstances, teachers may prefer to seek closure in the courts. At other times, the department may issue an inquiry against teachers who it thinks are engaging in unlawful practices detrimental to the department, such as gaming the system by providing fake degrees or bogus transfer or appointment orders.

Even in cases filed by the department against teachers, a fair amount of political interference is involved, which impedes the litigation process. Hence, even though the numerous cases that crop up in the courts vary in terms of the issues being addressed and the parties involved, they all tend to face similar hurdles in the litigation process. These constraints range from institutional constraints faced by the department to political economy barriers faced by the teachers.

The previous chapter highlighted the problems and issues pertaining to recruitment, retention and deployment faced by teachers and the setbacks they faced when interacting with the Education Department. It also analysed the policy gaps that allow corrupt practices to flourish in the department. For those who are not in a position to bribe officials or who use personal ties to have their requests granted, the courts are the only viable option. This part of the report attempts to analyse the link between policies and the main types of complaints and issues brought to the courts. It also examines why certain cases are not resolved within the education system and end up in the courts. This will provide a fair idea of the political economy factors that affect recruitment, transfers, promotions and deployment and that lead to dissatisfaction among teachers and to complaints against the department. Further, it will allow us to assess whether adequate recourse is available to teachers to register any grievances they may have against the department.

This chapter also investigates the institutional constraints that prevent the Education Department from taking action against teachers. Such an analysis is important as an inadequate complaint redressal system within the department and a long drawn-out litigation process results in loss of teaching hours for teachers and adversely affects learning outcomes for students.

Further, a lack of proper accountability structures for senior officials as well as political economy factors that prevent teachers from raising their concerns discourages and de-motivates them, reducing teacher effectiveness. This analysis will give us a fair idea of what institutional and political economy factors prevent the department from duly performing its duty in terms of teacher recruitment, firing and transfers.

4.2 Methodology

We adopt a qualitative approach for the analysis in this chapter. This includes interviews with teachers, DDEOs, EDOs and other Education Department officials, including the lawyers who handle its court cases (the Deputy Secretary Legal and the Legal Officers at the School Education Department). Since unions play an important role in the complaint redressal process, our interviews with teachers focus on union members. The interviews are supplemented by focus group discussions involving teachers and other stakeholders in the Education Department. Both these provide a fair idea of how the complaint redressal mechanism works and what types of cases go to the courts. They also give an insight into the barriers and constraints inherent in the litigation process once a case goes to the courts.

To delve deeper into the institutional mechanisms involved and constraints faced in the litigation process – both by teachers and the Education Department – the last section of this chapter presents five case studies analysing court cases from across Punjab. These have been sampled from the most frequent case types that were either pending in the courts at the time of the analysis or had been resolved, with the frequency of case types being gleaned from the interviews and focus group discussions. Thus, a combination of interviews, focus groups discussions and case studies is used to provide a clear picture of the complaint redressal system within the department and the litigation process once a case goes to the courts and to highlight the main impediments that teachers and the department face in this process.

4.3 Complaint Redressal Mechanism

This section describes the complaint redress mechanism within and outside the Education Department.

4.3.1 The Path to the Courts

Under the Civil Servants Act 1974, Section 21, all civil servants are given the right to register their grievances with their relevant Competent Authorities. Thus, when a teacher or union has a complaint, the first point of contact is the relevant competent for that teacher. The Competent

Authority is the official responsible for appointing the teacher and dealing with any issues or concerns that he or she might have. If the Competent Authority does not respond to the teacher's complaint or delays the procedure, the teacher can go to court and obtain an order issued that instructs the Competent Authority to expedite the decision-making process. Contract teachers approach the High Court and permanent teachers approach the Service Tribunal. Once a decision is made by the Competent Authority, it may be appealed to the relevant Appeals Authority, who is an official in the Education Department and ranks higher than the Competent Authority. The decision made by the Appeals Authority can be appealed in the High Court (for contract teachers) or the Service Tribunal (for permanent teachers). The decisions made in these courts can then be appealed in the Supreme Court.

The Competent Authority and Appeals Authority vary according to the grade of the teacher (see Table 4.1). For instance, for PSTs and ESTs, the Competent Authority is the DDEO and Appeals Authority is the DEO. For SSTs and SSEs (up to Grade 16), the Competent Authority is the EDO and the Appeals Authority is the DCO. For Grade 17 and 18 officials, the Competent Authority is the Secretary Education and the appeal is to the High Court or Service Tribunal. For all officials in Grade 19 and 20, the Competent Authority is the Chief Minister and all appeals go to the High Court or Service Tribunal.

Table 4.1: Structure of Competent and Appeals Authorities

Post/Grade	Competent Authority	Appeals Authority
Grades 5–14 (PSTs/ESTs)	DDEO	DEO
Grades 14–16 (SSTs/SSEs)	EDO	DCO
Grades 17–18	Secretary Education	Goes directly to the courts
Grades 19–20	Chief Minister	Goes directly to the courts

In some cases, instead of the Competent Authority, teachers go to the Complaint Redressal Cell (CRC) before they go to the courts. The CRC operates at the divisional level for the purpose of conducting inquiries into complaints brought to it by teachers or by the department. Decisions on all inquiries are made by a committee headed by a retired judge of the High Court. There are a number of ways for a petitioner to register his or her case with the CRC: (i) by directly approaching the CRC, (ii) by going through the Secretariat (for cases brought to the CRC by the department) or (iii) by first filing the case in the Lahore High Court and then referring it to the CRC through the court.

Once a case is registered with the CRC, it can either initiate a probe or an inquiry. A probe is an initial inquiry that does not have to follow any timeline or formal procedures – it is conducted to

determine whether the reported misconduct has taken place. The result of a probe either confirms or dismisses the allegations of misconduct but does not prescribe any punishment. An inquiry, on the other hand, is carried out when the occurrence of misconduct is confirmed and the extent of the wrongdoing is investigated under the Punjab Employee Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability (PEEDA) Act (see Box 4.2) to decide the penalty for the misconduct. As in the courts, the CRC holds hearings as part of its probe or inquiry. After the case is decided, a copy of the judgment is submitted to the High Court – this is when a petition regarding the case has also been filed in the High Court.

For all civil servants, i.e. permanent teachers, the legal recourse available is the Service Tribunal; for all contract employees, it is the High Court. Teachers either represent themselves at these courts or hire legal counsel. The government is usually represented by government teachers who have a Master's degree in law. Box 4.1 gives a brief description of both courts and Figure 4.1 outlines the complaint redress process.

Box 4.1: Description of the Courts

Punjab Service Tribunals

Service tribunals were established in the Punjab under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974. These tribunals are headed by a chairperson who has been or is qualified to be a judge of a High Court. Decisions are made either by a bench (constituting the Chairman or the Chairman and another member of the Tribunal or two members of the Tribunal excluding the Chairman). If the Bench cannot come to a decision, the case is reviewed by the full Tribunal.

Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, may within 30 days of receiving the order, submit an appeal to the Tribunal, provided that the aggrieved civil servant has submitted an appeal or application for review or representation to such departmental authority and a period of 90 days has elapsed from the date on which such an appeal, application or representation was made. No appeal shall be made to the Tribunal against the order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness of a person to be appointed or to hold a particular post or be promoted to a higher grade.

The Tribunal is considered a civil court and hence has the same powers as vested in such courts by the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the Tribunal has the power to appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against. There is no courtfee for appealing a case or filing or exhibiting or recording any document in the Tribunal. The appellant needs to provide a

copy of the order that he or she is appealing against as well as a copy of the application the appellant initially made to the departmental authority in appeal to the order made by that authority.

All the requisite documents are to be presented to the Registrar who then forwards the case if all the documents are in order. At this stage, the case can either be dismissed or a date can be set for the hearing of the case. If the case is dismissed, the appellant can submit an appeal against the dismissal to the Tribunal. In case of a hearing, the appellant may represent himself or herself or hire a counsel. If the appellant cannot afford a counsel, the Tribunal will be responsible for appointing one to him or her. Once the case is decided, an appeal to the decision can be made to the High Court.

High Courts

There are five High Courts in Pakistan: one in the capital cities of each province and one in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. The High Court of the Punjab is located in Lahore with its benches located in Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi. The High Court is headed by the provincial Chief Justice. All appeals to the decisions made by the High Court are made to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. All civil and criminal courts come under the purview of the Lahore High Court.

Figure 4.1: Complaint Redressal Process



4.3 Hurdles in the Litigation Process

4.3.1 Barriers to Complaint Redress: Why Do Teachers Resort to the Courts?

There are a number of impediments within the Education Department that force teachers to take their concerns to the courts. These range from political barriers to financial constraints to teachers' personal traits – whether he or she is motivated enough to go through the tedious and physically and mentally strenuous court process. Some teachers refrain from filing petitions in the High Court or Punjab Service Tribunal merely to avoid the inconvenience of attending frequent court hearings and the high costs of hiring legal counsel. Thus, apart from the difficulties presented by the department's complaint redress process, the litigation process in the courts is also rife with problems. This nexus between the barriers to complaint redressal in the Education Department and in the courts determines the number of cases that actually go to court.

In the Education Department, the first obstacle that teachers face is in the form of the clerks. The clerks' exercise of power over the department's workings and their possible misuse of this power creates opportunities for manipulating policies against teachers who have no political backing and for favouring those with whom they have political and social ties. Nor are officials at the higher level immune to this temptation to bend rules for their own purposes. Those without political connections and strong relationships with the department find themselves particularly disadvantaged, with some officials blatantly asking teachers for political favours in order to get their work done.

If teachers lack strong political backing, their other option – apart from the courts – is to bribe the clerks. This can prove useful as they can use the clerks to gain access to confidential documents or to amend their applications after submitting them if such an amendment might help their case. We came across one such example in Gujranwala where a teacher had applied for a post at two schools but had not been included on the merit list for either school. Usually, the official handling the applications for recruitment draws a line across the empty spaces but in this case, the last column on the application was left uncrossed. The teacher then bribed one of the clerks to fill in the last blank with the name of a school where she knew she would be at the top of the merit list and then argued that she was on merit for that school. This is an example of a teacher bribing a clerk to unjustly support her case. At other times, teachers may also need to bribe a clerk to get their work done when they are in the right. For instance, a clerk may refuse to register a complaint or give priority to a case unless he or she is bribed.

Some teachers, however, do not want to use such illegal means and opt for the courts as a last resort. Once a case reaches the courts, it can take from a few months to a few years to be resolved, depending on the promptness of the court and the ease of implementing the order. Even in the courts, however, the clerks handling the cases may ask the teachers for money before they fix a date for their hearing. These clerks have the discretion to move dates around and delay hearings. Moreover, given the huge costs associated with fighting a case, many teachers become discouraged at the beginning and are reluctant to take their cases forward. Teachers face the additional challenge of maintaining their attendance at school while being present for court hearings. Valuable time and resources are wasted on fighting these cases and those who are not financially well off cannot afford to expend their resources in this way unless it is a last resort.

4.3.2 Institutional Constraints Faced by the Education Department: What Limits Speedy Justice?

The Education Department, in turn, lacks the capacity to handle the burden of court cases that falls on it. Although each district-level department houses its own litigation branch, this branch usually lacks the proper human capital needed to deal with the court cases it may face. The Litigation Officers who staff these branches often lack the proper qualifications and have little or no background in law. The post of Litigation Officer may be filled by a head master or subject specialist who performs the duties of a legal officer as an additional charge. This lack of adequate human resources in the department prevents cases from being processed quickly. Moreover, there are no lawyers available to the department and the legal documents for court cases are drawn up by officials who lack the appropriate legal knowledge.

Political interference in the litigation process also hampers the department in performing its duties. This interference comes both from superior officials within the department and from politically affiliated teachers. Higher-level officials may block the smooth running of the recruitment, transfers or promotion processes, compelling teachers to go to court. If the court's decisions go against the department, the higher-level officials concerned – either for their own monetary benefit or as a matter of pride – might choose not to accept the decisions and not implement the court's orders. The courts cannot affect teacher recruitment, transfers, promotions and other matters directly and can only order the department to do or undo a particular appointment, transfer or promotion. Thus, if the department does not accept the court's order, the appellant may remain aggrieved and decide to appeal to the Supreme Court. This prolongs the case and ultimately wastes the department's resources and time.

When teachers involved in the case are politically affiliated, political interference at their end can also create problems in the litigation process for the department. In such cases, political figures such as national or provincial assembly members may not allow the department to institute court orders against the teachers. District-level governments often succumb to such pressure and either do not go to court against politically affiliated teachers in the first place or are unable to institute court orders issued against such teachers.

Thus, teachers and the Education Departments alike are constrained by political and institutional barriers that, first, do not allow them to resolve complaints within the department and, second, hinder the efficient processing of cases once they go to the courts. The following section discusses the different types of cases that are most commonly brought to the courts and why. It provides an in-depth analysis of five cases sampled from the most frequent case types.

4.4 Court Case Studies

4.4.1 Mapping the Different Types of Cases and Their Causes

Our interviews with teachers, EDOs, DEOs, litigation officers and lawyers revealed that the courts handle many types of cases (see Table 4.2). However, the most frequently occurring involve transfers or promotions.

Table 4.2: Most Frequent Case Types

Case Type	Explanation
Transfers	Bogus transfer: when a teacher creates a fake record of his or her previous place of posting and enters the system through a fake transfer order If a transfer is requested but not granted
Seniority claim	Unfair promotion
Study leave	Study leave is mandated in teachers' contracts but may not be granted
Place of posting	Unfair deployment
Recruitment	Out-of-merit recruitment

Dismissal	Unfair dismissal
Punishment under PEEDA Act	Unfair termination or other penalties under this act
Upward mobility package	Due promotions not given as announced by the chief minister
Bogus order	Fake transfer orders, recruitment orders etc.
Punjab Middle Schooling Project	Complaints against the implementation of this project
Merger of schools	Unfair school mergers or teacher transfers resulting from such mergers
Teacher salary package	High Court
Rationalisation	Unfair teacher transfers; multi-grade teaching resulting from rationalisation, over-burdening of teachers due to the 1:40 STR policy
Training	Non-provision of training

Court cases are fought by teachers both at an individual level and at a collective level from the platform of teachers' unions. Teachers' unions form a very powerful group in the Punjab and provide a collective forum for teachers to convey their concerns to the government. The most powerful union is the Punjab Teachers Union but, apart from the unions, there are around 35 associations in the province that also fight for teachers' rights. Different associations cater to teachers of varying grades. While the Punjab Teachers Union comprises mainly PSTs and SSTs, associations such as the Senior Staff Association cater to Grades BPS 17 to 20 and the Punjab Subject Specialists Association is the main forum for subject specialist teachers.

Some organisations, such as Tanzeem-e-Asataza and the Muslim Workers Federation, are linked to political parties and thus have strong political ties that aid them in their work. Fighting court cases collectively also lessens the burden of legal costs for individual teachers. One such example is that of a group of teachers from the Muslim Teachers Federation who filed a case against the

merger of schools (under the rationalisation policy) in 1993; they argued that the merger had led to an imbalance in STRs and a consequently higher incidence of multi-grade teaching. The case lasted only two months and was resolved in favour of the union.

Since the efficiency and effectiveness of the department's competent authority and the CRC varies from division to division, there is also some inter-district variation in the number of court cases that arise in each district. For instance, the CRC's active role in Gujranwala could be one of the reasons that the number of court cases there is considerably lower than in other districts, such as Rahim Yar Khan. In Rahim Yar Khan, the CRC is not particularly active and, from what we learnt through our focus group discussions with teachers there, not many teachers are even aware that such a cell exists – they see the courts as their only recourse to justice.

The massive number of cases pending in the courts at all divisions and levels is due mainly to misinterpreted and half-hearted policy implementation or ignorance of the rules. If an EDO is inefficient or is unaware of the rules, several critical departmental processes such as recruitment or the distribution of teacher packages can be delayed. Frustrated, teachers may then go to the courts. For example, some EDOs are not aware of the rule that, if any of the selected applicants in the first phase of recruitment do not join the service within 190 days, the applicant next on the merit list should be sent an appointment letter. When these applicants do not hear from the department, following the lapse of 190 days, they turn to the courts to obtain their rightful seats. This has happened both at the Bahawalpur Bench in the Lahore High Court and in Gujranwala.

Intermittent bans on recruitment also disrupt hiring, especially of reserve applicants on the merit list. Even if the ban is lifted, the department may fail to issue these applicants with appointment letters for the remaining seats. In both Rahim Yar Khan and Gujranwala, the two cases we studied were decided in favour of the applicants on the waiting list. However, valuable time was wasted deciding these cases, which could have been avoided with a clear policy injunction issued in the beginning, directing the department to inform the candidates on the waiting list in time to avoid confusion later.

Other cases that can arise due to the inefficiency of the department involve teacher packages. The EDO is required to process these before 1 December, but in many cases, not all the files are processed – teachers who are left off the list may be compelled to file a case against the department. The recruitment process is also handled shoddily because universities across the country do not mark their students in a consistent manner and the department has not devised a method to take this into account when drawing up the merit list. There is no consensus within

the department on the conversion of marks awarded in a particular degree. Dissatisfied applicants, if rejected on the basis of academic merit, may then take their case to the courts on these grounds.

Some court cases arise due to officials' misuse of power. One such case in Rahim Yar Khan involved the DCO who, as the Chairman of the Departmental Promotion Committee, had decided to recruit fewer teachers than the number specified and kept six seats vacant on a personal whim. He was ordered by the court to submit a detailed report giving his reasons for reducing the number of seats and told to appear in court within eight days to defend his decision to curtail the number of recruitments. His decision had affected a number of candidates who had then filed court cases.

Having discussed the main types of cases that arise, the following subsections present five case studies that highlight the institutional and political barriers that give rise to such cases and inhibit the functioning of the litigation process. Box 4.2 gives a brief outline of the format of the writ petition.

Box 4.2: Format of Writ Petition

WRIT PETITION NO.

PETITIONER: The person who files the writ in the court

RESPONDENTS: A defendant who has to respond to the petition or people against whom the legal action is intended by the petitioner

APPELLANT FACTS AND FIGURES: This includes the facts of the case (details of the real occurrences relevant to the petition), Question(s) of Law (Issue that involves the application or interpretation of legal principles by judge), Grounds (reasons on which petitioners substantiate his/her position) and Averment (a formal statement by a petitioner that he/she offers to prove or substantiate).

PRAYER: A humble request by the petitioner for acceptance of petition by the honourable court. A request also to pass such other orders and further orders as may be deemed necessary on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.

4.4.2.1) Case Study 1: Seven Educators versus the Government of Punjab

A group of seven educators filed a petition with the Bahawalpur Bench of the Lahore High Court pertaining to the issuance of contract-based appointment letters. The details of the case are as follows. The District Recruitment Committee of Rahim Yar Khan had invited applications through an advertisement dated 24 June 2012 for the contract-based appointment of educators in primary, elementary, secondary and higher secondary schools. Despite being eligible as per the merit list issued, the petitioners were ranked low on the list and were not inducted into service. However, a number of candidates on the list did not join the service, leaving the petitioners next in line in merit. They submitted applications asking to be inducted against the remaining seats. This did not happen as the Education Department (Punjab) imposed a ban on all recruitment on 23 January 2013. By law, a merit list loses its validity after 190 days of its issuance.

After the ban was lifted, the respondents approached the Secretary Education regarding their appointment, 190 days having passed since the merit list was issued. The Secretary advised against the issuance of their appointment letters. The counsel for the petitioners claimed that the ban on the issuance of appointment letters could not be imposed on recruitments that had already been completed. Additionally, these appointment letters applied to leftover posts resulting from applicants who had not joined the service. The counsel 'prayed' that the above-mentioned merit list should not be nullified.

Justice Muhammad Ameer Bhatti, in his order dated 25 June 2013, observed that the respondents agreed that the petitioners were eligible for the given appointments. He also observed that, as a result of the ban imposed by the government and the delay in the hearing of the petition, 190 days had passed. The judge stated that the ban did not apply to these appointments since the letters had been issued before the ban was imposed. He directed that such bans should be issued with care. The petition was accepted and the respondent authority was directed to issue the appointment letters in favour of the petitioners within a period of 10 days.

This case is indicative of how a sudden change in policy can disrupt departmental workings and have an adverse effect on deserving applicants. Intermittent bans on recruitment create confusion, both within the department and for teachers and applicants. Even if a ban were to be imposed, the department should not use it to deprive deserving individuals of their right to be inducted into service. A ban is usually temporary and should not supersede the preceding policy. Once the ban is removed, the default policy should be followed automatically. Such bans should

be regulated and only enforced against specified criteria where the discretionary powers held by the enforcer are clearly stated. Also, provision for suitable extensions in the existing merit list could be included in the policy to prevent any damages as a result of unexpected bans.

Members of the recruitment committee should be trained in the rules of the department. A lack of in-depth understanding of the rules on their part causes confusion when there is the slightest change in policy. The department is slack and inefficient in implementing policies and apt to delay vital processes. The court's verdict clearly chided the department for its carelessness in implementing this particular policy under different circumstances. If appropriately implemented, most policies would lead to the resolution of issues within the department itself, which would prevent litigation. A well-trained department that carefully implements properly laid-down policies would effectively reduce the burden of litigation.

4.4.2.2) Case Study 2: Hafiz Mehmood Ahmad versus the Secretary Education Punjab etc.

Hafiz Mehmood Ahmad filed an appeal in the Punjab Service Tribunal, requesting the issuance of a stay order to stop the promotion of 17 teachers from BS 19 to 20. The appeal also asked the Punjab Education Department to reconsider its decision not to promote Ahmad to BS 20.

Among the respondents, Ahmad blamed Muhammad Jamil Najam, the DPI Punjab, in particular for having informed the department that a pending inquiry was being conducted against him (Ahmad). He argued that including this statement in his evaluation report had proved detrimental to his chances of promotion and, moreover, that Najam had played an adverse role in the previous inquiry being carried out against Ahmad. He contended that Najam had been unlawfully appointed DPI and that, as Ahmad was being considered for promotion to the same post, the order promoting Najam to BS 20 would cause Ahmad to lose his promotion.

In his response, Najam stated that the issue of Ahmad's promotion was a purely departmental matter over which he had no control. He also stated that his only concern was the irreparable loss that the other applicants might have to face as a result of their deferred promotions. He asked the Tribunal not to affect the other promotions and, if found deserving by the Education Department, to promote Ahmad.

Ahmad also named Munawar Hussain Akhtar, a former DPI, a respondent to the appeal and claimed he had been unlawfully promoted to the position of DPI. Akhtar responded that his promotion was lawful and he had been posted as DPI after the completion of all legal

formalities. In their response, the Punjab government's Secretary Services, Government of Punjab, S&GA Department, Lahore and the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Punjab, Lahore, in their response, stated that the promotion committee cleared and recommended Ahmad for BS 20. However, the Punjab Education Department had deferred his promotion pending orders on the audit report by the Chief Minister Punjab were awaited. Therefore, the appellant had not been promoted on account of pending disciplinary proceedings.

In all of this, what is most surprising is that the court did not question how the petitioner had obtained access to PERs, which are confidential documents of the department. Presumably, the petitioner must have used illegal means to do so but he was not reported for this misconduct.

Favouritism and nepotism as a result of political affiliations affect promotions in the public sector to a large extent. Due to loopholes in the department, merit lists are easily manipulated and deserving candidates are denied their rightful promotion. Despite the department's inefficiency and inadequate adherence to policy, when such cases are forwarded to tribunals and courts, they are properly addressed and consequently remedied by the department unless there is political involvement. A closely monitored online system of evaluation and promotions could be set up to filter any possible human infringements. Furthermore, increasing contact and coherence among different departments would help decrease litigation in the matter of promotions.

Despite the charges brought against Ahmad in the inquiry report, he was still promoted to BS 20 by the department, which went against the court's ruling that his promotion be halted until the Disciplinary Committee had cleared him. This calls into question the implementation of the promotions policy. According to Najam, the Education Department sometimes overlooks rules and regulations and makes decisions based on compassionate grounds. There is, therefore, a need for strict positions and decisions from the courts and tribunals to help correct the department in cases where rules and regulations have been violated.

4.4.2.3) Case Study 3: Hafiz Mehmood Ahmad versus the Government of Punjab

Under the law, it is a serious offence to use school premises to provide private tuition. Hafiz Mehmood Ahmad, senior headmaster of Government Central Model School on Rattigan Road, Lahore, was transferred – along with eight other teachers – on allegations of conducting paid tuition classes on school premises. The offence was discovered when the District Nazim raided the respondents' school after school hours. Ahmad appealed in the Punjab Service Tribunal and negated the accusation. He also contended that, as he had not completed his three-year tenure,

his transfer violated the Government of Punjab's transfer policy, which required teachers to complete three years in a particular post.

A four-member committee delegated by the Punjab chief minister carried out an inquiry that absolved Ahmad of the allegations of engaging in paid tutoring, based on statements from parents and teachers who claimed that students were being tutored for their exams without paying any extra fee. The Punjab Service Tribunal accepted the appeal and declared the transfer order null and void. However, the case did not end there. Not fully satisfied with the inquiry and decision, the Zila Nazim filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the tribunal's decision. Rather than conducting a fresh investigation, the court simply upheld the latter's decision.

While the case was sub judice in the Supreme Court, the Chief Minister's Inspection Team (CMIT) revealed its findings from a second inquiry into this issue. The findings were irreconcilable with those of the previous inspection: Ahmad was shown to have received, on average, Rs 300–500 from each tutee and the students and teachers involved had been forced to give statements in his favour.

Additionally, there was evidence of nepotism in the tribunal's investigation because the committee members were allegedly related to Ahmad. This demonstrates that corruption and favouritism is not restricted to policy implementation in the Education Department – they also affect the litigation process and courts' investigation. Often, teachers and school officials have political backing that encourages them to engage in such practices without fear of punishment. They find it rational to bypass systems and policies due to the weak accountability structures in place. Political patronage also acts as a hurdle in the conduct of transparent inquiries.

Despite taking the issue to court, the entire process failed to yield justice. No action was taken following the CMIT's findings. The City Government was unable to affect Ahmad's tenure at the time as the case was being heard in the Supreme Court. Later, once he had completed his three-year tenure, the district government – as punishment – transferred him to the outskirts of Lahore.

This case reveals that teachers often find loopholes in policies and ways to circumvent rules for their own benefit. For instance, Ahmad portrayed the paid tuition classes as extra help to clear himself of the charge. Teachers are not allowed to offer paid tuition classes since it encourages them to shirk their duties during school hours, in effect forcing students to take up tuition after

school. This is detrimental for in-school learning. Despite policies that aim to regulate such practices, weak implementation due to corruption and nepotism hampers the effectiveness of such policies. In this context, as many resources should be utilised to ensure effective implementation as to design new policies to achieve their desired outcomes.

4.4.2.4) Case Study 4: Saima Rubab versus the Government of Punjab

Saima Rubab, an SST at the Government Girls Elementary School in District Gujrat, had applied to the EDO (education) of Gujrat for an inter-district transfer on 20 October 2010 and managed to obtain a no-objection certificate from him. The EDO (Rawalpindi) at the time, Qazi Zahoor-ul-Haq, exercised the powers delegated to the DPI (SE) and transferred the petitioner – this action was deemed illegal. When, after two years, the new EDO (Rawalpindi) learnt of the transfer, he returned Rubab's application to the EDO (Gujrat) with the remarks that, as per the direction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, no SST out of the district would be adjusted in Rawalpindi and the vacant posts would be filled through 50% in-service promotions.

Haq (the ex-EDO Rawalpindi) said that the applicant had been transferred inadvertently and the legal procedures for Inter-District Transfers had not been adopted – thereby cancelling Rubab's transfer orders dated 30 July 2011. The applicant was directed to report to the EDO (Gujrat) in order to be adjusted in district Gujrat.

Rubab appealed in the Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) against the cancelation of her transfer orders. Her counsel contended that she had been transferred on the basis of her application in accordance with the district transfer policy and that, after two years, this order had been cancelled on flimsy grounds. The Judge asked the EDO (Rawalpindi) and DEO to submit their paragraph-wise comments/reports in 30 days and suspended the operation of the impugned order till the next date of hearing.

As per standard procedure, to obtain approval for an inter-district transfer, a teacher has to submit an application to the EDO of his or her current district. If the district EDO accepts the transfer application, it then has to be approved by the EDO of the district to which the appellant wants to be transferred. Even after both EDOs have acceded, the transfer is deemed incomplete and illegal without the DPI's consent. In Rubab's case, the department did not follow the procedure outlined in the policy and did not seek the DPI's permission. The ex-EDO in Rawalpindi had thus illegally transferred Rubab.

Compromise on merit and the use of political influence in decisions pertaining to the transfer of teachers has become the norm: Rubab's case is one such example. The lack of repercussions in circumventing the legal route and the department's weak accountability mechanism has allowed many officials to authorise illegal transfers without being held accountable for it. Even when Rubab's case came to light, the court only cancelled the transfer orders and neither the court nor the department carried out a serious inquiry against the authority that had issued her transfer orders. The Education Department urgently needs to set a precedent for officials who do not follow the legal course specified by a policy or who hamper its effective implementation.

Moreover, there is no independent body or mechanism in the department that can verify the legality of transfers. The department learnt about the problem with Rubab's transfer case after two years and if the new EDO of Rawalpindi had not looked into the matter, the issue would never have surfaced. An independent body or e-portal that monitors and updates the status of transfer cases regularly could be a helpful way of ensuring transparency.

4.4.2.5) Case Study 5: Ashfaq Ahmad versus the Government of Punjab

In 1999, the Government of Punjab introduced an order that imposed the forced retirement of headmasters whose schools did not perform well in the final higher secondary examinations and had a pass rate of below 20%. Ashfaq Ahmed, a mathematics subject specialist and Head Master of Comprehensive School in Pindi Bhattian, was one of the Head masters retired under this order. He filed a petition against the Government of Punjab and asked that his retirement be reversed on the grounds that his school lacked the necessary facilities, which had resulted in the poor performance of his students. The school did not have a proper building and lacked science teachers, laboratories and other basic facilities. It was also located in a disadvantaged area and the students came from a poor socioeconomic background.

Discouraged by the poor quality of the school, many students had dropped out in the middle of the school year. Ahmed had encouraged them to return to school and offered to tutor them personally for their exams, which were approaching in six months' time. He made repeated requests to the government to install basic facilities in the school but the Education Department paid no attention to these requests. As a consequence of the poor facilities, the students did not perform well in the final examination and Ahmed's school was one of those that had a pass rate of less than 20%.

Consequently, after a hearing conducted under the supervision of the DPI Schools, the Education Department compulsorily retired Ahmed from service. He appealed against this

decision in the Punjab Service Tribunal, following which the tribunal directed the secretary of the Education Department to pass an order reinstating him. However, the secretary refused to implement these orders. Ahmed approached the tribunal once again and the secretary was accused of contempt of court. The secretary then lodged an appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against both orders of the tribunal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the tribunal's decision to reinstate Ahmed.

This case highlights the blanket nature of government policies that fail to account for individual circumstances. In this case, the policy made no provision for disadvantaged schools and compulsorily retired headmasters of all schools with a pass rate of below 20%, irrespective of their initial student performance and the school facilities available. Further, this policy was introduced after the results were announced and no prior warning was given.

The sudden introduction of such harsh policies acts as a disincentive, rather than incentive, for teachers. A better approach would have been to give headmasters an opportunity to improve their schools' performance over time. For instance, in this case, instead of forcibly retiring all the headmasters of low-performing schools, the Education Department should have investigated each case to determine the reason for the school's poor performance. Not a single personal hearing was conducted for the headmaster involved to explain his individual circumstances. Such personal hearings are essential before any punishment is meted out. If, after a personal hearing and investigation, it is revealed that the reason for the school's poor performance is lack of effort on the headmaster's part, the department should punish the headmaster concerned using measures such as salary deductions.

Further, this case illustrates how the department can hamper the efficiency of the litigation process. The unwillingness of the secretary to accept the court's orders led to unnecessary delays in the resolution of the case. It wasted valuable time and resources – both of the court and the petitioner. The court's decision should be considered binding and it should be given legal power to penalise the department in cases of noncompliance.

5 Policy Recommendations and Avenues for Further Research

This report has documented the existing trends and outcomes in teacher recruitment, transfers, postings, absenteeism, qualifications and pre- and in-service training and has explored the relationship between major policy changes and these outcomes. It has also analysed recruitment, retention and deployment policies in the Punjab and investigated the political economy and institutional constraints that undermine the effective implementation of these policies.

The analysis indicates there are two main reasons that policy reforms have failed to meet their desired goals and that setbacks persist in improving teacher effectiveness. The first reason is gaps in policy design and ineffective implementation of policies. Policymakers and researchers alike fail to adequately evaluate existing policies and hence do not address the limitations of previous policies when designing new ones. Moreover, when designing policies, policymakers are unlikely to take into account the cultural and political context in which policies are implemented and, in particular, the role of key stakeholders and their incentives in successful policy implementation or hindrance. This results in flaws in policy design and lacunae in the rules and regulations governing teacher recruitment, retention and deployment, leaving room for political interference and nepotism in policy implementation.

Teachers and politicians often find loopholes in these policies, which they use to their advantage and attempt to game the system through red tape and corrupt practices. In order to counter this, policy design has to be immaculate so that policies offer little room for personal and political interference. For this purpose, the role of various stakeholders and the political and cultural context in which policies are to be implemented need to be carefully examined and understood.

This chapter summarises some of the main gaps in policy design and implementation that have been highlighted throughout the report and provides policy recommendations to address these gaps. The last section identifies avenues for future research that would enhance our understanding of the teacher labour market in the Punjab.

5.1 Policy Recommendations:

5.1.1 Policy Recommendations for Recruitment

The criteria for recruitment and the processes involved in hiring teachers appear to have improved greatly over time. However, there is still vast room for improvement given that recruitment remains prone to political influences and policy design flaws inhibit the hiring of high-quality teachers. In particular, certain areas could benefit from being targeted, such as the

level at which recruitment is carried out (whether at the school, tehsil or district level) and improvements in the quality of the teaching force, limiting political interference in the recruitment process.

Recruitment policies have ranged from school-based recruitment, where teachers are recruited on school-specific contracts, to tehsil-wise recruitment, where teachers compete for posts within a tehsil. Both strategies have their advantages and disadvantages. Tehsil-level hiring allows a larger pool of candidates to compete among each other for a post, creating greater competition and allowing the best candidates to be selected. However, it also results in teachers being posted far from their place of residence, leading to a high number of transfer requests and, in the case of politically motivated transfers, a skewed distribution of teachers within a tehsil.

On the other hand, school-based hiring limits the pool of teachers competing for a specific post, resulting in some of the best-quality teachers being left out of the system. For instance, if two teachers, both with a Master's degree, compete for a certain post and two teachers, both with a Matriculation certificate, compete for another, one of the latter two would be inducted and one of the former two would be left out of the system. With tehsil-level recruitment, however, the two Master's degree holders would be selected and neither of the two Matric certificate holders would be allowed to enter the system.

This does not mean school-based recruitment should be dismissed – it still has a number of advantages. First, it allows teachers to select schools and obtain postings near their place of residence. This tackles the issue of distance to school and commuting problems that result in transfer requests and high absenteeism among teachers. Further, the fact that, in school-based recruitment, teachers lose their seniority if they transfer from one school to another discourages them from applying for transfers once they are recruited. This reduces the degree to which teachers can game the system: they are less likely to enter the system through a posting in some remote area where there is less competition for posts and then apply for a transfer out of that area to a school near their place of residence.

Keeping in view the degree of politically motivated transfers, a case can be made for reverting to school-based hiring with limited transfer opportunities. However, some flexibility would need to be introduced in the policy that deals with the issue of not enough good-quality teachers being available in certain areas. For instance, if not enough teachers meet the minimum hiring criteria in a certain area, those who have applied to other schools should be considered for that post.

Further, if highly qualified teachers have all applied for the same post, those who are not selected for it should be considered for other nearby posts.

By increasing the minimum professional and academic qualification requirements, previous policies have greatly increased the proportion of Master's degree holders and B-Ed and M-Ed degree holders in the teaching force. However, as pointed out in Section 2.2, there remain a high proportion of teachers with a Matriculation certificate and PTC or CT. These teachers belong to the older cohorts hired under earlier, less stringent policies. To deal with this under-qualified portion of the teaching force, there should be a mechanism for terminating permanent teachers who do not meet the minimum qualification requirements. They should be given a time period within which to either improve their qualifications (which could be done on government expense) or acquire the requisite in-service training and pass certain exams.

This report also indicates that a major proportion of teachers in public schools have second-division degrees – an indicator of poor performance. While qualification is not directly linked with effectiveness, it is necessary for teachers to have mastered the content that they are supposed to be teaching. Thus, increasing the eligibility criterion from a second division to a first division along with the minimum qualification requirements will ensure that teachers entering the system have sufficient mastery over the subject content.

The main aim of recruitment is to attract well-qualified and able individuals to the teaching sector. In order to do this, the recruitment cycle should correspond directly to the completion of the university academic year. However, this is often not the case, which results in fewer qualified people applying for teaching posts since most of them have already adjusted themselves in other occupations. Moreover, the Education Department should attract better-quality applicants to the teaching sector by extensively marketing the vacancies available in universities and through social media and newspapers.

In order to limit this control, the application submission process should also be automated. Initially, online applications could be supplemented with the option of hardcopy submissions, given that some teachers might not have access to computers or may not be computer-literate; the aim, however, should be to move towards a completely automated process. This would eliminate the role of clerks in the recruitment process, limiting the extent of political interference and nepotism in the system.

Further, even if the entire system of recruitment is computerised, there may still be cases of teachers holding bogus degrees. At present, the Education Department verifies applicants' degrees after they have joined the service. This has the adverse consequence of creating vacant posts if teachers holding fake degrees are fired. Moreover, those with personal connections in the department or political affiliations are able to retain their posts despite their fake degrees and get away with not having their degrees verified. Thus, the recruitment policy should require applicants to have their degrees verified by the Higher Education Commission before submitting their applications while non-verified degrees should not be considered. Further, public and private universities should maintain an online database of their graduates that would allow the government to verify applicants' degrees easily. While this might not completely prevent bogus degree holders from entering the system – as teachers with political backing may still find ways to get around the system – it would greatly limit such corrupt practices.

5.1.2 Policy Recommendations for Retention

We have focused on three main ways of motivating teachers and ensuring their continued effort: training them, providing them with pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives and improving their accountability structure through monitoring.

The introduction of the CPD framework and restructuring of the DSD has helped improve in-service training in terms of the frequency of training sessions held and the number of teachers being trained annually. However, our interviews and focus group discussions have revealed that many teachers are still not confident about their knowledge of the curriculum which is a major factor resulting in their de-motivation. This arises largely because training material and methods are not tailored to teachers' specific needs. One way forward is to customise training to the specific needs of different teachers on the basis of their qualifications, subjects and school.

At times, teachers also feel that the teaching methods they are being taught are hard to apply in real-life classes because of limitations such as large class size, multi-grade settings, a lack of infrastructure or difficulty in application. There is, therefore, a great need to ensure that the training curriculum is developed keeping such factors in mind and is designed to equip teachers to handle real-world situations and specific teaching contexts. We recommend that context-specific training be carried out with different training sessions for teachers working at different school levels, locations (urban or rural) and schools with different STRs.

Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives have been introduced in the past to improve teachers' performance. Pecuniary incentives include salaries and bonuses tied to performance. In

this case, however, teachers have received salary raises that were not performance-based and hence failed to enhance their effort. Teachers' salaries are structured such that they receive annual increments that are not tied to their performance. Their salaries are increased further when they move one grade up on the BPS, which, again, is not directly tied to performance.

The recommendation here would be to directly link teachers' salaries to their performance. The concept of bonuses should also be introduced for teachers who perform well in a given academic year, for instance, those who are able to improve their students' results by a certain percent. This would provide impetus for teachers working at currently low-performing schools to improve their students' results. Simply rewarding the best performers (such as the 2011 teacher incentives scheme discussed in Section 2.2.2), on the other hand, would discourage low-performing and disadvantaged schools that cannot compete against the better-quality public schools.

Non-pecuniary incentives include providing teachers with a clear career path and promotions linked to their performance. The 2010 promotions policy attempts to do this by linking promotions to teachers' qualifications and their PERs for the last three years. Despite these efforts, promotions remain a contentious issue with nepotism and red tape playing a major role in determining these promotions. Due to this political interference, the promotions structure in place fails to provide teachers with an attractive career path.

One way around the issue of nepotism and bribery in the promotions process would be to automate the generation of seniority lists. This would ensure that all eligible teachers are automatically considered for promotion and there is little room for manipulation by either clerks or higher-level officials. It would also address the concern that many teachers have that their names are often missed on the seniority list and someone junior to them in merit is promoted instead. An online portal should be established so that seniority lists and promotion rules are visible to all and a time period should be specified in which teachers are allowed to contest the seniority lists issued. This would reduce the number of court cases relating to teachers' names being missed on the seniority list and these teachers realising the error a year or two after it has occurred.

When teachers are promoted to a higher grade, they are often moved from their current school to a higher-level school. For instance, when an EST in a primary school is promoted to an SSE, he or she is moved up to a middle or higher secondary school. This implies that, as teachers improve their qualifications or gain experience, they are moved out of primary schools to higher-level schools and that lower-quality teachers with less training and experience are introduced in

their stead. It is, however, vital that primary schools, which lay the foundation for students' further learning, have good-quality teachers. Thus, as a policy, the system of promotions should be structured such that, when a PST is promoted, his or her pay scale is increased to that of the corresponding grade but he or she is retained in the primary school. This would ensure that the quality of teachers in primary schools improves and the number of PTC/CT and Matriculation certificate holders – which is typically very high in primary schools (see Chapter 2) – is reduced.

Monitoring is the other method of ensuring teacher performance and great strides have been made towards this end. The system of monitoring has largely been mechanized with the MEAs and AEOs marking teacher attendance through smart phones that not only record the GPS coordinates oft eh schools being visited but also allows the monitor to take a picture of the teacher with his or her class. However, although this has increased the accountability of teachers and hence has led to reduced absenteeism, teachers have raised concerns about the monitoring staff being badgering and intrusive. One way to curtail this is to reduce the number of officials doing monitoring visits. If through the use of ICT the degree to which teachers can game the system can be reduced, there is no need to have multiple monitoring systems in place as checks. Further, the monitoring staff should be trained to be more amiable towards the teachers so that the teachers are more receptive and open towards them.

5.1.3 Policy Recommendations for Deployment

The second chapter of this report presents a dismal picture of the distribution of teachers across schools in the Punjab. The distribution is clearly skewed: certain districts have an excess supply and others a shortage of teachers. Further, it indicates a high proportion of one-teacher schools and schools with multi-grade teaching, particularly in rural areas. This inefficient deployment results from the inadequate allocation of posts on recruitment in the first instance and politically motivated and unwarranted transfers in the second.

According to the current recruitment policy, the EDO and DMO of a particular district allocate sanctioned posts across schools, typically on the basis of an STR of 40:1. This does not always lead to the best allocation of seats as some schools may have an STR of 40:1 but lack subject specialists. Others may have multi-grade teaching or may be one-teacher schools. These concerns are not addressed by ensuring an STR of 40:1. A better way would be to look at a teacher's workload and the number of grades he or she teaches and then decide how many and what types of posts to sanction for that particular school. One way of doing this efficiently would be to have each school's HT identify its needs and propose sanctioned posts for the

school. The DMO and EDO could then jointly verify and approve these proposals and finalise the allotment of posts across schools. This would ensure a more efficient deployment of teaching resources.

Rural areas in particular lose out in terms of the quality of teaching resources as no teacher wants be posted to a remote or disadvantaged area. To counter this, teachers' contract terms should include a compulsory one- to two-year tenure in a remote or disadvantage area, so that every teacher has to spend some part of his or her tenure serving in such areas. If this is not feasible for female teachers – who may have concerns about commuting or accommodation – caveats in the policy could allow them to serve this term at a disadvantaged school near their place of residence. Moreover, while big city allowances are in place, no such benefits are stipulated for teachers serving in remote areas – this makes teaching in big cities even more attractive. Remote-area allowances and benefits, such as transport facilities and accommodation, need to be introduced to counter this and to make teaching in remote areas a more viable option.

Politically motivated transfers that distort teacher deployment can be limited by banning transfers altogether or discouraging them through school-specific appointments as discussed above. Valid transfer requests – such as when a female teacher gets married or when a teacher shifts from one district to another – can be dealt with by allowing exceptions to the rule in such circumstances. However, these exceptions should be clearly delineated so that there is little room for manipulation by teachers or government officials. Further, transfer applications should be made online and their scrutiny automated. This would limit political interference and curb the discretionary power of clerks in transfer matters. Such a policy would reduce the number of transfers as well as the degree of political interference in the transfer process.

5.2 General Recommendations

Apart from the specific concerns related to the recruitment, retention and deployment of teachers, there are a number of general concerns that affect all teacher-related policies. One such overarching concern is the level of political interference and red tape in teaching processes, which starts at the level of the clerk. Clerks tend to stay in a certain post for as many as 20 to 30 years and develop something amounting to a monopoly in their respective areas. Since they are the first point of contact for teachers when submitting any sort of application, they exercise discretionary power over the process and may choose to delay the processing of certain applications and expedite that of others.

The recommendations presented above deal with this issue to a great extent. Particularly, automating the processes of recruitment, transfers and promotions would completely eliminate the role of clerks. Another way to curb their discretionary power would be to transfer them more frequently: the average tenure of a clerk in a certain area should not be more than five years. However, one shortcoming of such a policy is that, as clerks presently serve as the institutional memory of a district, this memory would be lost if they were moved frequently. A way to address this concern would be to make it compulsory for clerks to maintain records (computerised if possible) of their day-to-day activities and document the notifications and memorandums passed during their tenure in a district. These databases would then replace the clerks as the institutional memory of the district-level offices.

Clerks also have a positive role to play as liaisons between teachers and the Education Department. Their knowledge of policy documents and processes and the fact that they are accessible to teachers allows them to play the role of confidante and advisor. They are able to guide teachers in matters of transfers, postings, salaries and so on and help them understand how certain policies work. This is indeed an important role but the problem arises when these clerks misuse their position by favouring certain teachers over others. To avoid this, a separate cadre of clerks should be created whose sole purpose is to provide guidance to teachers and who are not involved in processing applications for transfers, etc. In this way, clerks could continue playing a positive advisory role but without being susceptible to political pressure or inclined to take bribes or give favours.

Another general concern relevant to all facets of teacher management is the transient nature of policies and short-notice changes in rules and regulations. For instance, bans on transfers are often stipulated in an ad hoc manner without prior notice. Such changes often create confusion for the officials implementing the policies and lead to discontent among teachers. To avoid this, frequent and short-notice policy changes should not be allowed; any policy changes or bans should follow a systematic procedure whereby all the stakeholders concerned are consulted before the policy is finalised.

Finally, government officials often lack a proper understanding of the policies in place. This creates room not only for political interference but also for teachers manipulating the system. To avoid this, the officials responsible for implementing policies should be given prior training and briefed on what the policy entails and how exactly it is to be implemented. This will make the implementation process more efficient and reduce its susceptibility to political pressure.

5.3 Avenues for Further Research

This report is a first step towards understanding the dynamics of the teacher labour market in the public sector. It has touched on the main factors affecting teacher effort and motivation and, in turn, student learning outcomes. However, a number of questions remain unanswered and need to be addressed to fully comprehend how effective recruitment, retention and deployment strategies can be formulated. For instance, what exactly is meant by 'good-quality' teachers? If academic and professional qualifications alone do not determine teachers' competence, then what factors do? Moreover, what is the correct measure of teacher performance? Is it the level of teacher absenteeism or students' test results? This report has indicated that PERs do not adequately capture teacher performance and are susceptible to political manipulation. However, the right measure of teacher performance – to which incentives and promotions can be linked – is not clear. These are all first-order questions that need to be explored in greater detail.

The ethnographic study indicates that political interference, nepotism and corruption in the Education Department prevent the proper implementation of policies. Clerks have further been identified as the cornerstone of these corrupt practices. However, a more detailed study is needed to determine exactly how the role of clerks has morphed from that of mere record keepers to important players in the implementation of recruitment and post-recruitment teacher-related policies. In terms of political connections, it is clear that teachers with political backing and affiliations are able to get ahead in the education sector. What is not clear is what level of political connections is needed. Do local politicians play a greater role in teacher-related matters or do MNAs and MPAs have a greater stake in the teaching sector? Where does the most political pressure come from? Mapping the political networks of teachers and government officials could help us gain a better understanding of the political economy surrounding the education sector.

The policy recommendations presented in this section are suggestions that need to be tried and tested. This creates further space for future research. For instance, as highlighted by the ethnographic study, the views of teachers and government officials on optimal policy design are not always aligned. This is because teachers want policies that facilitate their needs and create a desirable working environment from their perspective. On the other hand, although government officials also take this into consideration, their priority is to make schools functional and to manage teaching resources in the best possible manner. This does not always result in the best working environment for teachers, for instance if they are posted to remote areas. How can these conflicting viewpoints be reconciled best? Policies need to be flexible enough that teacher'

incentives are not distorted but not so flexible that they leave room for political manoeuvring and manipulation by teachers. To see whether the policies set out above meet these criteria, they need to be piloted and then rigorously evaluated in terms of their effectiveness, merits and demerits.

This report has identified many of the political and institutional constraints inherent in the Education Department that hamper the effective recruitment, retention and deployment of teachers. However, for a fuller conceptual understanding of these shortcomings and before policy recommendations can be substantiated, a deeper investigation of the policy rules that dictate the workings of the department needs to be conducted. Moreover, past polices need to be evaluated more rigorously. Both data and time constraints prevent such an analysis but future research in this area could provide guidelines as to why teacher-related policies fail to achieve their goals. This, in turn, would help formulate a more efficient and effective teaching force.

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Appendix

Appendix A1: Minimum Qualification Requirements:

Post	Academic Qualification	Professional Qualification	Pay Scale
Elementary School Educator	BA/BSc	B. Ed/M.Ed/MA EDU	Grade 9
Senior Elementary School Educator	BA/BSc	CT/B. Ed/M .Ed	Grade 14
Secondary School Educator	MSc/MA English/TEFL	B.Ed/M.Ed	Grade 16

Appendix A2: Restructured DSD:



Source: ww.dsd.edu.pk

Appendix B: List of Interviewees

Interviewee Name	Designation	Date
Rana Naveed Akhtar	EDO, Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Tahir Kashif	EDO, Gujranwala	24th June
Tahira Shafique	EDO, Lahore	22nd June 2013
Mehmood Hussain	EDO, Attock	12th July 2013
Abida Shaheen	DEO Female Attock	12th July 2013
Muhammad Hanif Khan	Deputy DEO Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Muhammad Sehri Rana	AEO Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Mushtaq Ahmed	Director Admin, DPI Office Lahore	8th July 2013
Mushtaq Siddiqui	DEO Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Nighat Ghazala	DEO Female, Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Allah Dad Malik	Deputy District Education Officer (M.EE)	12th June 2013
Allah Rakha	Secretary, Punjab Teachers'Union (PTU)	4th June 2013
Amjad	DDEO Elementary Attock	12th July 2013
Ashfaque Ahmed	Ex-EDO Lahore	1st July 2013
Asim Bhatti	Secondary Education Service (SES)	14th May 2013
Chaudhry Ghulam	Teacher	27th May 2013
Dilshad Ahmed Din	Head Teacher, Gujranwala	24th June 2013
Ghulam Shakir	Litigation Officer	20th May 2013
Tariq Bajwa	Litigation Officer, Lahore	1st July 2013
Humayun	Deputy Director Colleges, Lahore	22nd June 2013
Imran	Assistant Director Administration, Gujranwala	24th June 2013
Iqbal Kathia	Litigation Officer	16th July 2013
Ishtiaq	PA EDO, Gujranwala	24th June 2013
Ishtiaq	JCO DEO Female Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013
Khalida Naz	Teacher, Member Muslim Teacher Federation	5th May 2013
M Aslam	Superintendant Litigation Branch, Gujranwala	24th June 2013
Malik Muhammad Sajid	Deputy DEO Sadiqabad	4th July 2013
Mohammad Islam Siddiqui	DPI Punjab	22nd June 2013
Muhammad Aslam	Superintendant Litigation, Gujranwala	24th June 2013
Muhammad Fiaz	System Analyst, PMIU	29th April 2013

Qamar Ahsan	Teacher, Member Muslim Teacher Foundation	5th May 2013
Rahila	Teacher, Member Punjab Teacher Union	4th June 2013
Rana Bashir	PA to EDO, Rahim Yar Khan	4th July 2013